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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
As a result of a certain economic and political evolution at both international level 
and on the domestic scene, the European regions have enjoyed in the recent decades an 
increasingly important role in shaping and managing socio-economic development. The 
pressure of globalisation and democratisation stimulated central governments to share or 
fully renounce a series of their competencies; the regional governments have been among 
the beneficiaries of this process. While this movement has taken place for the last decades 
in most West-European, liberal-democratic states, most of the new member states of the 
EU, including Romania, find themselves at the beginning of the regionalisation process.  
 
By the end of the negotiation process which had taken place over 5 years between 
the Romanian government and the European Commission, Romania had established 8 
statistical development regions, a general framework for regional development, i.e. Law on 
Regional Development 315/20041, and a first institutional structure to manage and 
implement Structural Instruments after 2007. Beyond 2005, the preparations for 
implementing the EU Cohesion Policy in Romania continued and intensified, since the 
results of the Chapter 21 negotiations represented only the base for this construction. In 
2007 the Structural Instruments programming was completed; the European Commission 
officially approved the National Strategic Reference Framework and the 7 Operational 
Programmes and these entered the implementation phase. Subsequently, the institutions 
responsible for the management and implementation of the Operational Programmes and 
their detailed competencies were finally decided upon. 
 
The analysis carried out in the framework of this research project is based on a 
methodology derived from the Multi-Level Governance theory, as developed by Gary 
Marks and Lisbeth Hooghe2. The purpose of this research is not to test the MLG theory 
against the policy-making process related to regional development in Romania in order to 
explain it [this process] or to asses to which extent the policy outcomes are different as a 
result of the regional actors involvement; rather, the study aims to analyse  
? the extent to which the Romanian regional development policy-making 
system is organised in and functions at several levels,  
? which are the most significant institutions involved and at which policy-
making stage, i.e. programming, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, 
financial management and control, audit; and, finally,  
? to which extent the regional structures in place in Romania contribute to 
this policy-making process and occupy a strong position in this institutional 
architecture.  
  
The basic concept of multilevel governance consists of a ‘structure of authoritative 
decision-making – that is, the sum of the rules (mainly formal but also informal) 
concerning the locus and practice of authoritative governance in a polity’ (Marks, 1996, 
22). Developed initially for EU regional policy, the MLG concept is currently applied to 
other policy fields, such as environment, youth or even economic policy. The key feature 
 
1 This law is already a second, improved version of the first legislative act no. 251 on regional 
development passed in 1998 (see Chapter II for a detailed comparison between the two legislative 
acts) 
2 In addition to Gary Marks and Liesbeth Hooghe, some other authors dealt with the MLG, from 
different perspectives (see, for a good example, Bache&Flinders, 2004, Multi-level Governance, 
Oxford University Press). Nevertheless, these contributions haven’t managed to change substantially 
the framework established by Marks and Hooghe, and this is the reson for which this research is 
mainly based Marks&Hooghe’s theoretical construction.  
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of this structure is a set of rules organising the functional division of labour among 
various levels of government. The nature of government here is, according to Marks, 
underpinned by three key assumptions: (1) that one has to make the distinction between 
political institutions and political actors; (2) that the state basically consists of a set of 
rules structuring authoritative relations in the polity, but not being itself an actor; and (3) 
that the orientation of political actors towards the rules that constrain them may change 
according to circumstances (Marks, 1996, 22). The state is seen more or less as machinery 
operated by political actors placed behind the steering wheel through, for example, 
elections. These political actors preserve or change their values and interests after they gain 
the leading/managing positions but they will remain factional and try to satisfy their 
interest through the state instruments at their disposal, as long as they maintain their 
legitimacy.     
 
On the basis of the theoretical model for multi-level governance developed by Gary 
Marks and Lisbet Hooghe, the Romanian governance system, as a whole, represents a type 
I of MLG3. A limited number of jurisdictions, nested as “Russian dolls”4, fulfil a series of 
functions, shared and/or divided specifically for each policy, i.e. the national level-central 
government; the regional level-regional development agencies and regional development 
boards5; the county level-county councils, prefects; the municipalities level-city/commune 
council, mayors.  
 
The steering process in Romania has been already integrated into the international 
“trend” of diffusion of central authority towards higher, parallel and lower layers. This 
process is unbalanced and characterised by a stronger diffusion of authority towards 
higher levels (international organisations, i.e. EU,) combined with a still highly 
centralised political system. The lower levels are weak; the formal authority they enjoy 
through legislation is not doubled by a corresponding material one. At the same time, 
economic interest groups or economic actors influence the decision-making process, 
through legal channels, i.e. lobby, but mostly through corruption. 
 
There are five core elements underpinning this main hypothesis:   
 
1. the particular power position the European Union/Commission enjoys in this 
field, position assured by the accession talks and the negotiations on the Chapter 
21 „Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments”, as well as, 
after 1st of January 2007, as initiator and coordination of the EU Cohesion 
Policy implementation (upward diffusion of authority);  
2. the high degree of centralisation of the Romanian management system for pre-
accession aid and structural instruments (path dependency/efficiency 
issue/administrative culture in Romania); 
3. limited role for the RDAs in the policy-making process (downward diffusion of 
authority – regional dimension) 
4. the limits of the decentralisation process and administrative reform in Romania, 
administrative culture and the role local authorities play in the policy making 
 
3 Forms of MLG type II co-exist as well, e.g. the institutional system in place for the implementation 
of cross-border cooperation programmes, but they are rare. 
4 As we will see in the chapter 3, although the Constitution declares the administrative-territorial levels 
of governance as autonomous, acting independently from each other, in practice the lower local level, 
especially the small towns and the communes, still find themselves in a subordination position 
towards central government.   
5 Which have competences regarding regional development policies only. 
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process as regards Cohesion Policy (downward diffusion of authority – local 
dimension); 
5. corruption (one of the manifestations of sideways diffusion of authority),   
 
In order to assess to which extent a system functions “in a multi-level” manner, 
several, if not all, policies elaborated by and implemented within the system should be 
assessed, regardless of its organisation, i.e. centralised unitary, decentralised unitary, 
regionalised unitary, federal6.  
 
As mentioned before, the MLG theory, as developed by Marks and Hooghe, 
provides the methodology for this research. As Hooghe and Marks say, “a first 
approximation to measuring multi-level governance is to say it varies with the number of 
jurisdictions bearing on individuals in a particular territory. But this measure must be 
refined if it is to be meaningful. First, it must take account of the distribution of policy 
competencies across jurisdictions. Second, it must take particular account of fiscal 
power—the power to tax and spend. Third, a weighted measure of multi-level governance 
must take account of formal and informal power relations among jurisdictions” 
(Hooghe&Marks, 2001a, 2).  
 
The analysis confirmed most of the working hypotheses proposed in the 
introductory chapter, with one surprising outcome: entering the EU and becoming 
beneficiaries of the EU Cohesion Policy and its structural instruments meant a reduction of 
the powers of the regional level/institutions.  
 
The governance process in Romania has been already integrated into the 
international “trend” of diffusion of central authority towards higher layers. This transfer 
process has taken place in parallel, and as a consequence, of the efforts Romania has 
undergone, after 1990, to re-integrate in the Euro-Atlantic structures. In this context NATO 
and the European Union have had the strongest influence on the Romanian policy and 
decision-making actions, influence/penetration sealed once Romania became a member of 
these two international organisations. The particular power position the European 
Union/Commission has enjoyed in regional development has been assured by the accession 
talks and the negotiations on the Chapter 21 „Regional policy and the coordination of 
structural instruments”, as well as, after 1st of January 2007, as initiator and coordination of 
EU Cohesion Policy implementation.  
 
In the framework of the Phare ESC Component, the RDAs fulfil the 
Implementation Authority role for a part of the Phare ESC priorities. The competencies of 
the RDAs are mainly limited to project implementation (appraisal and selection, 
monitoring, control). They do contribute to the programming phase, but indirectly; the 
Regional Development Plans elaborated by the RDAs served as a source for the National 
Development Plans, and the Phare ESC priorities were decided by the MEI/MDPWH with 
the European Commission taking into account the RDPs priorities, but not reflecting them 
completely. The Regional Development Boards do enjoy decision-making rights both in 
programming and implementation of the Phare ESC, as they approve the RDPs and the 
lists of projects appraised and selected by the RDAs. As their representatives are members 
in the NBRD, they also approved the National Development Plans. Nevertheless, we 
should underline the fact that these boards are composed of representatives of the local 
authorities, mostly promoting their local interest. As repeatedly mentioned, the National 
Board for Regional Development hasn’t been very successful in carrying out its strategic 
 
6 See Loughlin 2000, 26-7 
 12
tasks related to the promotion of regional development. Its role was limited to the approval 
of the National Development Plan, of the appraisal and selection criteria for the Phare ESC 
and of the large infrastructure and HRD projects; as a consequence, it was convened rarely, 
generally when it needed to exercise these formal competencies.    
 
As concluded in the fourth chapter, if we compare the pre-accession period with the 
2007-2013 programming period, the Phare ESC represents a predecessor of the NSRF 
rather than of the Regional Operational Programme. Despite the fact that the sums the  
MDPWH/RDAs/RDBs implement between 2007-2013 are considerably higher than the 
budget of the Phare ESC, the role of the institutions responsible for regional development 
in Romania, at both regional and national level, decreased as regards the management and 
implementation of the NSRF/Structural Instruments, in terms of weight in policy 
elaboration and implementation. Their responsibilities are limited to the Regional 
Operational Programme, which deploys 20% of the total allocated funds. Within the ROP 
delivery system, the role of the RDAs remains, more or less, the same, but some of the 
competencies of the RDBs are taken over by the Ministry, as Managing Authority.                  
  
 The Regional Development Agencies remain an institutional tool for the 
implementation of the ROP, under the management of the MDPWH. They carry out 
specific tasks as prescribed by the Managing Authority, i.e. programming, evaluation, 
audit, expenditure certification, but they do not enjoy decision-making power in any of 
these policy areas. Project appraisal and selection, the bulk of the implementation work, is 
outsourced, and the RDAs do not have voting rights in the Monitoring Committee. The 
Agencies do represent significant centres of technical expertise as regards implementation 
of a series of regional development measures, but in terms of regional development as 
such, further than being able to carry out the analysis of the socio-economic situation in the 
region, the SWOT analysis, and to set up a list of development priorities based on these 
analyses, they make little difference. As underlined in the fourth and fifth chapters, the 
Regional Development Plans, including the ones drafted for the 2007-2013 programming 
period, stop at setting up the strategy, and do not contain detailed information on the RDPs 
financing sources, on the implementation, monitoring and delivery system of the plan. the 
other institutions set up for regional development in Romania, the National Board for 
Regional Development and the Regional Development Boards make even less difference. 
The former was only consulted during the ROP elaboration and it did not approve the 
National Development Plan 2007-2013; the National Coordination Committee enjoyed this 
competence. 
 
 The position of the RDBs as members of the Monitoring Committee became less  
significant. Even if they have voting rights as members of this committee, given its limited 
role, and especially the fact that it does not approve the selected projects anymore, the 
competencies of the RDB are significantly reduced. Further than approving the Regional 
Development Plans, they do not seem to carry out any of their tasks as regulated by the 
Law on Regional Development no. 315/2004.   
 
As Hooge&Marks state, “a weighted measure of multi-level governance must take 
account of formal and informal power relations among jurisdictions” (Hooghe&Marks, 
2001a:2). The analysis of the formal relationship between jurisdictional levels proved the 
centrality of the institutional system in place for the implementation of regional 
development policy. The elaboration on public administration history, culture, and “modus 
operandi”, without bringing hard evidence of systemic malfunctioning, supports and even 
strengthens the conclusion of the formal analysis. The central authorities exercise, through 
political and administrative channels, a strong influence on local authorities, which are 
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paternalistic and display a rent-seeking behaviour. The principles of “local autonomy” and 
“decentralisation” still need some time to become the real basis for the organisation of 
public administration in Romania and for the relationship between its layers.        
 
Regional development in Romania     
 
More than ten years ago, the “Green Book on Regionalisation” and the subsequent 
legislation created the first framework for regional development in Romania. The 
development regions were defined and the institutions in charge of this policy at both 
national and regional level were set up. Since then, these institutions have exercised their 
competencies on this legal basis, in the framework of regional development policies which 
subscribed to other set of rules, as well, i.e. Phare programmes and Cohesion Policy 
programmes; becoming a member of the European Union is indisputably the most 
important factor which determined the creation of regional structures in Romania. 
 
These ten years haven’t witnessed significant changes as regards regional 
development in Romania. A second law on regional development refined and updated the 
existing arrangements in order for these to correspond to EU requirements, i.e. especially 
as regards the NUTS II regions. The January 2007 moment clarified the structure of the 
system that the implementation of the EU Cohesion Policy required: as the EU structural 
funds are invested in a large series of national priorities, they are managed by different 
ministries through national-wide programmes; the Ministry of Development and the 
RDAs, RDBs and the NBRD remained responsible for one of the 7 Operational 
Programmes, which currently embodies the Romanian regional development policy.  
 
From the point of view of administrative-territorial organisation, the 8 development 
regions are not administrative-territorial units and they do not have juridical personality; 
they represent agreements between counties, created for the elaboration, implementation 
and evaluation (sic!) of the regional development policies, and for data collection at NUTS 
II level. At the same time, at this level, there is no regional government, legitimated 
politically by elections at a regional level, with the power to collect taxes and to spend 
them in the regions, through socio-economic development programmes. Regional 
development plans are drafted, but they have a limited impact, as the RDAs are in charge 
only of the implementation of those RDPs priorities financed through ROP, and no 
mechanism exists for monitoring and evaluating the results and impact of the each OP 
interventions at a regional level. The socio-economic evolution of the regions will be 
analysed again for the future programming period, 2008-2020, but it will be difficult 1. to 
accurately asses which interventions had a certain impact, positive, or negative on the 
development of the regions, and 2. to adopt, until that period, eventual adjustment 
measures, to counteract the negative effects of certain interventions in terms of regional 
disparities. For example, more than half of the SOP Transport 2007-20013 budget will be 
directed at the motorways, the related national road infrastructure and railways in the 
north-western part of Romania. This investment will have a clear positive impact on the 
development of Transylvania, which already registers a competitive edge in comparison 
with Moldova, and the Regional Operational Programme won’t be able to counteract this 
development, although it takes into account the existing regional disparities in allocating 
funds to regions.              
 
Despite the choices made as regards the particular characteristics of the regions, 
regional institutions and regional development policy, the current arrangements represent a 
starting point, a good base on which the decision-makers could genuinely rethink and 
implement socio-economic development at the territorial level where investments can 
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bring the best returns. Nevertheless, the setting up of a new, regional, governmental tier in 
Romania needs to overcome considerable obstacles, and the very first of them is the 
political will to induce such a change. The next programming period, 2014-2020, might 
constitute an impetus for more regionalisation. It will be, firstly, up to the Romanian 
government to “regionalise” some of the future Operational Programmes7, starting with the 
two OPs which are already implemented partially at regional level, i.e. SOP Human 
Resources Development and SOP Environment, or even to prepare 8 integrated regional 
development programmes. Provided that the European Commission is convinced of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of this approach, and of the capacity of the institutions 
responsible for the programmes implementation, it will most probably not have anything 
against approving more regionalised national OPs or 8 regional development plans. But, as 
Romania is a full member of the EU, it will be up to her to decide on the future of regional 
development within its boundaries.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 This is not possible in the case of the SOP Transport, for example, which, it is already known, will 
continue to focus on major, nation-wide infrastructure projects. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Als Ergebnis einer besonderen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklung 
sowohl auf internationaler als auch auf nationaler Ebene ergibt sich für Europa in jüngster 
Zeit eine immer wichtigere Rolle im Gestalten sozioökonomischer Entwicklungen.  
Globalisierungsdruck und Demokratisierung ermuntern zentrale Regierungen zum 
Kompetenztransfer. Hiervon profitieren unter anderem regionale Regierungen und 
Verwaltungsebenen.  Während diese Bewegung im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte die 
Mehrzahl der eher liberal-demokratisch ausgerichteten Westeuropäischen Staaten erfaßt 
hat, stehen die neuen EU Länder einschließlich Rumänien erst am Beginn dieses Prozesses. 
Im Jahr 2005 und gegen Ende des fünfjährigen Verhandlungsprozesses zwischen der 
rumänischen Regierung und der Europäischen Kommission besaß Rumänien nicht nur acht 
statistisch entwickelte Regionen und einen allgemeinen Rahmen für regionale 
Entwicklungen wie zum Beispiel eine regionale Gesetzgebung, sondern auch eine 
vorläufige institutionelle Struktur, die das Schaffen und Aufrechterhalten struktureller 
Instrumente nach 2007 ermöglichte.  Auf der Basis der Ergebnisse der Kapitel 21 “ 
Regionalpolik und Koordinierung der strukturpolitischen Instrumente” Verhandlungen 
konnten die Vorbereitungen zur Schaffung einer EU-Kohäsionspolitik nach 2005 weiter 
vorangetrieben werden.  Im Jahr 2007 war dieser Prozeß abgeschlossen, nachdem die 
Europäische Kommission den nationalen Strategie-Referenz-Rahmen und auch die sieben 
operativen Programme offiziell genehmigt hatte.  Letztere wurden dabei aus der Taufe 
gehoben.  Hieran schloß sich die Gründung der mit  dem Management der operativen 
Geschäfte beauftragten Institutionen an. 
 
Die im Rahmen dieses Forschungsprojektes entstandene Analyse basiert auf einer 
von einer Multi-Level Governance (MLG) Methode extrahierten und von Gary Marks und 
Lisbeth Hooge entwickelten Methode.  Sinn der Studie ist es nicht, die MLG Theorie 
gegen den Politik-gestaltenden Prozess auszuspielen, der für die örtliche Entwicklung in 
Rumänien verantwortlich ist, oder zu erfassen, in welchem Ausmaß sich die politischen 
Ergebnisse durch die Einwirkung regionaler Entscheidungsträger unterscheiden, sondern 
vielmehr zu versuchen, herauszufinden, (i) in welchem Ausmaß das rumänische System 
organisiert ist und wie es auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen der regionalen Entwicklungspolitik 
funktioniert, (ii) welche die wichtigsten involvierten Institutionen sind, (iii) auf welcher 
politischen Ebene all dies stattfindet (Planung, Gründung, Erfassung, Buerteilung, 
finanzielle Kontrolle, Überprüfung), und schließlich (iv) in welchem Ausmaß die in 
Rumänien vorhandenen regionalen Strukturen den Politik-gestaltenden Prozeß 
beeinflussen. 
 
Das grundlegende Prinzip der Multi-level Governance besteht aus einer „Struktur 
autoritativer Entscheidungsfindung“ oder mit anderen Worten, einer Summe von sowohl 
auf Ort als auch auf die Durchführung bezogener Regierungsgewalt.  Ursprünglich für die 
Regionalpolitik der EU entwickelt, wird das MLG Konzept momentan auch auf andere 
Politikfelder wie beispielsweise Umwelt, Jugend oder Wirtschaft angewandt.  Den Kern 
dieses Konzepts bilden einige Regeln hinsichtlich der Arbeitsaufteilung zwischen 
unterschiedlichen Regierungsebenen. Marks zufolge beruht die Regierungsarbeit auf 
nachfolgenden Grundsätzen: (1) Politische Institutionen sind von den Politikern getrennt, 
(2) der Staat selbst verhält sich passiv und gibt Hierarchien vor, (3) die Einstellung der 
Politiker den Regeln gegenüber kann sich je nach Situation ändern. Der Staat wird als ein 
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von Politikern gesteuertes Gefährt betrachtet, das durch Wahlen gesteuert wird. Während 
die Politiker ihre Wertvorstellungen oder Interessen nach Erhalt einer leitenden Position 
behalten oder ändern, versuchen sie gleichzeitig, ihre Interessen mit Hilfe staatlicher 
Instrumente durchzusetzen, solange sie ihre Legitimität erhalten. 
 
Auf der Grundlage des von Gary Marks und Lisbeth Hooge entwickelten multi-
level theoretischen Modells repräsentiert das rumänische Regierungssystem den Typen 1 
einer MLG. Eine begrenzte Zahl an Jurisdiktionen erfüllen eine Vielzahl an Funktionen 
wie zum Beispiel Zentralregierungen auf nationaler Ebene, Entwicklungsbüros auf 
regionaler Ebene, Bezirksregierungen, Präfekten, Stadtbezirksregierungen, und 
Gemeinden. 
 
Der Steuerungsprozess hat sich in Rumänien in der Zwischenzeit dem 
internationalen Trend angepasst, eine Zentralautorität in höhere, gleichgestellte und 
tieferstehende Hierarchien einzugliedern. Dieser Prozess ist unausgeglichen und 
darüberhinaus durch eine Autoritätsangleichung an internationale Ebenen wie zum 
Beispiel die EU charakterisiert. Weiterhin ist das politische System nach wie vor überaus 
zentralisiert. Die unteren Ebenen sind schwach, ihre Gesetzgebende Autorität ist nicht 
durch eine korrespondierende materielle Ebene vergrößert. Gleichzeitig beeinflussen 
wirtschaftliche Interessensgemeinschaften die Entscheidungsprozesse, in erster Linie 
durch Korruption, aber auch durch Lobbyarbeit. 
 
Fünf Schwerpunkte untermauern diese Hypothese: 
 
1. Die besondere Machtposition der Europäischen Gemeinschaft wird nicht nur durch 
Beitrittsgespräche und Verhandlungen im Rahmen des Chapter 21 „Regionalpolik 
und Koordinierung der strukturpolitischen Instrumente“ untermauert, sondern auch 
durch die Schaffung einer EU Kohäsionspolitik (nach oben ausgerichtete 
Autoritätsangleichung),  
2.  Die ausgeprägte Zentralisierung des rumänischen Systems und seine Tendenz nach 
Vorabhilfe (Effizienzdefizite),  
3. Eine eingeschränkte Rolle für die Regionalentwicklung Agenturen (RDAs) im 
politischen Prozess (nach unten ausgerichtete Autoritätsangleichung auf 
regionaler Ebene), 
4. Die Limitierungen des Dezentralisierungsprozesses und der administrativen 
Reform in Rumänien, die administrative Kultur und die Rolle lokaler Autoritäten, 
(nach unten ausgerichtete Autoritätsangleichung auf lokaler Ebene), sowie 
5. Korruption 
Zur Beurteilung des Ausmaßes, in dem ein System auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen 
funktioniert, sollten viele, wenn nicht sogar sämtliche Grundsätze innerhalb des Systems 
erfasst werden, unabhängig von seiner Organisation wie z.B. Zentralisierung, 
Dezentralisierung, oder föderativ. Das System als Ganzes könnte als multi-level 
governance eingestuft werden, sobald die Mehrheit der Grundsätze im Einklang mit den 
Prinzipien der MLG Theorie steht. 
 
Wie bereits erwähnt bildet die von Marks und Hooghe entwickelte MLG die 
Grundlage für die vorliegende Forschung: „Eine vorläufige Festlegung der multi-level 
governance ist ihre Veränderung mit der Anzahl von Jurisdiktionen in einer festgelegten 
Region. Diese Vorgabe muss allerdings überarbeitet werden, um Bedeutung zu erlangen. 
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Zunächst muss die Verteilung der politischen Grundsätze innerhalb der Jurisdiktionen 
beachtet werden. Als zweites muss der wirtschaftliche Einfluss festgelegt werden, also die 
Besteuerung und die Ausgabegewalt. Als drittes muss eine ausgewogene Festlegung von 
multi-level governance die Machtverhältnisse zwischen den Jurisdiktionen 
berücksichtigen. 
 
Die Analyse hat die Mehrzahl der im Einführungskapitel vorgestellten 
Arbeitshypothesen bestätigt. Das Ergebnis ist überraschend: EU Beitritt und Profit von der 
EU Kohäsionspolitik und ihrer strukturellen Instrumente geht mit einer 
Machteinschränkung auf regionaler und institutioneller Ebene einher. 
Der Steuerungsprozess in Rumänien ist bereits in den internationalen Trend der 
Angleichung zentraler Autorität an höhere Ebenen integriert. Er fand zeitgleich mit der 
Wiedereingliederung Rumäniens in Euro-Atlantische Strukturen statt. In diesem 
Zusammenhang haben NATO und Europäische Union den stärksten Einfluss auf die 
rumänische Politik ausgeübt. Dies wurde durch den Beitritt Rumäniens in beide 
Organisationen verstärkt. 
 
Die besondere Macht der Europäischen Union bzw. Kommission in der regionalen 
Entwicklung wurde gesichert sowohl durch die Beitrittsverhandlungen im Rahmen des 
Kapitels 21 „Regionale Politik und die Koordination struktureller Elemente“ als auch 
durch den Beginn der EU Angleichungspolitik ab dem 1. Januar 2007. 
Im Rahmen der Phare ESC Komponente garantieren die RDAs die Umsetzung einiger 
Phare ESC Prioritäten. Die Kompetenzen der RDAs werden in erster Linie durch die neuen 
Projekte selbst eingeschränkt. Sie tragen indirekt zur Programmierphase bei. Die 
regionalen Entwicklungspläne bilden eine Quelle für die nationalen Entwicklungspläne. 
Die Phare ESC Prioritäten wurden vom MEI / MDPWH festgelegt.  Hierbei hat die 
Europäische Kommission die RDP Prioritäten teilweise berücksichtigt. 
 
Die regionalen Entwicklungs-Vorstände haben Entscheidungsrechte in Bezug auf 
Phare ESC, da sie die RDPs und auch die Projektliste bestätigen. Ihre Repräsentanten sind 
auch NBRD (National Rat für Regionalentwicklung) Mitglieder und segnen als solche die 
nationalen Entwicklungspläne ab. Wie bereits häufig erwähnt, war das National Board for 
Regional Development nicht allzu erfolgreich bei der Förderung der regionalen 
Entwicklung. Seine Bedeutung wurde eingeschränkt auf die Genehmigung des nationalen 
Entwicklungsplanes, auf die Auswahlkriterien für die Phare ESC sowie auf die Infrastuktur 
und auf HRD Projekte. Deshalb trat das Board selten zusammen. 
 
Wie im vierten Kapitel zusammengefasst, ist das Phare ESC in erster Linie ein 
Vorläufer des NSRF und nicht so sehr örtlichen Operations-Programms. Dies ergibt sich 
aus einem Vergleich der Anfangsphase mit der Periode von 2007 – 2013. Obwohl die von 
MDPWH / RDAs / RDBs zwischen 2007 und 2013 ausgegebene Gesamtsumme das Phare 
ESC Budget deutlich übertrifft, hat der Einfluß der mit regionaler Entwicklung 
beauftragten Institutionen sowohl auf regionaler als auch auf nationaler Ebene 
abgenommen. Ihre Verantwortung beschränkte sich auf das regionale Operations-
Programm, welches 20% der verfügbaren Gesamtsumme ausgibt. Innerhalb des ROP 
Systems bleibt die Rolle der RDAs unverändert. Allerdings werden einige Kompetenzen 
der RDBs vom Ministerium übernommen. 
 
Die örtlichen Entwicklungsagenturen bleiben ein institutionelles Werkzeug zur 
Ausführung der ROP und unter der Leitung des MDPWH. Während sie vom Management 
formulierte Aufgaben wie beispielsweise Programmierung, Evaluierung, Buchprüfung, und 
Ausgaben-Überwachung erledigen, besitzen sie keine Entscheidungsgewalt. 
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Projektauswahl und –ausführung werden ausgelagert. Weiterhin haben die RDAs kein 
Stimmrecht. Während die Agenturen technische Expertise hinsichtlich der Einführung 
regionaler Entwicklungsmaßnahmen besitzen, machen allerdings kaum einen Unterschied 
hinsichtlich der regionalen Entwicklung. Wie im vierten und fünften  Kapitel ausgeführt, 
besitzen die regionalen Entwicklungspläne keine detailierten Informationen hinsichtlich 
der RDP Finanzquellen, oder der Ausführung beziehungsweise Überwachung des Plans. 
 
Die für die regionale Entwicklung in Rumänien zuständigen Institute wie der 
Nationale Ausschuß für örtliche Entwicklung oder der Örtliche Entwicklungsausschuß 
verursachen einen noch geringeren Unterschied. Ersterer wurde lediglich während der 
ROP Ausarbeitung konsultiert und genehmigte nicht den nationalen Entwicklungsplan 
2007 – 2013, im Gegensatz zum nationalen Koordinatsausschuß. 
 
Hooge & Marks zufolge sollte eine ausgewogene multi-level governance formelle 
und informelle Machtverhältnisse berücksichtigen. Eine Untersuchung der 
unterschiedlichen Rechtsprechungsebenen ergab eine zentrale Ausrichtung des 
institutionellen Systems. Aufarbeitung von Geschichte, Kultur und „modus operandi“ 
unterstützt die Ergebnisse der formalen Analyse. Die zentralen Autoritäten beeinflussen 
lokale Autoritäten über politische und administrative Kanäle. Die lokalen Autoritäten 
erscheinen dabei patriarchalisch. Die Ideen von lokaler Autonomie und Dezentralisierung 
werden noch einige Zeit benötigen, bevor sie in die öffentliche Verwaltung in Rumänien 
Eingang finden werden. 
 
Regionale Entwicklung in Rumänien 
 
Es ist mehr als 10 Jahre her seit das „Grüne Buch über Regionalisierung“ und die 
sich anschließende Gesetzgebung einen vorläufigen Rahmen für die regionale Entwicklung 
in Rumänien gebildet haben. Die Entwicklungsregionen wurden definiert und die 
entsprechenden Institutionen sowohl auf nationaler wie auch auf regionaler Ebene 
gegründet. Seitdem haben diese Institutionen ihre Macht innerhalb des Rahmens der RD 
Gesetze ausgeübt. Anschluß an die Europäische Union ist zweifellos der wichtigste Faktor 
für die Entwicklung regionaler Strukturen. 
 
Die vergangenen 10 Jahre haben keine signifikanten Veränderungen der regionalen 
Entwicklungen in Rumänien gebracht. Ein zweites RD Gesetz verbesserte die 
existierenden Anordnungen und glich sie an EU Bedingungen an. Insbesondere die NUTS 
II Regionen und ein Moment im Januar 2007 definierten die Grundlagen zur Einführung 
der notwendigen EU Anpassungspolitik. Weil die EU Strukturfonds für vielfältige 
nationale Prioritäten ausgegeben werden, werden sie von verschiedenen Ministerien und 
durch landesweite Programme verwaltet. Das Entwicklungsministerium, RDAs, RDBs und 
auch der NBRD blieben verantwortlich für jeweils eines von 7 Programmen, die 
gleichermaßen die rumänische regionale Entwicklungspolitik verkörpern. 
 
Vom Standpunkt administrativ-territorialer Organisation aus betrachtet bilden die 8 
Entwicklungsregionen keine administrativ-territorialen Einheiten. Vielmehr repräsentieren 
sie Vereinbarungen zwischen Bezirken und wurden nicht nur für die Datenerfassung auf 
NUTS II Ebene, sondern auch für die Ausarbeitung und Überwachung regionaler 
Entwicklungspolitik geschaffen. Gleichzeitig existiert auf derselben Ebene keine durch 
Wahlen legitimierte regionale Regierung mit der Befugnis, Steuern zu erheben und für 
sozio-ökonomische Entwicklungsprogramme Geld auszugeben. Regionale 
Entwicklungspläne werden zwar erstellt, haben jedoch nur einen begrenzten Einfluß, da 
RDAs nur mit der Ausführung solcher RDP Prioritäten beauftragt wurden, die durch ROP 
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finanziert wurden. Es existiert kein Mechanismus für die Überprüfung der Ergebnisse und 
des Einflußes jeder OP Intervention auf regionaler Ebene. Diese sozio-ökonomische 
Entwicklung der Regionen wird erneut für die zukünftige Periode von 2008 – 2020 
analysiert werden. Dabei wird es Schwierigkeiten bereiten, den Einfluß bestimmter 
Interventionen zu erfassen und auch unumgängliche Anpassungsmaßnahmen einzubauen, 
um negativen Effekten bestimmter Interventionen vorzubeugen. Beispielsweise wird mehr 
als die Hälfte des SOP Transport-Budgets für den Zeitraum von 2007 – 2013 für 
Autobahnen, Straßen und Eisenbahnschienen im Nordwesten von Rumänien. Diese 
Investition wird in jedem Fall einen positiven Einfluß auf die Entwicklung Siebenbürgens 
haben. Schon heute hat Siebenbürgen einen erkennbaren Entwicklungsvorsprung vor der 
Moldau. Diese Entwicklung wird durch regionale Programme nicht aufgehalten werden 
können, obwohl der Verteilungsschlüssel der Gelder regionale Unterschiede 
berücksichtigt. 
 
Trotz der existierenden Unterschiede stellen die gegenwärtigen Bedingungen einen 
vielversprechenden Ansatz dar, der es Entscheidungsträgern erlauben wird, sozio-
ökonomische Entwicklungen auf staatlicher Ebene voranzutreiben, die vielversprechende 
Gewinne erlauben werden. Nichtsdestotrotz werden der Schaffung neuer Strukturen 
bedeutsame Hindernisse im Weg stehen und hier insbesondere die Politische Bereitschaft 
nach Veränderung. Der Zeitraum von 2014 – 2020 wird vielleicht mehr Regionalisierung 
erlauben. Der Hauptverantwortliche wird dabei die rumänische Regierung sein, beginnend 
mit zwei OPs, die teilweise bereits auf regionaler Ebene existieren. Sollte die Europäische 
Kommission sowohl von der Effektivität dieses Vorhabens als auch von den Fähigkeiten 
der beteiligten Institutionen überzeugt sein, wird sie wahrscheinlich keine Vorbehalte 
gegen die Genehmigung weiterer OPs auf nationaler Ebene haben. Dabei wird Rumänien 
als Vollmitglied der EU die Hauptverantwortung tragen.         
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACIS Authority for the Coordination of Structural Instruments 
CBC  Cross-Border Cooperation 
CEE Central and Eastern European Countries 
CF Cohesion Fund 
CSG Community Strategic Guidelines 
DIS Decentralised Implementation System 
EAFRD European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EC European Commission 
EDIS  Extended Decentralised Implementation System 
EFF European Fishery Fund 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EO Emergency Government Ordinance 
ERDF  European Regional Development Fund 
ESC Economic and Social Cohesion 
ESF European Social Fund 
EU European Union  
EUR Euro 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
G.D. Government Decision 
GD General Directorate 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HRD Human Resources Development 
IB Intermediate Body 
IFI International Financial Institutions 
ISPA Pre-Accession Structural Instrument 
JASPERS Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in European Regions 
JIM Joint Inclusion Memorandum 
MA Managing Authority  
MAI Ministry of Administration and Interior 
MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
MDP Ministry of Development and Prognosis 
MDPWH Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing 
MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance 
MEI Ministry of European Integration 
MER Ministry of Education and Research 
MESD Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development 
MIAR Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform 
MoC Ministry of Culture 
MoLFSS Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Security 
MPF Ministry of Public Finance 
MPH Ministry of Public Health 
MTCT Ministry of Transport, Construction and Tourism 
NAE National Agency for Employment 
NARMPP National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring of Public 
Procurement  
NASMEC  National Agency for Small and Medium Enterprises and Co-
operatives 
NBRD National Board for Regional Development 
NDP National Development Plan 
NEPA National Environmental Protection Agency 
NGO Non-governmental Organization  
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NIS National Institute for Statistics 
NPAA National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 
NRDP National Rural Development Programme 
NSRF National Strategic Reference Framework 
NUTS Official Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics  
OP Operational Programme 
PCU Project Coordination Unit 
PIU Project Implementation Unit 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PU Paying Unit 
R&D Research and Development  
RDA Regional Development Agency 
RDB Regional Development Boards  
RDP Regional Development Plan 
REPA Regional Environmental Protection Agency 
ROP Regional Operational Programme 
SAMTID Small and Medium Towns Infrastructure Development  
SAPARD Special Programme for Pre-Accession Aid for Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment 
SF Structural Funds 
SIs Structural Instruments 
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
SMIS Monitoring Information System 
SOP Sectoral Operational Programme 
SOP ENV Sectoral Operational Programme Environment 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
TA Technical Assistance 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
USAID US Agency for International Development 
WB World Bank 
WG Working Group 
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Regions, Regionalisation, Regional Development Policy and 
Management of EU funds in Romania. Institutions and central 
problems.   
 
As a result of the particular economic and political evolution at both international 
level and on the domestic scene, in the recent decades the European regions have enjoyed 
an increasingly important role in shaping and managing socio-economic development. The 
pressure of globalisation and democratisation stimulated central governments to share or 
let go of a series of competencies, and regional governments have been among the 
beneficiaries of this process. While this movement has taken place over recent decades in 
most West-European, liberal-democratic states, most of the new member states of the EU, 
including Romania, find themselves at the beginning of the regionalisation process.  
The evolution of the Romanian nation(al)-state has its similarities and its 
peculiarities in comparison with other Balkan or Central-East European countries. This 
historical evolution determines the slow pace and the particular shape regionalisation has 
taken in this country: 
 
“Political-administrative adjustments at sub-national level will be the result of 
specific initiatives based on their own history, identity and dynamics….this means 
that large-scale reorganisation of the basic structure of the State is an illusion and 
would not be in tune with prevailing political-administrative relationships.” 
(Hendriks, Raadschelders, Toonen 1995, 224) 
 
At the same time, the strongest determinant for the initiation and continuation of the 
regionalisation process in Romania is its choice to move closer to the European Union; this 
process is shaped (also) by the conditions Romania needed to fulfil in order to become an 
EU member. Due to this intrinsic relationship, the changes regional development policy 
have undergone at the European level during these last 10 years, i.e. from the 1994-1999 
programming perspective, to 2007-2013, have had an impact on the evolution of regional 
development policy in Romania.  
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1.1 The EU Cohesion Policy and the evolution of its “regional 
component” in the last 10 years 
The idea of “region” and “regionalisation” was introduced in Romania in the mid 90’s, 
before the negotiations with the European Commission for the EU membership officially 
started but having this perspective in the background; at that time the 1994-1999 
programming period of the EU regional policy was unfolding, shaped by intense 
negotiations and resulting in the so-called “Delors II” package. The 1994-1999 
programming period witnessed a decrease in the Commission role and a strengthening of 
the Member State position as regards funds allocation and implementation of Regional 
Policy, a tendency which has continued until nowadays. In the spirit of the subsidiarity 
principle, the regions’ influence and participation in the making of EU Regional Policy 
increased; nevertheless, this happened within the limits of the constitutional organisation of 
the national state as such, e.g. regions in federal or regionalised states enjoyed a heavier 
weight in the decision-making process; at the same time, this power shift was in practice 
not significantly detrimental to the central government position.  
As a result of the latest enlargement round Regional Policy needed a series of 
adjustments in order to respond adequately to two of the major challenges the Financial 
Framework 2007-2013 raises: to meet the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy, i.e. “growth 
and jobs”, a process already endangered by the global economic recession and the hesitant 
reforms advanced by Member States. Secondly, these objectives are to be met not by a 15-, 
prosperous, European Union, but by an EU with 12 new members, countries engaged in a 
complex process of closing a significant economic and social development gap.  In this 
context, the Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 concentrates on achieving “growth and jobs” and 
lays emphasises on the funds’ effectiveness8, and less on the particular 
governance/administrative-political level, i.e. wheter the funds management should be 
carried out at a regional or national level and where these results need to be achieved. 
 The three new proposed priorities of the Cohesion Policies, i.e. “Convergence”, 
“Competitiveness”, “European Territorial Cooperation”, and the new, reassessed, strategic 
and operational systems in place for the Structural Funds management between 2007 and 
2013 aim to simplify the implementation work they promote and to ensure its 
effectiveness. The trend of “re-nationalisation” of some competencies towards the 
Members States continues in this programming period, an aspect which adds further 
 
8 “The fact that expected results or effects have been obtained and that objectives have been achieved” 
(EVALSED Glossary) 
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pressures on the administrative capacity of the institutions responsible for the policy 
management and implementation, especially in the new member states.      
1.2 European integration and regional development in Romania 
Upon completion of the negotiation process, on 1st of January 2007 Romania became a 
member of the European Union. One of the chapters discussed in the framework of the 
negotiation process was Chapter 21, „Regional policy and the coordination of structural 
instruments”, based on the previous Framework regulation laying down general provisions 
on the Structural Funds (Council Regulation (EC) 1260/1999) and on the related 
implementing regulations and decisions. The accession negotiation in the framework of 
this chapter focused on9:  
• Legislative framework 
• Territorial organization 
• Programming capacity 
• Institutional framework - administrative capacity 
• Financial and budgetary management  
 
The legislation on regional policy in place beginning with 1998 was considered 
initially satisfactory by the European Commission. Nevertheless, several legislative 
changes still needed to be brought in especially regarding territorial reorganisation, i.e. the 
NUTS II regions, integrated planning and programming, institution strengthening and 
better defining competencies, and the application of the partnership principle. Systems for 
monitoring and evaluating the implementation of regional policy and for gathering regional 
statistics were still to be set up (European Commission, 2000 Regular Report, 70).  
At the end of the negotiation process, in 2005, when this chapter was permanently 
closed, Romania had established 8 statistical development regions, a general framework 
for regional development, i.e. Law on Regional Development 315/200410, and a first 
institutional structure to manage and implement Structural Instruments after 2007. Beyond 
2005, the preparations for implementing EU cohesion policy in Romania continued and 
intensified, as the results of Chapter 21 negotiations represented only the base for this 
construction. In 2007 the Structural Instruments programming was completed; the 
European Commission officially approved the National Strategic Reference Framework 
and the 7 Operational Programmes and these entered the implementation phase. 
 
9 Detailed information on the negotiation process and the 21st Chapter are available on the webpage of the 
European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulgaria_r
omania/chapters/chap_21_en.htm  
10 This law is already a second, improved version of the first legislative act no. 251 on regional development 
passed in 1998 (see Chapter II for a detailed comparison between the two legislative acts) 
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Subsequently, the institutions responsible for the management and implementation of the 
Operational Programmes and their detailed competencies were finally decided upon, (see 
Table 1, page 63).  
This structure was set up on the basis of institutions implementing pre-accession 
funds,  i.e. Phare, ISPA and SAPARD11. For regional development policy in Romania, 
currently embodied by the Regional Operational Programme 2007-2013, and for the entire 
structure meant to implement SIs beyond 2007, the Economic and Social Cohesion 
Component of the Phare National Programme is of maximum relevance, as in its 
framework Cohesion Policy-like programming and ERDF- and ESF-like projects were 
carried out. The institutions involved in the management and implementation of the Phare 
ESC Component became, after 2007, Management Authorities, e.g. Ministry of 
Development, Public Works and Housing (previously the Ministry of European 
Integration), Ministry of Labour, Family and Equal Opportunities, Ministry of 
Environment, Ministry of Transport, or Intermediate Bodies, e.g. Regional Development 
Agencies, Ministry of SMSEs, Regional Environment Protection Agencies. 
 
The main macro contextual aspects of regional development in Romania need to be 
highlighted. On one side the legislation in force regulating regional development policy 
and setting up the institutional structure for its implementation has a wider scope than the 
shape regional policy takes currently in Romania, i.e. the Phare Economic and Social 
Cohesion Component and the Regional Operational Programme. The Law on Regional 
Development no. 315/2004 provides for regional development institutions, strategies and 
competencies which are not active, elaborated or carried out in practice, e.g. the National 
Board of Regional Development and the National Strategy for Regional Development ( as 
we will see in the chapters III and IV).  
On the other side, socio-economic regional development is pursued through the 
Economic and Social Cohesion Component of the Phare National Programme (1998-
2006)12, and, upon accession, by the Regional Operational Programme (ROP) 2007-2013, 
programmes with specific management and implementation rules and institutional delivery 
systems. Further on, regional development plans (RDPs) were drafted under the guidance 
of the Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and 
 
11 As for the programming period 2007-2013 Cohesion Policy was clearly delimitated from the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy, the European funding for agriculture, i.e. The National Plan for Rural Development,  will 
not be covered here.  
12 The implementation of this component currently runs in parallel with the ROP, and it will be finalised 
around the year 2010. 
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Housing, to serve as sources for the National Development Plans, including for the NDP 
2007-2013 programming period, but these RDPs limit themselves to making an analysis of 
the socio-economic development at regional level and at setting up the investment 
priorities of the region (genuine shopping lists, in most cases), and no implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism are presented. These priorities will be financed from 
different operational programmes, but the Regional Development Agencies and the 
Regional Development Boards (as regional institutions) have little influence on the 
implementation of other OPs that the Regional Operational Programme. The setting up of 
the Regional Committees for Strategic Evaluation and Correlation was meant to counter-
act this disconnection between the implementation of Structural Instruments and their 
impact at regional level, but as it has, again, no decision making power outside the ROP, it 
can only assess, ex-post, this impact, and not genuinely steer regional development.          
Surprisingly, the analysis revealed that the implementation of the ROP 2007-2013 
involves to a lesser extent the regional institutions, i.e. Regional Development Boards and 
the above-mentioned NBRD, than the Phare ESC (see chapter 4). This evolution confirms 
the weight attached in Romania to regionalisation and regional development: as this 
process was initiated under the EU influence, it stagnated and even regressed when this 
disappeared. The way it unfolds currently in Romania, regional development policy seems 
caught between the “quest” for regionalisation as perceived in this country in the mid 90’s, 
and the current situation at a European level, where the regional element of the Cohesion 
Policy is of secondary importance, after the Lisbon objective of creating “growth and 
jobs”.    
As regards “regionalisation” as such, this process is in a very incipient phase in 
Romania. The development regions as such are not administrative-territorial units, with an 
historical identity, and the Regional Development Agencies are not public institutions, but 
NGOs with a public role (such as Chambers of Commerce). Although the planning and 
programming process for regional development was carried out at regional level in wide 
partnership, in the concrete, implementation phase, the national central and European 
institutions decided what, where and how it was financed. The county and (large) 
municipal councils are still powerful actors in the development process, as the county 
dominates the Romanian territorial-administrative structure underneath the central 
government. Currently the two layer structure: communes, cities and counties (all three 
local administration layers in accordance with the Romanian Constitution) vs. central 
government are deeply rooted in the mental framework of the citizens and represent 
serious competition for the regions.   
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As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the final responsibility and decision-
making power as regards regional development policy, in its two delimitated forms, have 
been permanently located at European and central level: from the National Agency of 
Regional Development, to the Ministry of Development and Prognosis, and finally to the 
Ministry of European Integration reorganised in 2007 as the Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and Housing. This is otherwise a general rule as regards implementation of 
pre-accession funds and EU Cohesion Policy in Romania.    
This overall picture verifies Bache’s statement, according to which “the degree of 
MLG through partnership across member states varies, in large shaped by the pre-existing 
territorial distribution of power” (Bache, 2004, 167) (see also (Perraton&Wells, 2004, 
186). As the pre-existing territorial distribution of power in Romania clearly advantages 
the central and county government, these two layers also tend to preserve and further their 
power position in this newly introduced policy field, i.e. regional development.   
1.3 Public administration reform 
The issue of public administration reform is of utmost importance for both EU 
Cohesion Policy and regional development. The administrative capacity of central and 
local public institutions determines the timely, efficient and effective funds absorption, 
from both the supply and demand sides: as funds suppliers, the (mostly central and 
regional) institutions in charge of the management and implementation of both Phare and 
SIs need to have the adequate capacity to carry out their tasks and to achieve the proposed 
output, results and impact of the programmes under their responsibility. On the demand 
side, as funds beneficiaries, the public institutions, at all layers, need to be able to access 
the funds made available for them, and implement their projects in conformity with the 
rules and regulations in force. For both sides co-financing capacity is important (at project 
level), especially in the context of SIs, where the additionality principle (at programme 
level) is very closely observed. 
          The reform of public administration, of utmost importance not only for regional 
development and regionalisation, but for all policies the Romanian government pursues, 
and for the governing act as such, has unfolded along two dimensions: 1) horizontal, i.e. 
seen as “quality” of the administrative act, irrespective of its locus (local, regional, 
central), and 2) vertical, i.e. decentralisation, both administrative and fiscal. It is widely 
admitted that the progress registered in reforming the public administration is limited. 
Despite a special focus on this issue during the negotiation process, it is generally 
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acknowledged that translating these formal measures into a change in the mentality of both 
the administration and citizens will happen only in the long run. The main factor 
determining the “incremental” reforms of public administration in Romania is the (lack of) 
political will and consensus in this sense. Even if some progress is definitely registered, 
especially at Ministerial level and in “avant-garde” units/departments where especially 
young civil servants are working, mostly in fields involving contact with foreign 
institutions, the general picture reflects a non-transparent, inefficient, not client-oriented, 
bureaucratic, clientele-like and corrupt public administration. As regards administrative 
decentralisation, the progress registered especially as regards clarification of the 
competencies enjoyed by each administrative level was for a very long time negatively 
counter-balanced by the defective fiscal centralisation and small and rural communities’ 
fiscal dependence on county councils. The new legislation in place after 2006 addressed 
this situation, but its impact on the capacity of local authorities to master their own 
development process is still uncertain.          
The European Commission acknowledges in the 2006 Monitoring Report the 
progress made by Romania in the field, especially as regards new legislation adopted, but 
at the same time some still unresolved issues are pointed out: a new law on Unitary Pay for 
civil servants, to complement the new Civil Service Statute, is likely to be further delayed 
and the Government continues to rely on Emergency Ordinances to adopt laws (European 
Commission 2006 Monitoring Report, 37). The need for further reforming and 
strengthening the public administration is acknowledged in the National Strategic 
Reference Framework, which sets this aspect as one of the four thematic priorities of the 
Romanian Government in the next years, to be implemented through the Operational 
Programme for Development of Administrative Capacity.        
Corruption, still present in Romania, is addressed here for two reasons. On one 
side, as Mungiu-Pippidi assesses, “extended corruption in public administration is the 
direct consequence of its institutions being incapable of offering services to the 
population, especially highly important public services, such as justice and security.  It is 
the direct symptom of the lack of efficiency and the weakness of the formal Romanian 
institutions.”13 (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002b, 30) On the other side, corruption represents a 
manifestation of side-way diffusion of authority, as defined by the MLG theory. 
 
13 Here corruption is defined as a supplementary fee paid to obtain public goods, and, this is the reason for 
which it is an indicator of how the institutions do their job rather than of local culture or mentality. The 
people offer bribes to public administration for public goods it should offer for the taxes the citizens pay 
already. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002b, 140) 
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2 Clarifying and narrowing down the research field  
 
Claval, in his “Introduction to Regional Geography” differentiates between three 
types of regional policies (Claval, 1998, 180-183). The evolution of regional policy from 
one type to another involved a process of regionalisation, i.e. the creation of a new tier in 
the territorial organisation of the state, with the corresponding institutions to which a 
transfer of competencies from the centre is undertaken (top-down).   
1. the policy of central planning by central governments and its regional 
dimensions. In this case, “the national policy for planned development of the territory must 
determine the general structure of networks and guarantee the articulation of the internal 
space with the outside world […].” (Claval, 1998, 181). These policies are often based on 
moral considerations, on the vague idea that it is better to look for harmonies or balances, 
than on a real understanding of the process at work in spatial organisation. (Claval, 1998, 
181).  
2. regional policy conceived as the establishment of local or regional frameworks. 
The actions inspired by the centralist doctrines did not give the expected results and a new, 
bottom-up approach was adopted. The central governments ceased to intervene directly in 
the spatial organisation of the economy, but put in place the territorial structures best 
designed to stimulate indigenous energies and provide locally the support and linkages 
they need. The hierarchy of territorial divisions must be adapted to the new scale of local 
life and the new structures need to have the corresponding competences and means to 
carry out the development process of their area. A significant success factor in this case is 
the local co-ordination of actions, among all stakeholders, public and private. (Claval, 
1998, 182).  
3. actions of regional authorities, development measures (coagulated in plans, 
programmes) taken by the regional actors themselves. In this framework, the local-regional 
competences may vary in distribution and the results are not optimal all the time, as the 
severely restricted nature of regional powers in the end makes the tasks of enacting 
coherent development policies rather difficult (Claval, 1998, 183).  
EU regional/cohesion policy represents a particular approach to socio-economic 
development, an answer to the issues of European enlargement and furthering economic 
development of and integration with the new member states, beginning with the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark in the 70’s. The implementation system of this policy moulds the 
administrative organisation and structure of the Member States, an aspect which 
determines variations in the importance of the regional element in the process.  
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The Romanian case is a type I regional policy, as defined by Claval. Policy is 
induced and financed to a large extent by the European Union and the central government. 
In this context, regional development policy in Romania is carried out through the 
Economic and Social Cohesion Component of the Phare National Programme, and the 
Regional Operational Programme. If regional policy is defined as a policy to be 
elaborated, managed and implemented by legitimate regional government for/in the 
(hystorical-) administrative region under its jurisdiction, and financed mostly through the 
regional budget, collected by the regional government from the citizens of the region, the 
Romanian type of regional development policy represents only a starting point in this 
direction14.  
As mentioned before, although the Regional Development Agencies elaborated 
regional development plans, the RDAs and the Regional Development Boards play a role 
only in the implementation of the priorities of these plans which are financed from the 
Regional Operational Programme and the Phare ESC Component. The other priorities are 
to be financed from other sources, i.e. OP Human Resources Development, SOP 
Environment, SOP Transport, the National Plan for Rural Development. These investments 
will, for sure, have an impact on the socio-economic development of the regions, but no 
mechanisms are in place for the monitoring and evaluation of their results and impact at 
regional level, despite the fact that for some of them,  i.e. OP Environment,  Human 
Resources Development OP and the National Plan for Rural Development, implementation 
is partially carried out by deconcentrated regional bodies, subordinated to the Ministries 
managing the respective programmes.     
     
3 Overall purpose and theoretical framework 
3.1 Overall purpose 
As already presented, the eight Romanian development regions do not constitute 
territorial-administrative units, but statistical regions, set up as a common agreement 
among a number of neighbouring counties. Nevertheless, Romania practices an incipient 
 
14 For a regional development model, see Keating, 2000, 4-6. He identifies four factors as 
underpinning and determining regional development: 1. culture and identity as factors , 2. institutions 
and the vehicle for the creation and transmission of culture and values and the framework for rational 
cooperation, 3. social relations, the existence or otherwise of a local business class and the 
incorporation of labour and capital in the development coalition and 4. patterns of politics and 
political competition and the incentives for politicians to adopt pro-development policies, look to the 
future and generate public goods.     
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type of regional development policy, as emphasised in the paragraphs above and a series of 
regional institutions were created in order to implement this policy.    
This research aims to analyse the role these regional institutions, i.e. the Regional 
Development Agencies and Regional Development Boards, play in the framework of 
Romanian regional policy, as delimitated in sub-chapter 2 of this introduction. The 
conclusions of this analysis will facilitate an overall assessment of the regionalisation 
process in Romania, its characteristics, stages and perspectives.  
The analysis carried out in the framework of this research project is based on a 
methodology derived from the Multi-Level Governance theory, as developed by Gary 
Marks and Lisbeth Hooghe15. The purpose of this research is not to test the MLG theory 
against the policy-making process related to regional development in Romania in order to 
explain it [this process] or to asses to which extent the policy outcomes are different as a 
result of the regional actors’ involvement; the study aims to analyse the extent to which 
the Romanian regional development policy-making system is organised in and functions at 
several levels, which are the most significant institutions involved and at which policy-
making stage this involvement is registered, i.e. programming, implementation, 
monitoring, evaluation, financial management and control, audit; and, finally, to which 
extent the regional structures in place in Romania contribute to this policy-making process 
and occupy a strong position in this institutional architecture.  
MLG is used here similarly to the way Bache and Flinders apply it in their 2004 
book, “Multi-level Governance”, as an “organising perspective”, i.e. framework of 
analysis that provides a map of how things (inter)-relate and leads to a set of research 
questions (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 94). The purpose of the one of Marks&Hooghe’s 
latest contributions to the development of MLG theory was to “mine the relevant 
literatures for some conceptual benchmarks in order to facilitate empirical analysis.” 
(Marks&Hooghe, 2004, 16). This research doesn’t intend to bring major adjustments to the 
MLG theory as such, but to start on this path of empirical analysis, by presenting and 
analysing regional development policy in Romania and the involvement of regional 
institution in its elaboration and implementation.   
The choice of the MLG theory for this analysis is justified by the fact that it is not 
enough to analyse the existing regional institutions and their formal competences in a 
 
15 In addition to Gary Marks and Liesbeth Hooghe, some other authors dealt with the MLG, from 
different perspectives (see, for a good example, Bache&Flinders, 2004, Multi-level Governance, 
Oxford University Press). Nevertheless, these contributions haven’t managed to change substantially 
the framework established by Marks and Hooghe, and this is the reson for which this research is 
mainly based Marks&Hooghe’s theoretical construction.  
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vacuum; in order to draw a valid conclusion on the weight of the regional actors in 
inducing regional development, they need to be seen against the background of the entire 
system, and in relationship with the involvement of all other institutions/layers in the 
regional development policy. 
3.2 MLG as theoretical framework of this research 
Despite the richness of literature covering local and regional governments and their 
socio-economic development, studies with a solid theoretical background and methodology 
focused on these aspects in transition countries/CEECs are scarce (see also Hughes, Sasse, 
Gordon, 2001, 1). The existing literature and attempts of theorising are mostly based on 
phenomena which have developed, in a different context and it might prove difficult to 
apply these theoretical models to CEECs, due to their particularities. The theory of multi-
level governance in this respect offers some more “espace de maneovre” for the researcher 
to analyse the power relationships between governance layers in transition countries, 
especially as the MLG takes into consideration informal aspects of governance, as well. 
Firstly, one has to keep in mind that in most ex-communist countries, as in Romania, the 
regional governance layer is not organised as regional government, elected by the voters in 
the regions, therefore (directly) legitimate and, at the same time, accountable for actions 
region-wide taken. Secondly, constructing a centralised system to implement the structural 
instruments goes back to an “inverse” “efficiency” argument: while in developed countries 
of MLG-type I, the externalities of the policy-making process are internalised through 
dividing competencies across three or four layers of administration, in a transitional, 
centralised system, the opposite happens: due to the weakness of the institutions at sub-
national level (and, theoretically, until this sub-national level is strengthen), the 
externalities are tried to be controlled through a concentration of competencies in less 
“hands”.  
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3.2.1 Multi-level governance theory 16 
The Westfalian nation(al)-state has been for centuries the key concept in 
comparative politics, in international relations studies and in federalist studies. 
Nevertheless, in the last years scholars have initiated and developed an in-depth analysis of 
the diffusion of state authority as an effect of, among other factors, globalisation. A 
migration of the statal redistribution power took place “upwards”, to international 
institutions and trans-national corporations, “sideways”, to global financial markets and 
global social movements and “downwards”, to sub-national bodies of all shapes and sizes 
(Payne 2000:203, Hooghe&Marks 2001a: 1). 
Despite some opinions that the post-globalisation nation-state is not an appropriate 
unit of political analysis anymore (Ohmae 1995), this remains an important actor on the 
international, national, regional and local arenas even if it does not monopolise power. It 
shares this or has it divided with and among other actors at the three mentioned levels 
(Payne 2000:211).   
In this context the concept of “governance”17 developed. Several scholars in 
comparative politics and public policy literature describe this phenomenon using for 
example the dichotomy “old”/”new” governance, where the former is understood as 
“steering” done by government and the later as “governing without government (as 
classical political theories conceive it)” via “self-organising, inter-organisational networks” 
(Rhodes 1996:660, see also Hix 1998 and Peters 2001, 2002). In international relations 
theoretical realm, especially according to the “new” International Political Economy 
School the international scene functions according to a “new medievalism” (Bull 
1977:254, Payne 2000:206-9)18.  
 The concept of multilevel governance has been gradually accepted in the last years 
as mirroring as faithfully as possible the EU policy-making system19. On the comparative 
politics strand, a convergence in this sense emerged between pluralists, elitist and Marxist 
 
16 In addition to Gary Marks and Liesbeth Hooghe, some other authors dealt with the MLG, from different 
perspectives (see, for a good example, Bache&Flinders, 2004, Multi-level Governance). Nevertheless, the 
theoretical framework designed here is mainly based on the main results of the research carried out by Marks 
and Hooghe. Contributions of some other authors are taken into account to the extent 1. they are bringing 
something new to the main MLG theoretical body, 2. or they are particularly relevant for the Romanian 
study-case.      
17 Governance can be defined as “spheres of authority…at all levels of human activity…that amount to 
systems of rule in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control.” (Rosenau 1997:145 in Payne 
2000:206). “The concept confirms that there has been a shift away from an authority based style of governing 
that has assumed the capacity of governments to exercise hierarchical control over society.” (Peters 2002:6). 
18 Bull suggested in 1977 that one alternative to the modern state system might be a modern and secular 
equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle 
Ages (Payne 2000: 206)  
19 See also Chryssochoou 2001:109-110 
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schools of thought (Marsh 1995 in Payne 2000:208). The same happened in international 
relations with the recent resuscitation by Risse-Kappen of transnational relations. He 
focuses on the interaction between states and their internal institutional structures, on one 
hand, and transnational relations, on the other hand (Risse-Kappen 1995, Payne 2000:210). 
The internal European debate between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists is as 
vivid as ten years ago. Nevertheless both parts accepted the reality of the EU multi-level 
system of governance20, the only bone of contention being the weight of national states in 
the European policy-making process. 
 The European Union system embodies, as several authors conclude, elements of 
“old” and of “new” governance (Sbragia 2000:220) corresponding to the different nature of 
the first vs. the second and the third pillars of the EU system (see also Chryssochou 
2001:98-100). The emphasis according to Hix is on “multi-level, non-hierarchical, 
deliberative and apolitical governance, via a complex web of public/private networks and 
quasi-autonomous executive agencies…” (Hix 1998:54). The EU is nowadays viewed 
rather as a network organisation, as “network governance” (Kohler-Koch 1998:11). Lisbet 
Hooghe and Gary Marks, critical to both realist state-centric and supranationalist accounts, 
bring a substantial contribution to this field through their in-depth empirical research of 
governance typologies and of the EU system as “polity”, and through the models for 
democratisation reforms of the EU they advance (Hooghe&Marks 2001a,b)21. Peters and 
Pierre (2004) highlight as well some further features of governance and MLG: the novelty 
of governance is its emphasis of process over institutions; MLG refers to a particular kind 
of relationship, non-hierarchical, both vertically and horizontally, between several 
institutional levels; MLG denotes a negotiated order rather than an order defined by a 
formalized legal framework; MLG is frequently conceived of as a political game, i.e. the 
relaxation of regulatory frameworks opens up for more strategic and autonomous 
behaviour among the actors (Peters&Pierre, 2004, 77-81). 
     
The basic concept of multilevel governance consists of a ‘structure of authoritative 
decision-making – that is, the sum of rules, mainly formal but also informal, concerning 
the locus and practice of authoritative governance in a polity’ (Marks, 1996, 22). 
Developed initially for the EU regional policy, the MLG concept is currently applied to 
other policy fields as environment, youth or even economic policy. The key feature of this 
 
20 The Intergovernmentalists acknowledged the domestic groups involved in a “two-levels game” 
nevertheless co-ordinated by the national government (Chryssochoou 2001: 105) 
21 For a detailed overview of the different concepts developed by numerous authors in order to illustrate 
governance, see Marks, 1993;  Hooghe&Marks, 2001a; 2001b; 2003. 
 35
structure is a set of rules organising the functional division of labour among various 
levels of government. The nature of government here is, according to Marks, underpinned 
by three key assumptions: (1) that one has to make the distinction between political 
institutions and political actors; (2) that the state basically consists of a set of rules 
structuring authoritative relations in the polity, but not being itself an actor; and (3) that the 
orientation of political actors towards the rules that constrain them may change according 
to circumstances (Marks, 1996:22). The state is seen more or less as machinery operated 
by political actors placed behind the steering wheel through, for example, elections. These 
political actors preserve or change their values and interest after they gained the 
leading/managing positions but they will remain factional and try to satisfy their interest 
through the state instruments at their disposal, as long as they maintain their legitimacy.     
Drawing on previous theoretical and empirical research, Gary Marks and Lisbeth 
Hooghe developed two distinct types of multi-level governance.       
 
Table 1: Types of Multi-Level Governance 
TYPE I TYPE II 
1. multi-task jurisdictions 1. task-specific jurisdictions 
2. mutually exclusive jurisdictions 
at any particular level 
2. overlapping jurisdictions at all 
levels 
3. limited number of jurisdictions 3. unlimited number of 
jurisdictions 
4. jurisdictions organized in a 
limited number of levels 
4. no limit to the number of 
jurisdictional levels 
5. jurisdictions are intended to be 
permanent 
5. jurisdictions are intended to be 
flexible 
Source: Marks&Hooghe, 2003, 5 
 
The first type of governance is embedded in federalism, concerned with power 
sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels. Type I of 
MLG shares a series of the characteristics of a federal system, the difference between the 
two being that, while federalism is confined to the national scene, MLG can be applied 
also beyond the national borders (Hooghe& Marks, 2003, 6; Marks&Hooghe, 2004, 17). In 
MLG type I, the power is shared among a limited number of jurisdictions (3), organised as 
a set of Russian-Dolls (“nested”). The respective jurisdictions cover a clearly delimited 
territory. The members of one jurisdiction could not belong, simultaneously, to another 
jurisdiction (2). Decision making powers are shared by or divided among jurisdictions, and 
each of them fulfils a number of tasks, i.e. general purpose jurisdictions, and not only one 
(1). The system is mostly organised in a limited number of jurisdictions, i.e. local, 
intermediate and central level (4). “Type I jurisdictions are durable. Jurisdictional reform, 
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i.e. changing, abolishing, or radically adjusting new jurisdictions – is costly and unusual. 
Such change normally consists of re-allocating policy functions across existing levels of 
governance. The institutions responsible for governance are sticky, and they tend to outlive 
the conditions that brought them back into being.” (Hooghe&Marks 2003, 7) (5). 
The second type of governance is practically the reverse of the first one. The 
number of jurisdictions is potentially vast rather than limited (3), these are overlapping at 
the same level and do not necessarily contain, hierarchically or not, other jurisdictions 
present at one of the potentially numerous lower levels (2,4). A type II MLG has decision 
power on one defined task, not on an entire package (1). Being designed to respond 
functionally to changing citizens needs and preferences, type II jurisdictions are more 
flexible that the type I ones. Their survival is depending on their adaptability to these needs 
and preferences. Hence, the type II jurisdictions accept and implement a vast series of 
changes more rapidly. (Hooghe&Marks 2001a, 15)     
Recent research done on MLG by Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe also identified 
certain different policy choices characteristic for each of the two types of multi-level 
governance (Marks&Hooghe, 2004, 27-9). While Type I MLG represents intrinsic 
communities, i.e. the identity of the citizens within a MLG I jurisdiction strongly relates to 
a particular community, in a MLG Type II jurisdictions are instrumental arrangements, 
created in order to resolve certain, eventually non permanent, problems (extrinsic 
community). Type I governance is biased towards voice, i.e. political deliberation and 
conventional liberal democratic institutions, where decisions are taken consciously, 
collectively and comprehensively and the barriers to exit are high, while Type II MLG 
favours exit, that is, a member of a jurisdiction exits when it no longer serves its needs. In 
the same time, the MLG I Type favours a more structured conflict articulation. The 
limited number of jurisdictions bundling diverse issues facilitate party competition and the 
setting out of their agendas, and, automatically, the citizens’ choice making. The MLG II 
avoids conflict. The “jurisdictional fragmentation raises the bar for articulating ideological 
conflict, but it concentrate the mind on improving efficiency [in the decision-making 
process] within existing jurisdictional bounds” (Marks&Hooghe, 2004, 29).               
 
The existing MLG literature has come also under criticism. Peters considers that 
“the term remains largely descriptive rather than explanatory. The descriptive nature of a 
great deal of the governance literature reflects in part its attempt to capture virtually the 
entirety of the policy process, becoming something of later day systems analysis or 
structural functional analysis, of politics.” (Peters 2002, 6). “We do not have theories here 
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of predictive or explanatory qualities, but rather with important descriptive ambitions of 
guiding our research focus in new directions” (Olsson 2001, 1-2). Andrew Jordan, quoted 
by Stephen George (2004, 107), adds on the list some other major criticisms of MLG, as 
applied to the EU: MLG overstates the autonomy of the SNAs, it adopts a “top-down” 
view of SNAs but in the same time it focuses on SNAs to the exclusion of other actors and 
it mistakes the evidence of SNA mobilisation at EU level as evidence of SNA influence 
(see also Fairbrass&Jordan, 2004, 152).  
3.2.2 Path dependency - a vicious circle? 
In a type I MLG system, the barriers to change the distribution of jurisdictions or of 
competences inside a jurisdiction are very high. Two things have to happen in order to 
create a new jurisdiction. Firstly, reformers must coordinate to bring the change about. 
Secondly, they must surpass whatever decisional barriers stand in their way 
(Hooghe&Marks, 2001a:15). The more rooted a jurisdiction is in other institutions, the 
higher the barriers to change, and as decision to “give away” competencies are taken by the 
actors in power, interests already organized and vested in established jurisdictions will 
benefit from this power shift.  
A level of governance, once established, is likely to behave as a magnet for 
additional competencies, even if this is not optimal from a pure efficiency standpoint. Path 
dependency arises due to increasing returns to concentration of competencies in existing 
jurisdictions (Hooghe&Marks, 2001a, 16).  
3.2.3 Flexibility & Efficiency  
As stated before, a dispersion of authority does take place in the European Union, 
from central governments upwards, in favour of the EU, downwards, in favours of sub-
national authorities, and sideways, towards economic and social actors active at different 
jurisdictional levels. One of the most significant factors underpinning this authority spread 
is the continuously expanding and more intricate content of the process of governing. The 
governments are overloaded with work as a result of the response these have to give to the 
everyday more numerous and especially economic challenges of a globalised world. Gary 
Marks identifies three possible scenarios in which governments themselves choose to have 
less competencies, respectively to delegate them to other actors. 
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‘A. Government leaders actually prefer to wash their hands of authority: they 
actively seek to shift responsibility for some set of decisions to sub-national or 
supranational actors; 
B. Government leaders shift authority for some set of decisions not because they 
want to rid themselves of responsibility; but because some other concern outweighs 
their resistance; 
C. Government leaders are unable to check or reverse dispersal of authority to sub-
national or supranational institutions.’ (Marks, 1996, 25-32)  
 
Literature on MLG, federalism or new institutionalism etc., lay at the basis of their 
analysis the assumption that the dispersion of governance across several jurisdictions is 
more efficient, i.e. qua internalising the policy externalities, and normatively superior, i.e. 
more democratic, to central state monopoly. A decentralised governance system could be 
better informed, due to the proximity to the citizen. The policies made by such a system 
could reflect better the options and preferences of these citizens and could facilitate 
competition among jurisdictions, innovation and experimentation (Hooghe&Marks, 2001a, 
4) despite the high coordination costs they might involve. 
3.2.4 Informal aspects  
As Marks and Hooghe say, “a weighted measure of multi-level governance must 
take account of formal and informal power relations among jurisdictions” 
(Marks&Hooghe, 2001, 2-3), and how they interact with each other, in order for the 
dynamics of authoritative decision-making process to be fully understood 
(Bache&Flinders, 2004, 4). Both administrative cultures and as corruption bring more 
nuances to the formal aspects of the governing system in Romania. 
4 Work hypotheses 
 
On the basis of the theoretical model for multi-level governance developed by Gary 
Marks and Lisbet Hooghe, the Romanian governance system, as a whole, represents a type 
I of MLG22. A limited number of jurisdictions, nested as “Russian dolls”23, fulfil a series 
 
22 Forms of MLG type II co-exist as well, e.g. the institutional system in place for the implementation of 
cross-border cooperation programmes, but they are rare. 
23 As we will see in the chapter 5, although the Constitution declares the administrative-territorial levels of 
governance as autonomous, acting independently from each other, in practice the lower local level, especially 
the small towns and the communes, still find themselves in a subordination position towards central 
government.   
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of functions, shared and/or divided specifically for each policy, i.e. national level-central 
government; regional level-regional development agencies and regional development 
boards24; county level-county councils, prefects; municipalities level-city/commune 
council, mayors.  
The steering process in Romania has been already integrated into the international 
“trend” of diffusion of central authority towards higher, parallel and lower layers. This 
process is unbalanced and characterised by a stronger diffusion of authority towards 
higher levels (international organisations, i.e. EU,) combined with a still highly 
centralised political system. The lower levels are weak; the formal authority they enjoy 
through legislation is not doubled by a corresponding material one. At the same time, 
economic interest groups or economic actors influence the decision-making process, 
through legal channels, i.e. lobby, but mostly through corruption. 
As we will see in the next chapters, this general, overarching hypothesis verifies in the 
case of regional development policy. The decision-making power is concentrated at the 
national and European levels, while at regional level a limited number of decisions are 
taken by the county and city councils (local administrative layer), in their quality of 
members of the Regional Development Boards. The authority of regional level even 
decreased in the framework of Regional Operational Programme implementation system, 
as the RDB lost its competency to approve projects financed through this programme.     
Five are the core elements underpinning this main hypothesis:   
1. the particular power position the European Union/Commission enjoys in this field, 
position assured by the accession talks and the negotiations having taken place on 
Chapter 21 „Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments”, as 
well as, after 1st of January 2007, as initiator and coordinator of EU Cohesion 
Policy implementation (upward diffusion of authority);  
2. the high degree of centralisation of the Romanian management system for pre-
accession aid and structural instruments (path dependency/efficiency 
issue/administrative culture in Romania); 
3. the limited role of the RDAs in the policy-making process (downward diffusion of 
authority – regional dimension) 
4. the limits of the decentralisation process and of the administrative reform in 
Romania, the specific administrative culture in this country and the role local 
authorities play in the policy making process as regards Cohesion Policy 
(downward diffusion of authority – local dimension); 
 
24 Which have competences regarding regional development policies only. 
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5. corruption (one of the manifestations of sidewise diffusion of authority),   
Although their setting up as such constitutes and important step for the 
regionalisation process in Romania, the regional institutions currently in place in this 
country enjoy a limited number of competencies, narrowed down to this policy field, i.e. 
socio-economic regional development/implementation of a part of the Phare ESC 
Component and the ROP, only.  
As regional NGOs of public utility having jurisdiction on a non-political-
administrative region, it proved difficult for the development regions and Regional 
Development Agencies to compete with the county and county councils, as regards 
legitimacy and competencies/power position in the EU Cohesion policy-making process. 
There is a two-fold explanation for this situation: the “county” has been a permanent 
presence of the territorial-administrative scene in Romania for at least 150 years. Further 
on, the county councils represent the “transmission belts” of central government’s policies 
in the territory; most of these are still elaborated and decided at central/European level. 
The Regional Development Boards, composed of the representatives of the local 
administration, lack direct political legitimacy for the regional level, and its members act in 
competition (each of them trying to promote its own local interests and projects) and not 
for the benefit of the region as a whole.     
Despite the numerous institutions bound by legislation to be involved in making the 
regional policy, if one takes a closer look at their membership structure, they are rather 
overlapping. Ultimately, the same people make decisions, respectively, the ministry in 
charge with regional development and the county councils: the Minister of European 
Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing, is the president of the 
National Board of Regional Development25, half of the members of the NBRD are 
presidents and vice-presidents of the Regional Developments Councils, actually presidents 
of the county councils. As mentioned above, power in the regional development policy 
field is concentrated actually in the hands of the European Commission, central 
government and, to a more limited extent, counties. 
 As a consequence, the RDAs have had limited input in elaborating, managing and 
coordination of Cohesion Policy. Their role is restricted to implementation of programmes, 
namely, the implementation of the two programmes, Phare ESC and the ROP. At regional 
level, the Regional Development Boards enjoy decision making power, as provided for by 
the Law on Regional Development 315/2004. On one side, as mentioned before, their 
 
25 See the Decision no. 772/14.07.2005 regarding the approval of the Rules for organising and functioning of 
the National Board for Regional Development, http://www.mie.ro/_documente/cndr/hg772_2005.pdf 
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members represent the local, and not the regional level, as the local level is their source of 
political legitimacy. On the other side, their competences decreased considerably under the 
ROP, local authorities being beneficiaries of funds and projects being approved by the 
Ministry, and not by the RDBs (not even as members of the Monitoring Committee) or by 
the National Board of Regional Development anymore, as it was the case with Phare ESC.      
The assertion made by Hooghe and Marks regarding MLG and path dependency is 
fully recognisable in the Romanian case. Statistics prove the strong identity the citizens 
have vis-à-vis the “county” and the weak regional one (EWR 1/2002, page 32). As we will 
see in the chapter 5, the “judet” have never disappeared from the territorial-administrative 
structure of Romania since the first reforms in the 18th century, while the regional level, 
between judet and national level also co-existed until 1968 but in different forms and under 
different names. The last decades of the communist regime and the significant 
transformation the county experienced practically pinned down the two levels structure 
presently in force in Romania. This factor hampered the realisation of a radical 
administrative reform, in the sense of introducing a regional governmental layer, especially 
in the context of full economic and political transition. The regional structures were created 
using the European integration momentum, but the new competences regarding regional 
policy were distributed to already in place jurisdictions, as the central and county 
governments. 
On the contrary, as regards MLG efficiency and flexibility, the reality in Romania 
doesn’t verify the theoretical assumptions. Although decentralisation may lead, in theory, 
to a more efficient governing system and is normatively superior to centralisation, in 
Romania the latest remains, to a large extent, the core organisation and steering principle, 
at least informally. This choice is made by the central government, not willing or able to 
take the measures necessary for the country to face the challenges of globalisation, 
integration and democratisation. Partially this choice is justified, as the local level capacity 
to steer development is low; nevertheless, this vicious circle needs to be broken, and 
administration needs to be reformed in order for this to be able, at all levels, to carry out its 
development tasks. Unfortunately, the political forces haven’t reached consensus yet as 
regards the measures to be taken in order to break this cycle. Formally some competencies 
have been decentralised to county and local level, but these local authorities mostly lack 
the skills and financial means (especially at small municipality and commune level) to 
appropriately deal with the challenges of decentralisation.  
For the very same reasons, the management system in place for the EU funds is 
highly centralised. Interesting to see is that exactly “efficiency” was envisaged when the 
 42
system was constructed on this principle. Further than acknowledging the fact that most of 
the objectives of the pre-accession programmes and the ones through which structural 
instruments will be implemented have a sectoral, nation-wide or central nature, and n ot 
regional, we have to keep in mind that the one of the most important reasons for which 
sub-national public authorities have limited competences vis-à-vis socio-economic 
development is their limited capacity to deal with the responsibilities related to this 
activity.   
5 Methodology 
 
In order to assess to which extent a political-administrative system functions “in a 
multi-level” manner, several, if not all, policies elaborated by and implemented within the 
system should be assessed, regardless of its organisation, i.e. centralised unitary, 
decentralised unitary, regionalised unitary, federal26. The system as a whole could be 
qualified as multi-level governance if most of the policies are made and carried out 
according to the principles of the MLG theory. 
Up to this date most studies on MLG have been carried out in the field of Cohesion 
Policy, where the principle of “partnership” was introduced for the first time almost 20 
years ago with the declared purpose of involving the local and regional authorities in the 
policy-making process. Later the principle of “partnership” was extended to cover 
economic and social stakeholders. The intense discussions regarding the administrative 
reform of the EU institutions, including the debate launched with the White Paper of 
Governance in 2001 transformed MLG in a normative standard for making policy in the 
EU and new policy-making instruments, reflecting this policy-making manner were 
proposed, e.g. open method of coordination27.    
As mentioned before, the methodology for this research is based on the MLG 
theory, as developed by Marks and Hooghe. As Hooghe and Marks say, “a first 
approximation to measuring multi-level governance is to say it varies with the number of 
jurisdictions bearing on individuals in a particular territory. But this measure must be 
refined if it is to be meaningful. First, it must take account of the distribution of policy 
 
26 See Loughlin 2000, 26-7 
27 See Mr. Prodi speeches: “I believe we have to stop thinking in terms of hierarchical layers of competence 
separated by the  subsidiarity principle and start thinking, instead, of a networking arrangement, with all 
levels of governance shaping, proposing, implementing and monitoring policy together.” Romano 
PRODI,European Parliament – 15 February 2000; A strong Europe is not the same thing as a centralised 
Union. Far from it. The way to achieve real dynamism, creativity and democratic legitimacy in the EU is to 
free the potential that exists in multi-layered levels of governance”, ROMANO PRODI, After Reform: a 
future strategy for Europe as a whole, 1.02.2001 on http://www.evropska-unie.cz/eng/speech.asp?id=537
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competencies across jurisdictions. Second, it must take particular account of fiscal 
power—the power to tax and spend. Third, a weighted measure of multi-level 
governance must take account of formal and informal power relations among 
jurisdictions” (Hooghe&Marks, 2001a, 2).  
This study will concentrate on two main aspects: formal sharing of authority in the 
regional development policy field and informal aspects influencing the formal “picture” 
offered by official documentation and statements. The second element in the methodology 
proposed by Marks and Hooghe does not need further investigation, as it is a well-known 
fact that the RDAs have no power to tax and spend; they just manage a pre-given budget, 
i.e. the regional share of the financial allocations for Phare ESC and ROP, decided at 
central level. The RDBs cannot tax and spend as regional institutions, only its members 
have this competence at local level, in their quality of local administration representatives. 
Their contribution to the regional development policy represents the co-financing of their 
own projects, approved and implemented in the region, but mostly with a local impact.     
5.1 Distribution of policy competencies across jurisdictions 
The first aspect, the formal distribution of competences across jurisdictional layers, 
forms the bulk of this research and the methodology for carrying out the respective 
analysis is closely designed on the MLG theory as developed by Marks and Hooghe. The 
assessment of division and sharing of authority in the policy field of cohesion policy, will 
concentrate on institutional actors.   
As identified before, the Romanian governance system is a type I MLG; the 
jurisdictions identified in this system are the country in its entirety/the national level, the 
county and the municipalities/the local level (as defined by the 2003 Constitution). In the 
specific case of the regional development policy, the European and regional levels 
constitute jurisdictions as well. 
The main competencies fulfilled by these layers in the framework of the regional 
development policy are: programming, implementation (including project generation, 
appraisal, selection), strategic and operational monitoring, evaluation, information and 
publicity, financial management and control, and audit. 
Firstly, the institutions involved horizontally at national level in the management 
and implementation of the Phare National Programme28 and of the National Strategic 
 
28 National Aid Coordinator, National Authorising Officer, Joint Monitoring Committee. 
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Reference Framework and the 7 Operational Programmes29 will be identified and their role 
relating to the identified core competences presented and analysed. The motivation for this 
approach is twofold: these institutions enjoy decision-making power for issues related to 
regional development policy. At the same time, this analysis will demonstrate the high 
degree of centralisation of the entire system in place for the management of EU funds.  
Secondly, the focus will switch to the institutional structure in place, at national 
and regional level, for the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion Component and the 
Regional Operational Programme. The role of each institution involved will be presented 
and analysed in relation to the identified core competences. Based on this detailed picture, 
a qualitative assessment of the weight of each institution involved will be carried out. This 
weight will be determined firstly by the role played by a certain institution, i.e. decision-
making vs. simply operational or source of information for processes managed by other 
institutions, e.g. in the case of projects appraisal and selection for the ROP, the RDAs 
manage this process, carried out by external evaluators, but the Ministry is deciding upon 
the projects to be finally implemented. The accumulation of competencies will also 
contribute to defining the power position of each institution involved. The more 
competencies it has and the more decisions its takes, the more powerful an institution is.    
5.2 Informal power relations among jurisdictions 
As mentioned above, a first distinction needs to be made between formal and 
informal realities. Formal realities are easily “traceable” and, consequently, analysed, as 
they are recorded in different official sources. As informal aspects, this analysis  
concentrate on public administration culture and corruption, as mentioned also by Marks 
and Hooghe in their studies. These two issues are treated indirectly, by making use of the 
rather exhaustive second literature existing in the field. The centralistic and politicised 
public administration culture in Romania suggest that the central government enjoys even 
more power than formally distributed to, while corruption, at governmental level, 
illustrates the power of the economic actors exercising their influence through different, 
unofficial and illegal channels. One should, nevertheless, underline the fact that this 
informal background proves in no way concrete, for example corruption, phenomena 
unfolding in the institutions involved in the managing of the structural/pre-accession funds; 
sketching this background seeks to colour the rather “black-and-white” picture of the 
formal sharing and division of authority in the field of cohesion policy, and at giving some 
 
29 National Coordination Committee for SIs, Management Co-ordination Committee, Authority for the 
Coordination of Structural Instruments, Certifying and Paying Authority, and Audit Authority 
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hints regarding what might happen beyond the rigorously designed institutional 
architecture.   
5.3 Literature overview  
For the purpose of this research in a first phase a thorough desk-based research was 
carried out. As regional development is a new concept in Romania, the literature of high 
analytical value in this field and country is scarce and the policy-making process not very 
transparent, the need for empirical research proved significant.       
As written sources, I referred mainly to legislation in the field and primary and 
secondary literature. Limited use is made of mass-media sources, due to their less clarity, 
and often less accurate information they display30.  
Considering the (institutional) actor-centred approach of the present research, basic 
legislative arrangements, i.e. Romanian Constitution and the EU (constitutional-) treaties 
which are setting up the check-and-balance institutional system, constitute the starting 
point for research and assessment. Further legislation carrying out institutional engineering 
and/or designing and implementing policies (European and Romanian legislation on the 
co-ordination, management, and implementation etc. of the Structural Funds, Romanian 
legislation on public administration and regional organisation and development) give 
numerous details on the formal division of competences.  
 The literature on regionalisation in Romania doesn’t account for many 
contributions. As in the case of most CEE countries, the studies dealing with this process 
mainly describe the legislative, institutional and political evolutions in the field. Some 
interesting technical studies on the regional disparities in Romania, before and after 1989 
and other subjects could be found systematically in the Romanian Business Journal and 
Revue Roumaine de Geographie. Some other, mostly descriptive studies, were issued by 
the Open Society Foundation, the Romanian European Institute and the Polirom Publishing 
House. Very few studies are dealing with the power relationships between the four 
“governance” levels on a solid theoretical basis accompanied by an in depth analysis and 
empirical research.        
On the Romanian side, several national action and developments plans, 
programmes and strategies for the adoption of the “aquis communautaire”, for reinforcing 
 
30 This aspect rather underlines how scanty and blurred information in the field reach the mass-media and, 
further than that, the population. From my personal practical experience the issue has two causes: on one size 
the emitter provides the receiver with limited amount of information, but on the other side the receivers do 
not posses the necessary tools to understand properly the complex details.     
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administrative capacity and for regional development, constitute important sources of 
information as well. Some of the most reliable sources of information on public 
administration, decentralisation and regionalisation in Romania are the publications of the 
Romanian Academic Society and its Romanian Centre for Public Policy and the works of 
the Institute for Public Policy in Bucharest, conducted under the co-ordination of the Open 
Society Foundation. The same Foundation initiated in Budapest the Local Government and 
Public Reform Initiative, a research programme under whose label high quality works in 
the field are published. The publications of the United Nations Development Fund in 
Romania, especially the Early Warning Reports supply as well relevant and reliable data in 
the field of interest of this study.   
The literature, primary and secondary, on multilevel governance in the EU and on 
regional policy as MLG study case is abundant. In Germany Beate Kohler-Koch, Fritz 
Scharpf, Markus Höreth, M. Jachtenfuchs, Katrin Auel, Arthur Benz, Thomas Esslinger, 
Tanja Börzel are analysing the process, while the anglo-saxon literature in the field is 
dominated by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, Simon Hix, 
Michael Keating, James Rosenau, Alberta Sbragia, Ian Bache. Nevertheless, the analysis 
carried out here will mostly rely on the theoretical model developed by Marks&Hooghe. 
At the same time, the shortcomings of this theoretical framework, especially its rather 
descriptive than explicative nature, haven’t been addressed yet, at least not systematically 
and with no overhauling results. As previously mentioned,  a very recent publication 
(Bache, I.&Flinders, M. Multi-level governance, eds. 2004) tried to address some of these 
limits and to further the research in this direction. As regards MLG in Romania, no study 
using this theoretical framework is available at the moment. 
5.4 Empirical Research   
Empirical research verifies in practice, “on the ground”, to which extent the balance 
of power prescribed in legislation also functions in the territory in the day by day policy 
making process. Interviews carried out in 2004, 2005 and 2008 with Directors and 
employees of RDAs, RDBs, county councils, Ministry of European Integration, Ministry 
of Public Finance, have provided essential information for the completion of this research 
(see annexed interviews resumes).  
Although not directly linked, the internship carried out in 2004 at the House of 
Flevoland Region in the Netherlands helped me significantly in understanding the 
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functioning of the EU Regional Policy and its interaction with the domestic development 
policy practiced at the regional level in this country.  
Last but not least, working within the Romanian Authority for the Coordination of 
Structural Instruments, Ministry of Economy and Finance, the institution in charge with the 
preparation and coordination of the SIs implementation for 2007-2013 enabled me to have 
real insight in the aspects constituting the subject of this research.  
6 Organisation of the thesis   
 
This first chapter introduces the context, actors, main literature in the field and 
central problems to be addressed in this thesis. The purpose, objectives and working 
hypothesis of this research project are also presented here, as it is the case with the multi-
level governance theory, as analysis framework, and the methods extracted from this and 
used in order to address the work hypotheses.   
 
Due to the novelty of the subject, escaping the trap of description proved difficult. 
The choice of writing a separate chapter, the second one, comprising background 
information, was determined by two reasons: firstly, if these pieces of information had 
been introduced in the core chapters, the latest would have been too descriptive and long, 
limiting the space for analysis as such. The second motive was my intention to give readers 
a choice: the readers already familiar with the subject can leave out the second chapter and 
go directly to the core analysis, the ones not familiar with the subject benefit of a concise 
overview of the issues of outmost relevance for this research project. 
 
The third chapter was initially introduced at the end of the thesis, before the 
concluding chapter, in order to complete the analysis carried out on the Phare ESC 
Component and ROP management and implementation systems; nevertheless, considering 
the fact that it deals with the public administration (evolution, organisation and culture) 
and corruption issues, it is more fitted for this part to actually set up the context in which 
the regionalisation process and regional development policy unfold in Romania.     
 
On this background, created by the second and third chapters, the fourth chapter 
focuses on the PHARE Economic and Social Cohesion Component and on the institutional 
architecture built up for the programming, implementing, controlling, monitoring and 
evaluation of the funds in question. The first part of the chapter will shortly introduce the 
Phare National Programme in its entirety, with a focus on the main institutions involved in 
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its management, as these institutions play a decision-making role for the Phare ESC as 
well. The second part concentrates on the analysis of the institutional system in place for 
the Phare ESC management and implementation.  
 
The same approach will be used in the fifth chapter, covering Structural 
Instruments and the institutional structure prepared for their management and 
implementation; as these institutions have completed only the programming phase and 
entered in implementation at the end of 2007, a complete assessment on their overall 
performance will be possible only at the end of a policy-making cycle, in 2014-15, 
respectively.    
 
The sixth and last chapter will draw conclusions on the involvement of each layers 
in the policy-making process related to regional development in Romania, and as regards 
regional development as such, respectively on regional development policy, institutions, 
perspectives in this country.  
7 Conclusions 
  
More than10 years after the “Green Book on Regionalization in Romania” was 
published, the purpose the eight development regions and regional bodies were set up for, 
respectively to create a frame and strong institutions for the implementation of the EU 
regional development policy in Romania can be considered, to a significant extent, 
fulfilled. Nevertheless, this does not imply in any way that the regionalisation process in 
Romania is completed; actually, the state of the art from this point of view suggests that it 
only started and its development is uncertain, as even the only factor which stimulated it 
until 1st of January 2007, the European Integration, disappeared. The development of the, 
by than, “Regional Policy”, into the nowadays “Cohesion Policy”, marks the decrease of 
the “regional” element involvement in this policy, as a high share of the policy’s budget is 
spent in “Convergence” countries, having different socio-economic development needs 
and administrative organisation in comparison with the older Member States.  
 The bottom line of the whole discourse regarding Cohesion Policy and structural 
instruments is that their largest share is spent on sectoral needs, through programmes 
elaborated, managed and most of the time implemented as well, at central level. The 
regional institutions created almost 10 years ago play only an operational role in 
implementing 20% of the ERDF, ESF and EC funds allocated to Romania, funds 
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distributed not through 8 regional development programmes, ideally respecting the 
particularities of each region, but through, paradoxically, a national Regional Operational 
Programme and other sectoral six (see chapter two for their detailed presentation). 
Transforming the 8 development regions in territorial-administrative tiers will most 
probable not happen in the near future. 
Diffusion of authority from the central government has taken place since the regime 
change. This process can be characterised as unbalanced; the upwards diffusion of 
authority, towards the EU, especially, and sideways, towards economic interest groups, 
seems stronger than towards lower levels of administration. In the case of the Regional 
Policy, despite the “richness” of bodies/actors which are bound through legislation to be 
involved in the policy-making process, these are rather overlapping if one takes a closer 
look at their membership structure. In the end the same people take decisions at all levels: 
the Minister of European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing 
is the president of the National Regional Development Council but half of the members of 
the NRDC are presidents and vice-presidents of the Regional Developments Councils, 
actually presidents of the county councils. The decision making power is concentrated 
actually in the hands of the European Commission, Ministry of European Integration 
(Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing)/Ministry of Economy and  
Finance/government and counties. 
The proper conditions for elaborating and implementing regional policy are created 
after other problematic issues, from political and macro-economic stability until 
administrative change are fully addressed. Once these reforms completed, a re-arrangement 
of the units composing the territorial structure of the country and of the competencies of 
each administrative-governmental layer becomes possible. Through decentralisation 
towards both local and regional levels, the power of the central government and of the 
county councils should decrease, at least theoretically. Therefore, the central and county 
government should voluntarily renounce to some of their competences in order to enhance 
the position of the local and regional government/structures.  
Despite some progress being registered in formally reforming administration and 
decentralising certain competences towards the local level, the Romanian political leaders 
have been more inclined to preserve power at any costs and than giving it away. Carried 
out adjustments to political-administrative/territorial institutional arrangements, necessary 
for optimally steering the development process, came as a response to accession 
negotiations and not as actions taken by a central government aware of the necessities of 
these reforms. At the same time, the changes operated verify the path-dependency 
 50
assumption made by Marks and Hooghe that new competencies tend to be awarded to 
institutions already having jurisdiction in a particular sector and territory.  
At the same time, the lack of expertise at local level, both specific to 
implementation of structural instruments and to wider development policy, determined the 
European Commission to favour, in Romania as in all new MSs, a management system 
concentrated in the hands of the central government. If this move might prove effective in 
the short-term, as the funds will be faster absorbed, in the longer run the central authorities 
will be overwhelmed by the numerous tasks implied by the process, and, if there are no 
SNAs prepared to take over some of the competencies and responsibilities localised now at 
central level, the system will block. The natural action to be taken would be to prepare the 
public administration beneath the central level to fulfil tasks as regards European cohesion, 
regional and (generally development) policy, but, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs, 
on one side some other priorities are to be found on the agenda of political leaders and, on 
the other side, the central government wouldn’t take such measures if these touched their 
power base. It is a vicious circle and the qualitative reform of the administrative system, as 
a whole, and, more important, the political will to do this, are central to breaking it.  
As already stated, I expect to find an already penetrated system of governance in 
Romania. The accession process and especially the process of adopting the “aquis 
communautaire” already transferred powers once belonging to the central government 
towards the EU level: “The process of Europeanisation, i.e. extending the boundaries of the 
relevant political space beyond the member-states, will contribute to a change of 
governance at national and sub-national levels. Being a member of the EU is concomitant 
with the penetration of the governance system; any polity which is part of such a 
penetrated system is bound to change in terms of established patterns of governance.” 
(Kohler-Koch 1998:2). 
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CHAPTER II 
ESCAPING THE DESCRIPTION TRAP: BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION ON ENLARGEMENT, PRE-ACCESSION AID, EU 
COHESION POLICY, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION IN ROMANIA 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, due to the rather recent history this 
research addresses, escaping the trap of description proved difficult. The aim of this 
second, descriptive chapter is twofold: firstly, to present a series of necessary background 
information which, if introduced in the other chapters, would have fragmented them 
significantly and reduced the space for analysis as such. On the other side, this chapter 
gives the possibility to make a choice: the readers already familiar with the subject can 
leave out this background information and go directly to the core analysis, but at the same 
time, it offers other readers, less familiar with the issues addressed, the possibility to  
benefit of a concise overview on the most relevant issued on the basis of the study. In this 
second chapter information on the EU Enlargement Policy, the Romanian case, the EU 
pre-accessions financial support, the evolution of the EU Regional/Cohesion Policy, 
implementation of the EU Cohesion Policy in Romania, legislative framework for regional 
development policy in Romania, i.e. Law no. 315/2004, Public administration organisation 
in Romania will be presented.  
1 EU Enlargement Policy and Romania 
 
 Romania was one of the few communist countries practicing a more independent 
trade policy before 1989. It strongly opposed COMECON31, because of its impact on the 
national sovereignty, and in 1969 followed the Polish example and concluded an 
agreement with the EEC that permitted to a range of Romanian agricultural products to be 
exported to the EC without supplementary levies. In 1976 Romania negotiated an 
agreement on exports of textiles with the EC, followed in 1980 by a full trade and 
cooperation agreement (Grilli 1993, 74). In 1985, Romania expressed its intention to 
further its collaboration with the EC through a renewed trade and co-operation agreement. 
The negotiations for this second trade and co-operation agreement between Romania and 
 
31 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Economic organization from 1949 to 1991, linking the 
USSR with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany (1950–90), Mongolia 
(from 1962), Cuba (from 1972), and Vietnam (from 1978), with Yugoslavia as an associated member. 
Albania also belonged between 1949 and 1961. 
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the EC started in April 1987, and they continued with ups and downs. In June 1989 they 
were interrupted by Ceausescu, due to the events unfolding in the other communist 
countries, which spilled over in the falling of the communist regime in Romania as well. 
After the first Romanian post-communist free elections took place, in May 1990, the 
discussions with the EC were restarted at the initiative of the new Romanian government; 
the new trade and cooperation agreement was signed by the EC in October 1990 and 
entered into force in March 1991. 
 The Romanian Trade and Co-operation Agreement has similar features as the  
agreements signed by the EC with the other ex-communist countries. Practically these 
agreements gather in one single document all previous decisions regarding the trade 
between Romania and UE, i.e. the general agreements and the sectoral ones in agriculture, 
textiles and steel. The EC retained the right to apply safeguards if necessary, while the 
elimination of the other set up quotas was planned. The basic principles of East-West trade 
relationships were reinforced, also the reciprocal “most favoured nation” (MFN) status and 
the elimination of trade barriers (Pinder 1991, 83).      
Continuing to get closer to the EU, in 1993 Romania signed the Europe 
Agreement, instituting an association with the European Communities and their member 
States, agreement which created a free trade zone between the two parts. After the decision 
of the 1993 Copenhagen European Council as regards the possibility of the associated 
states from Central and Eastern Europe to become members of the European Union if they 
meet the necessary economic and political criteria, on 22nd of June 1995 Romania 
submitted its application for EU membership, a few months after the Europe Agreement 
had entered into force (on 1st of February 1995).  
 After the European Commission adopted in 1997 the Agenda 2000, the accession 
process with all 10 CEECs candidate counties and Cyprus was formally launched in 
Brussels on 30th of March 1998. It included a pre-accession strategy, yearly updated after 
1998, the accession negotiations, a “screening” of the EC legislation and a review 
procedure that comprised regularly reports issued by the European Commission. 
 In this context Romania signed in 1998 the Accession Partnership (amended in 
December 1999, January 2002 and May 2003), which identified, on the basis of the 
enlargement talks and the conclusions of the Commission Regular Reports, the short and 
medium-term working priorities Romania needed to address in order to fulfil the accession 
criteria. The Accession Partnerships also indicated the financial assistance made available 
by the European Union in order to support Romania to take the measures necessary for this 
purpose.    
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  In December 2004 the accession negotiations were concluded, and on 25th of April 
2005 Romania signed the Treaty of Accession, becoming an EU member on 1st of January 
2007, in conformity with the accession calendar.  
2 The EU pre-accessions financial support 
 
 In December 1989 PHARE was set up, a programme for financial assistance 
directed initially to Poland and Hungary (the acronym comes from Pologne, Hongrie, 
Assistance à la Réstructuration Economique), extended in the following seven years of 
the 90s to 12 recipient countries (Henderson, 1999, 95). Initially, the programme did not 
provide funding for macro-economic stabilisation, but for micro-economic change, and the 
initial main targets were: privatization, restructuring of enterprises, banking and financial 
services, SMSEs, social issues (Pinder 1991, 90).  
 Romania was included in the PHARE programme in 1990, as the second most 
important net recipient, after Poland. Beginning with 1998, as the enlargement process was 
launched, PHARE’s “pre-accession focus” was enhanced, and it became the main financial 
instrument for the pre-accession strategy implementation, with three objectives:  
1. Strengthening public administrations and institutions to function effectively 
inside the European Union.  
2. Promoting convergence with the European Union’s extensive legislation (the 
acquis communautaire) and reduce the need for transition periods.  
3. Promoting Economic and Social Cohesion32.  
 
In 1998 the financial assistance accorded to Romania amounted to 117 MECU, for 
the priorities identified in the Accession Partnership, and for the participation in the 
Community programmes33. In 1999 Romania was the beneficiary of more that 200 
MEURO. From this amount 166,9 MEURO were allocated to the 1999 National 
Programme, and 50 MEURO for the participation of Romania to general programmes for 
all the candidate countries, in areas like environment, infrastructure, cross-border co-
operation, SMSEs. An additional 5 million were allocated for a cross-border co-operation 
programme (CBC) with Bulgaria and 5 more million for a co-operation programme with 
Hungary. In total the PHARE programme allocated € 1.203 billion to Romania during the 
period 1990-1999. 
 
32 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assistance/phare/index_en.htm, and the Council Regulation 
3906/89, 2005 consolidated version, art. 3 (3) 
33 Funds were provided also under the Catch-up Facility (16 MEURO), for the rehabilitation of the mining 
sector and restructuring of financial institutionsk (1998 Commission Report on Romania, page 7).   
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 In 2000 the EU financial assistance witnessed a major reshuffle, underpinned, on 
one side, by the complexity of the preparations Romania needed to carry out in order to 
become a EU Member, and by the heated discussions on the Financial Framework 2000-
2006 which had to take into account the probability of a new enlargement round to take 
place in this time span. During the 1999 Berlin European Council an agreement was 
reached as regards future allocation to the potential new member states. Two new financial 
instruments, ISPA and SAPARD, were designed to address particular problematic issues in 
the candidate countries, i.e. transport and environmental infrastructure, (future Cohesion 
Fund-like projects) and respectively agriculture (future EAGGF/now EAFRD), allowing 
Phare to concentrate on concrete aspects of the accession process, including preparing for 
implementing Structural Instruments. 
 
After the major reorganization carried out in 2000, Phare’s priorities became 1. 
Institution building and 2. Economic and Social Cohesion. 70% of the total Phare funds 
are invested into the first priority, shared approximately equally by the two sub-priorities 
1.1. Institution Building/ Transfer of know-how and 1.2. Institution Building involving 
Investment. Towards the second priority are directed the rest of the 30% of the funds34. 
The priorities are tightly co-ordinated, investments projects implemented with Phare funds 
acquire added value through specific transfer of knowledge (or the other way around) (see 
also “Guidelines for Implementation of the Phare Programme in Candidate Countries for 
the period 2000-2006”, page 5-8).       
Under Institution Building/Transfer of know-how the candidate countries are 
assisted in their efforts of strengthening the administrative capacity of diverse domestic 
institutions in order for these to cope with the membership requirements. The appropriate 
adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire and automatically the country 
capacity to face the EU membership challenges depend on the professionalism and 
efficiency of the national administration and judiciary. Further than technical assistance 
projects, through two specific sub-programmes, Twinning and, more recently, Twinning 
Light, the expertise of older Member States is made available to candidate countries, 
through long- and medium-term secondment of civil servants and accompanying expert 
missions. The task of reforming administration and judiciary in the CEECs has proved no 
easy job and the value added of these two sub-programmes has been continuously 
confirmed in the last years.  
 
34 There are some slight fluctuations, on a yearly basis: between 28% and 35% of the Phare money goes to 
ESC Component in the years 1998-2004. 
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Institution Building involving Investment concentrates on efforts to be made in 
order for the (future) Member State to align with the EU norms and standards in different 
fields. Investments are made in key regulatory institutions whose equipment or 
infrastructure need to be upgraded in order to monitor and enforce the acquis effectively 
and only on the basis of a clearly-cut government strategy on public administration reform, 
modernisation and governance and in conjunction, if necessary, with Institution Building 
projects involving the transfer of the related “know-how”. 
The second priority of the Phare programme is to co-finance investments in 
Economic and Social Cohesion, through measures similar to those supported in the 
Member States by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European 
Social Fund (ESF). The aim of these investments was to promote the functioning of the 
market economy and the capacity of enterprises to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the EU. The National Development Plan (NDP) represents the key 
planning instrument for the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion Component. This 
document was meant to evolve into the national development plan and programming 
documents a member state should have prepared and submitted to the European 
Commission in accordance with the 1260/1999 Council Regulation in order to receive 
Objective 1-like of assistance from the EU.    
Three types of Phare programmes were implemented in the acceding and candidate 
countries: national, cross-border cooperation (CBC) and multi-country&horizontal 
programmes. The Phare National Programme accounts for the largest part of the budget 
(slightly more than 70% in 200335). The Accession Partnerships, Regular Reports and the 
National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) constitute the basis for 
Phare programming (see Chapter III).     
The Phare Cross-Border Co-operation Programme assists border regions of 
acceding, candidate and neighbouring counties to surmount together specific development 
problems. In long run CBC projects are meant to accelerate the economic convergence of 
applicant countries within the European Union in a balanced manner that prevents the 
emergence of peripheral economic zones, and to prepare candidate countries for future 
participation in the INTERREG community initiative, currently the third objective of the 
EU Cohesion Policy, “European Territorial Cooperation”. 
The assistance provided under Multi-Country & Horizontal Programmes has been 
gradually more integrated into the national programmes. Therefore, “multi-country 
 
35 See the website of the DG Enlargement: http://www.europa.eu.int /comm/enlargement/pas/ phare/ 
programmes/ index.htm 
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programmes are now used only in cases where their adequacy is specifically demonstrated 
or where they can be considered as the most efficient and effective delivery instrument in 
view of economies of scale or the need to promote regional co-operation”36. These 
programmes were developed in co-operation with International Institutions (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, the Nordic 
Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) the Council of Europe Development Bank 
(CEB), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) and support small and medium size 
enterprises and municipal infrastructure; fight against fraud, nuclear safety and the 
introduction of the Extended Decentralised Implementation System (EDIS).      
 Romania also took part prior accession in several Community programmes, 
beginning with 1st of August 1996, e.g. to Leonardo da Vinci, Socrates and Youth for 
Europe. 
 
ISPA 
The main goal of the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession was to  
support the accession countries to comply with the European legislation in force for 
environment (drinking water, treatment of waste water, solid-waste management, air 
pollution) and transport. The adopted approach is similar to that of the Cohesion Fund; 
minimum grants of 5 million are allocated for projects in transportation and environment. 
Project proposals, submitted through the National ISPA Co-ordinator in the 
candidate country, are evaluated by the European Commission, which takes decisions 
regarding the projects to be financed upon the opinion of the ISPA Management 
Committee. 
 
SAPARD 
The SAPARD programme was designed with the aim of supporting the efforts 
made by the candidate countries to prepare for their participation in the Common 
Agricultural Policy and the Single Market. Its operational objectives were to help solve the 
priority and specific problems in agriculture and rural development and to contribute to the 
implementation of the acquis communautaire concerning the CAP and other agricultural 
priorities. 
 
36 Idem 
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Among the 15 eligible measures under SAPARD criteria the most important are: 
investment in processing and marketing (26% of the budget), investment in agricultural 
holdings (20%), investment in the rural infrastructure (20%), diversification of activities 
(11%), improving controls of quality, veterinary and plant health, for producer groups, and 
land registers. 
 The SAPARD Agencies, either located in the National Ministry of Agriculture, or 
established as separate entities under the aegis of the Minister of Agriculture were 
responsible for project selection, management, arranging finance and carrying out controls.  
3 The EU Regional/Cohesion Policy 
 
Initially seen as a side payment system for poorer EU member countries and aimed 
at lubricating additional economic integration, the EU Cohesion Policy has turned in the 
last decade into one of the corner-stone policies of the European Union.  
Between 1958 and 1975 a common regional policy was not one of the objectives of 
the European Community, even if, especially at the end of the 60’s, several appeals for 
such a policy were made to the EC institutions, e.g. the Werner Report. In the Treaty of 
Rome the principle of cohesion was mentioned only in the preamble. Nevertheless, in this 
time frame two funds, the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), the latter serving mainly the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the EC, were set up.  
In 1975 the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established. This 
development was determined by the first enlargement EU underwent in 1973 when, finally 
surmounting the French opposition, UK, together with Ireland and Denmark, joined the 
EC. Until 1988, the Commission acted as a mere administrator of the ERDF, and the funds 
were distributed according to a quota system; the European Council, consequently the 
Member States, had decision-making rights as regards these financial allocation.   
Between 1988 and 1999 the Structural Funds and the Regional Policy were subjects 
of a series of reforms, the most paramount being introduced in 1988. For one more time 
enlargement had a heavy word to say in the bargaining process preceding this historical 
moment. In 1981 Greece and in 1985 Spain and Portugal became EC members. As the UK 
and Ireland in the previous decade, several regions in these three lands were less developed 
than the European average and a strong coalition was possible, coalition which convinced 
wealthier countries (i.e. Germany, till 1993 paymaster) to accord financial compensations 
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meant to balance the negative effects the common market completion had on their 
economies.  
Signed in 1986, the Single European Act succeeded in balancing the interests of all 
member states, the widening vs. deepening camps, by adding to the Treaty of Rome a new 
title on regional policy. The 1988 reform brought the ERDF, ESF, EAGGF together under 
the common framework known as the Structural Funds, doubled their budget and 
introduced a series of objectives and principle for granting funds to regions. From 
institutional point of view the Commission registered a remarkable increase in power. 
From a mere administrator of the ERDF it emerged as a pivotal actor in the process of 
drafting regulations and it had exclusive right of proposing the relevant legislation and the 
list with regions eligible for funding. The sub-national actors’ (SNAs) role in the policy 
making process is enhanced by the introduction of the “partnership principle”.  
 In 1993 the policy was not radically reformed, but a shift of power back to the 
member states took place; nevertheless, even if the national governments were drafting the 
list with eligible regions, the Commission remained arbiter of the process. The Maastricht 
Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, had a particular significance for furthering the 
position of the Regional Policy among other European policies, as the Cohesion Fund and 
the Committee of Regions37 were established. The Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance (FIFG) was also set up in this period.  
In 1999, the Berlin European Council approved the Agenda 2000 proposed by the 
European Commission and reformed significantly the Structural Funds regulations and the 
management and implementation mechanisms as an answer to the challenges the largest 
enlargement round in the history of the EU would raise (see also Peterson&Bomberg 
1999:153). Following the same lines as the SEA and the ToEU, Agenda 2000 reassessed 
the importance of economic and social cohesion. The common principles, i.e. 
 
37 Set up by the Maastricht Treaty, the CoR met for the first time in March 1994. Initially the CoR was 
obligatorily consulted in five areas, i.e. economic and social cohesion; trans-European networks in the field 
of transport, energy and telecommunications; public health; education and youth; culture. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam added a further five: employment, social policy, environment, vocational training and transport. 
The Committee is composed of 222 members and 222 alternate members, appointed for 4 years by the 
Council, after having been nominated by member states. The members are organised in four political groups: 
the Party of European Socialists, the European People's Party, the European Liberal Democrats and Reform 
Party the European Alliance. A President and First-Vice President are elected for a two year term by the 
members of the Committee. The Bureau is responsible for implementing the CoR's political programme. It is 
elected for 2 years from the Committee members. It consists of 40 members including the President and First 
Vice President. These three institutions are the most powerful in the framework of the CoR. Nevertheless, 
there are also 6 CoR Commissions, made up of CoR members, specialising in particular policy areas as noted 
below: Commission for Territorial Cohesion Policy, Commission for Economic and Social Policy, 
Commission for Sustainable Development, Commission for Culture and Education, Commission for 
Constitutional Affairs and European Governance, Commission for External Relations 
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concentration38, programming39, partnership40, additionality41, simplification, and the 
objectives of the Regional Policy were restated and adapted to the new situation. Agenda 
2000 also proposed a greater role to be played by the Member States in the day to day 
administration and monitoring of the funds. The ceiling of 0.46% of the EU GDP as 
structural expenditures was maintained, while the conflict between net-beneficiary 
countries which would have lost their structural funds not because their GDP is higher but 
because poorer regions are entering EU (the so called statistical effect) was resolved by 
according them transitional support until 2005 and beyond. 
Before 1999 the EU regional policy had 6 objectives42; for the sake of 
simplification in the 2000-2006 programming period these were reduced to 3 in order for 
the structural expenditures to be concentrated in the most needed areas and social groups.  
Under the first objective (Objective 1 - territorial) structural financial assistance 
was accorded to NUTS 243 regions whose development is lagging behind, whose per 
capita GDP is lower that 75% of the EU GDP average, in order to catch up with the better 
performing European regions; under this objective infrastructure projects and investments 
 
38 The Funds would be concentrated in the most disadvantaged regions (lagging ones, declining industrial 
area, high unemployment, need of workers adaptation and rural development) 
39 Abandonment of short-term project-by-project programmes and its replacement by specific multi-annual 
programmes of three of five years.   
40 Involvement in the preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of programmes by different levels of 
government: the Commission, member states and the relevant authority at local, regional or national level, 
including private and social partners and other relevant organisations. 
41 Structural Funds should be additional to, and not simply a substitute for, existing or planned domestic  
investments. 
42  1. Assisting underdeveloped regions (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF and FIFG); 2. Assisting regions affected by 
the decline of traditional industries (ERDF and ESF); 3. Combating long-term unemployment and the 
integration of young people into the labour market (ESF); 4. Helping workers adapt to technological change 
(ESF); 5. (a) Structural reform of agriculture, including fisheries (EAGGF); (b) Helping the development of 
rural areas (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF and FIFG); 6. Assisting rural Arctic regions and areas of very low 
population density (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF and FIFG). 
43 NUTS is a hierarchical classification on 5 levels (3 are regional and 2 are local) of the administrative 
structures already in place in Member States. It was set up by the European Office for Statistics (Eurostat) in 
order to place the divers administrative systems of the member states in a single and coherent structure of 
territorial distribution in the EU. NUTS has no legal value per se, its form is the consequence of a 
“gentlemen’s agreement” between the Member States and not of an administrative reforming or harmonising 
process initiated at the European level. Nevertheless, it has been used in the Community legislation 
pertaining to the Structural Funds since 1988. In 2003 the NUTS was reformed in order to manage the 
inevitable changing process the administrative systems of the present and future Member States have suffered 
in the last years. A new Regulation43 establishes the new form in which the NUTS  is presented, i.e. in lists 
and maps.  There are 78 NUTS 1 regions, with a population between 3 and 7 million people. The German 
Länder, regions in Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Wales and Scotland, comunidades autonomas in 
Spain,  régions in France, regioni in Italy are classified in this category. The NUTS 2 level counts 210 
regions with a population between 800.000 and 3 million people. Among them the Kreise in Germany, 
départements in France, provincias in Spain, provincie in Italy, etc. can be found.  The NUTS 3 regions are 
more numerous (1093) with a population between 15000-800.000. NUTS 4 is defined only for certain 
countries: Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, UK. Together with the NUTS 5 regions, actually 
districts and municipalities, they are called "Local Administrative Units" (LAU) and are not subject of the 
NUTS 2003 Regulation.  
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in business economic activity were financed; 50 regions, representing 22% of the Union's 
population benefited from 70% of the funding available under Objective 1.  
The Objective 2 (territorial) supported economic and social conversion in 
industrial, rural, urban or fisheries-dependent areas facing structural difficulties. It covered 
18% of the Union's population and it amounted to 11.5% of total funding. 
The third Objective (Objective 3) was not a territorial but a thematic one. It aimed 
to half modernising the systems of training and promoting employment. Measures 
financed by Objective 3 cover the whole Union except for the Objective 1 regions where 
measures for training and employment were included in the catching-up programmes. 
12.3% of total funding was dedicated to this third objective.  
During the 2000-2006 programming period, the EU Regional Policy was 
implemented through four Structural Funds, i.e. the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG), the "Guidance" Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF - Guidance) and the Cohesion Fund.  
The ERDF is the most important structural fund; it aims to restore regional 
imbalances in the Community and to promote stable and sustainable development. Its main 
fields of intervention are productive investment to create/safeguard permanent jobs, 
infrastructure, enhancing endogenous potential: local development & SMSEs, technical 
assistance. The ESF mainly aims to develop human resources and eliminate 
unemployment and social exclusion. It supports the multi-annual National Action Plans in 
this field through active labour market policies promoting integration and re-integration, 
equal opportunities on the labour market, helping lifelong learning systems and training for 
innovation and adaptability to be design and successfully implemented. The Guidance 
section of the EAGGF supported the CAP and the improvement of agricultural structures. 
Its fields of intervention were mainly “accompanying” measures to the CAP, i.e. 
promoting early retirement, agri-environment, forestry, restructuring farms, setting up of 
young farmers, training, processing and marketing and other rural development measures.  
The Cohesion Fund was set up to enable some Member States to join the final phase of 
the EMU as quickly as possible. Eligible for the Cohesion Fund were the Member States of 
the EU with a per capita GDP of less than 90% of the Community average: Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain. The CF was not created for regions per se, but in order to support 
the development of an entire country. It finances projects in environment and infrastructure 
(trans-European networks). The 2000-2006 cohesion budget amounted to 18 billion 
EURO, Spain being the main beneficiary.  
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 Four separate Community Initiatives, the Interreg III, Urban II, Leader+, Equal, 
were also implemented in the 2000-6 programming period, financed through the ERDF 
and the ESF. For these innovative instruments, the Commission and the eligible 
regions/actors were the main decision factors. This gave the Commission the possibility to 
“import” its objectives and implementing mechanisms in the member states and empower 
financially the regions. The state could be bypassed to a large extent by both actors. The 
less complicated granting, implementing and monitoring mechanism used could generate 
lessons to be applied in the management of the structural funds in a future programming 
period. 
4 Implementation of the EU Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 in Romania 
 
 
The preparatory work for the 2007-2013 programming period started early in 
Romania, in the framework of the discussions with the European Commission on the 
negotiation Chapter 21 „Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments”. 
As these technical discussions were based on the European legislation in place at that date, 
i.e. Council Regulation no. 1260/1999, and the subsequent funds-specific regulations, a 
(national) development plan needed to be drafted, to include the analysis of the socio-
economic development of Romania in the light of the objectives of the Cohesion Policy 
and the strategy, the planned priority actions, their specific objectives and the related 
indicative financial resources. (Council Regulation 1260/1999, Art. 9) 
In December 2005 the National Development Plan was finalised, after almost two 
years of intensive consultations with its public and private stakeholders. As explained also 
in the plan as such, the NDP was developed specifically for the implementation of the EU 
Cohesion Policy and, despite its title, it was not meant to replace the overall, national 
strategy for economic development, embodied by the National Economic Development 
Strategy; its purpose was to plan how the European funds, including agricultural, are to be 
deployed in Romania between 2007-13 (/15).  
Drafting the NDP 2007-13 traces back to pre-accession assistance, as NDPs were 
drafted also for the periods 2002-2005, 2004-2006, and by the same institution, i.e. 
National Aid Coordinator, which, beginning with 2004, coordinated the Managing 
Authority for the Community Support Framework, currently the Authority for the 
Coordination of Structural Instruments within the Ministry of Economy and Finance (see 
Annex 1). The continuity of this activity and its location in the same department 
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contributed to the building up of expertise in this field, therefore the learning effect from 
pre-accession towards post-accession phase was very strong in this respect.  
As a result of the analysis carried out in the National Development Plan 2007-2013, the 
Romanian government decided on six national development priorities:  
 
1. Increasing economic competitiveness and developing an economy based on 
knowledge;  
2. Developing and modernizing transport infrastructure;  
3. Protecting and improving the quality of the environment;  
4. Developing human resources, promoting employment and social inclusion and 
strengthening administrative capacity;  
5. Developing rural economy and increasing productivity in the farming sector;  
6. Diminishing development disparities between country regions 
 
On the basis of the National Development Plan and of the Community Strategic 
Guidelines, the National Strategic Reference Framework 2007-2013 was elaborated; its 
main “raison d’être” is to strengthen the strategic focus of the Economic and Social 
Cohesion policies across Romania and to make the correct and appropriate linkages to 
other European Union policies and the Lisbon Strategy, the latest focuses on policies for 
growth and the creation of jobs (NSRF, page 9, in accordance with Council Regulation 
1083/2006, art. 27). 
The overall objective of the NSRF is to reduce the economic and social 
development disparities between Romania and the EU Member States, by generating a 15-
20% additional growth of the GDP by 2015. In order to attain this goal, the NSRF sets 5 
development priorities, reflecting strongly the conclusions of the NDP.  
 
1. Development of Basic Infrastructure to European Standards  
2. Increasing Long-term Competitiveness of the Romanian Economy  
3. Development and More Efficient Use of Romania’s Human Capital  
4. Building an Effective Administrative Capacity  
5. Promoting Balanced Territorial Development 
 
Following the separation at European level between Cohesion and Agricultural 
Policy, the NSRF does not cover the issues of agriculture and rural development, the fifth 
priority of the NDP being implemented though the National Plan for Rural Development, 
managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Nevertheless, the NSRF 
does cover Objective 3 funding, although, due to the specific characteristics of the relevant 
operational programmes, their preparation took, at a certain point, a separate route, along 
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which the dedicated general direction within the Ministry of European Integration/Ministry 
of Development, Public Works and Housing, collaborated more closely with the 
neighbouring and partner countries, under the coordination of the European Commission.       
In drafting the NSRF the Community Strategic Guidelines were closely observed44. 
The NSRF 2007-2013 is also synchronized with the National Reform Programme 2007-
2010, elaborated by the Department of European Affairs, under the direct coordination of 
the Prime-Minister Cabinet. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that, although new 
member states do not need to earmark the funds deployed in order to attain the Lisbon 
goals out of the total allocation, more than 50% of the funds are dedicated by the 
Romanian government to Lisbon-related expenditures (NSRF, 2007, page 155).        
The National Strategic Reference Framework is implemented through 7 
Operational Programmes under the Convergence Objective45 and 11 OPs under the 
European Cooperation Objective. An overview of these operational programmes, their 
managing authorities and intermediate bodies, and the European fund they are financed 
from is made in the following table.  
Table 2. 2007-2013 Operational Programmes, MAs, IBs and sources  
Operational 
Programme 
Managing Authority Intermediate Body Fund 
Convergence Objective 
SOP Increase of 
Economic 
Competitiveness 
Ministry of Economy and 
Finance 
Ministry for Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises, Trade, Tourism 
and Liberal Professions 
Ministry of Education, Research 
and Youth (National Authority for 
Scientific Research) 
Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology 
Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (Energy Policy General 
Directorate) 
ERDF 
SOP Transport  Ministry of Transport - ERDF + CF 
SOP Environment Ministry of Environment 
and Sustainable 
Development 
8 regional IBs coordinated by 
MESD 
ERDF + CF 
Regional OP Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and Housing 
Regional Development Agencies ERDF  
SOP Human 
Resources 
Development 
Ministry of Labour, 
Family and Equal 
Opportunities 
 
National Agency for Employment 
8 regional IBs coordinated by the 
MoLFEO 
Ministry of Education, Research 
and Youth 
National Center for 
Development of TVET 
ESF 
 
44 The annex 1 of the NSRF draws clear connections between the NSRF priorities and the community 
guidelines. 
45 As all 8 Romanian development regions are Convergence regions. 
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Operational 
Programme 
Managing Authority Intermediate Body Fund 
OP 
Administrative 
Capacity 
Development 
Ministry of Interior and 
Administrative Reform 
- ESF 
OP Technical 
Assistance  
Ministry of Economy and 
Finance - 
ERDF 
European Territorial Cooperation Objective 
OP Cross-border 
Cooperation 
(CBC) Hungary–
Romania  
National Development 
Agency (Hungary) Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing in Romania 
Will act as National Authority 
ERDF 
OP CBC 
Romania–
Bulgaria  
Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and Housing - 
ERDF 
OP CBC 
Romania – 
Serbia  
Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and Housing - 
ERDF (transfers 
to IPA) 
OP CBC 
Romania – 
Ukraine – 
Moldova 
Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and Housing - 
ERDF (transfers 
to ENPI) 
OP CBC 
Hungary - 
Slovakia – 
Romania – 
Ukraine 
National Development 
Agency (Hungary) Ministry of Development, Public 
Works and Housing in Romania 
will act as National Authority 
ERDF (transfers 
to ENPI) 
OP CBC Black 
Sea Basin 
Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and Housing - 
ERDF (transfers 
to ENPI) 
OP South-East 
European Space 
Ministry of Local 
Government and Spatial 
Development (Hungary) 
Ministry of Development, Public 
Works and Housing in Romania 
will act as National Authority and 
National Contact Point  
ERDF 
OPs Inter-regional
Cooperation 
 
INTERREGIVC 
URBACT II 
ESPON 2013 
INTERRACT II 
 
 
 
France 
France 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Ministry of Development, Public 
Works and Housing in Romania 
will act as National Authority and 
National Contact Point - 
ERDF 
Source: NSRF 2007-2013, 2007, pages 6-7 
 
The coordination of the NSRF implementation is undertaken in a series of 
committees, at political and technical level (see also the National Strategic Reference 
Framework, pages 161-2). These committees are analysed in detail in the chapter V.    
1. National Coordination Committee for Structural Instruments, established in 
order to provide strategic guidance and decision-making at political level; 
2. Management Co-ordination Committee, which will address management, 
administrative and horizontal issues with relevance to the OPs; 
3. Regional coordination committees, established in the 8 Regions, in order to 
assist in the correlation of interventions amongst the Operational Programmes; 
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4. Working Groups. 
5 Legislative framework for regional development policy in Romania, 
Law no. 315/2004 
 
 
The first Romanian Law on Regional Development no. 251/1998 was drafted on 
the basis of the Green Paper on Regionalisation in Romania, which was released in 1997. 
In the following years, in the light of the implementation of the Phare Economic and Social 
Cohesion Component, and in the context of the negotiations between Romania and the 
European Commission on the Chapter 21 “Regional policy and the coordination of 
structural instruments”, some adjustments needed to be made to this initial legislative 
framework.  
The main changes operated to the new Law on Regional Development 315/2004 
were meant to clarify the issue of development regions in Romania (the NUTS 2 regions 
needed to be recognised by law) the issue of financing the RDAs46, and the competencies 
of the institutions involved in the management of Regional Development Plans, as a result 
of the experience already accumulated and with a view to 2007-13 period.  
In this respect, the Law no. 315/2004 specifies clearly which the 8 development 
regions (NUTS II)  are (see Table 2.) and the counties forming them and decides that, 
when the Regional Development Agencies carry out certain tasks as required by other 
(national) institutions, e.g. implementation of ROP operations, this happens on the basis of 
a legal agreement, which stipulates the competencies and responsibilities of the RDAs and 
the financial means deployed by the latest in exchange of the services the RDAs provide.      
 
Table 3. RDAs, their capitals and the counties they incorporate  
Development region Capital Counties 
Development Region North-East  Piatra-Neamt Bacau, Botosani, Iasi, Neamt, 
Suceava, Vaslui 
Development Region South-East Braila Braila, Buzau, Constanta, Galati, 
Tulcea, Vrancea 
Development Region South 
Muntenia 
Calarasi Arges, Calarasi, Dambovita, Giurgiu, 
Ialomita, Prahova, Teleorman 
Development Region South-West 
Oltenia  
Craiova Dolj, Gorj, Mahedinti, Olt, Valcea 
 
46 Initially the activity of the RDAs supposed to be supported financially by the counties and municipalities. 
Some of these refused to make the respective payments, as they didn’t have any direct benefit (financed 
projects) from the activity of these agencies. This situation ran some of the agencies into financial crisis and 
incapacity of carrying out their tasks (see the interviews résumés , presented in the annexes 11-20). 
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Development Region West Timisoara Arad, Caras-Severin, Hunedoara, 
Timis 
Development Region North -West 
Oltenia 
Cluj-Napoca Bihor, Bistrita-Nasaud, Cluj, 
Maramures, Satu Mare, Salaj 
Development Region Centre Alba Iulia Alba, Brasov, Covasna, Harghita, 
Mures, Sibiu 
Development Region Bucharest-
Ilfov 
Bucharest Country Capital - Bucharest and Ilfov 
County 
 
The institutions involved in regional policy at regional and national level are almost 
the same as in 1998, with one exception: mirroring the reality, the National Agency for 
Regional Development is replaced by the Ministry of European Integration47, as national 
institution responsible with the elaboration, promotion, coordination, management, 
implementation, and monitoring of the regional development strategies and policies in 
Romania, and of other social and cohesion programmes (Art. 13)48. 
The new law details the competencies of the Regional Development Agencies, 
Regional Development Boards and of the National Board for Regional Development, as 
presented further. The law also introduced a definition and the principles of regional 
development policy in Romania, emphasises the principle of partnership, further than 
subsidiarity and decentralisation.   
Regional development policy is defined by the Law on Regional Development no. 
315/2004 as representing: 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
“…the set of policies elaborated by the Government, through the bodies of central public 
administration, by the local public administration, and specialised regional bodies, after 
consulting the involved socio-economic partners, with the aims of assuring economic growth and 
sustainable and balanced social development of a series of geographical areas constituted in 
development regions, of improving Romania’s international competitiveness and of reducing 
economic and social development gaps existing between Romania and the EU member states.”     
 
The current objectives of the regional development policy in Romania are: 
a) to diminish existing regional imbalances through stimulating balanced 
development, fast catching up with the delays in the economic and social fields of 
 
47 From this point of view the law already necessitates further revision, as the MEI become Ministry of 
Development, Public Works and Housing 
48 The last part of this article (“of social and cohesion programmes”) can, and has, create(d) confusion, as it 
could be interpreted as rendering the MDPWH responsible for (all 7) social and cohesion programmes, 
functions fulfilled by the Ministry of Economy and Finance through the Authority for Coordination of 
Structural Instruments (ACIS). Even if this article 13 was drafted before the National Aid Coordinator, 
subsequently combined with the SIs preparatory function, moved to the Ministry of Finance in 2004, it still 
needs redrafting, in order to clarify the institution responsible with regional policy in Romania, and the scope 
of its competencies and responsibilities. 
 67
the less developed areas, delays occurred due to certain historical, geographical, 
economic, social, political factors, and to prevent the occurence of new imbalances. 
b) to correlate the sectoral governmental policies at regional level through stimulating 
local and regional initiatives and full use of local and regional resources, with a 
view to stimulate socio-economic and cultural development.49         
The structures involved at regional level in regional development are the same as 
provided for in the Law no. 251/1998, the Regional Development Boards and the Regional 
Development Agencies. 
5.1 The Regional Development Boards 
Composed of presidents of the county councils, one representative of each category 
of local administration: municipality, towns and communes councils from each county of 
the region (see Annex 2), mainly coordinate the regional policy development and monitor 
the activities carried out in this framework. Each county council president takes over for 
one year the RDB presidency. In accordance with the Law 315/2004, the competencies of 
the RDBs are:  
PROGRAMMING 
o to analyse and approve the regional development strategy and programmes 
o to contribute to the elaboration of the National Development Plan 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o to approve the regional development projects, selected at regional level in 
accordance with the criteria, priorities and methodology elaborated by the 
national institution responsible with regional development policy, i.e. MDPWH, 
together with specialised regional institutions 
o to transmit to the National Board of Regional Development the projects this 
needs to approve at national level 
o to approve the criteria, priorities, financial allocation of the Regional 
Development Fund (to be approved by the National Board as well) 
o to propose to the National Board the annual contributions to be allocated to the 
Regional Development Fund from the county/Bucharest agreed budgets (these 
contributions, provided for in the annual budgets, are transferred to the Regional 
Development Fund every three months) 
o to attract other financial contributions, local and regional, with a view to attain 
the objectives of the regional development policy 
o to approve the bi-annual activity reports issued by the RDAs 
 
INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY 
o to coordinate and supports the development of regional partnerships and the 
information and communication activities 
 
 
49 The interregional, cross-border objective is not treated in this research.  
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5.2 The Regional Development Agencies 
In each development region functions a Regional Development Agency, as non-
governmental, not-for-profit body, of public utility, with legal personality. The RDAs have 
the following main competencies: 
PROGRAMMING 
o drafts and proposes to the RDB the regional development strategy, plan and 
programmes, and the plans to manage the funds 
o fulfils its attributions as regards the drafting of the National Development Plan 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o assures the implementation of the regional development programmes and of the 
funds management plans, in accordance with the decisions of the RDB, and 
national legislation in force 
o solicit to the national institution responsible with regional development amounts 
from the National Regional Development Fund, in order to finance the approved 
projects 
o attracts further resources, together with the RDB, in order to fulfil its attributions  
o assures the technical and financial management of the Regional Development 
Fund 
o it is accountable for the managed funds, to the RDB and MDPWH 
o sends the selected projects to the RDB, for approval; projects selected at regional 
level in accordance with the criteria, priorities and methodology elaborated by 
the national institution responsible with regional development policy, i.e. 
MDPWH, together with specialised regional institutions 
o organises and develops, with the support and under the coordination of the RDB, 
the regional partnerships 
o identifies and promotes, in partnership, projects of local, regional and intra-
regional interest, promotes the region, with the support of the RDB, and attracts 
foreign investments 
o assures the secretariat of the RDB 
o fulfils the contractual obligations and is responsible for their realisation, in 
accordance with the performance criteria and indicators established in the 
mentioned contracts 
o drafts bi-annual activity reports, to be approved by RDB and the national 
institution responsible with regional development policy, i.e. MDPWH,  
 
OPERATIONAL MONITORING 
o assures the and it is accountable for the implementation, technical and financial 
monitoring, and the control of the projects financed with European or national 
funds in the framework of the regional development programmes 
o assures, together with the specialised regional bodies, the data collection and 
aggregation at regional level, as regards the implementation of the non-
reimbursable funds allocated to the region 
 
INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY 
o organises at regional level the agreed information and publicity campaigns, as 
regards the regional development programmes and projects 
 
OTHERS 
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o signs contracts, conventions, agreements and protocols etc. with third parties, 
including EU institutions, in its field of activity, and submits them for the RDB 
approval 
 
The regional development programmes and the operational costs of the RDAs are 
to be financed from the Regional Development Fund, which is fuelled by: 1. the National 
Fund for Regional Development, 2. county councils/Bucharest council contributions, 3. 
other sources: private sector, banks, EU, other donors.  
5.3 The National Board of Regional Development 
At national level, the National Board of Regional Development coordinates the 
regional development policy in Romania. The NBRD is composed of the presidents and 
vice-presidents of the 8 Regional Development Boards and the same number of 
Government representatives, i.e. ministries involved in the implementation of the regional 
development policy; the NBRD is presided by the head of the national institution 
responsible with the regional development policy, i.e. ministry, who can delegate his/her 
tasks to a state secretary. The main competencies of the NBRD are: 
 
PROGRAMMING 
o endorses the policies and the national strategy for regional development, and the 
National Development Plan 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o approves the criteria and priorities as regards the utilisation of the National Fund 
for Regional Development 
o submits to the Government, for approval, the priority programmes financed from 
the NFRD, 
o proposes the deployment mechanism for the pre-accession funds allocated to 
Romania in the pre-accession period 
o endorses the projects proposed by the RDAs and approved by the RDBs, to be 
financed through regional development programmes, as regards the projects 
selected at regional level 
o approves the projects proposed by the RDAs and approved by the RDBs, to be 
financed through regional development programmes, as regards the projects 
selected at national level 
 
STRATEGIC MONITORING 
o analyses the deployment of the funds allocated to the RDAs from the NFRD, on 
the basis of the monitoring reports drafted and submitted by the RDBs 
o monitors the attainment of the regional development objectives, including in the 
framework of the external, interregional, trans-regional, cross-border cooperation 
o analyses and approves the activity reports presented by the National Coordination 
Committee for Phare Programmes, ESC Component, and the proposals made by 
this committee.  
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The National Fund for Regional Development finances multi-annual regional 
development programmes; this fund gathers national funds, as specially allocated in the 
national budget for the regional development programmes financed only from the state 
budget (sic!), and non-reimbursable financial support as received from other governments, 
international organisations, banks.     
6 Public administration organisation in Romania 
 
As the following chapter of the thesis will analyse in detail the evolution of the 
administrative system in Romania, this part limits itself to making a sketch of its current 
structure, as set up by the 2003 Constitution and regulated by the organic laws in force.    
At central level, the Romanian public administration is organised under the 
coordination of the government, in Ministries, whose number can and has varied greatly 
after 1989. The ministries can be supported in their activity by specialised agencies. 
The local administration in Romania is organized on two tiers: localities and 
counties. Formally, there is no hierarchical administrative subordination between localities, 
counties and the central government, each constituting a component of the public sector 
with full political legitimacy. 
 
Source: Sorin Ionita, 2003, 450  
 
 
50 http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/publications_wpc/sar_wp25.pdf
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At the level of localities (urban and rural), and at county level, a local council and a 
mayor, respectively, a county council are elected each 4 years. The president and the two 
vice-presidents of the county council are elected by and among its members. 
The prefect is the representative of the government in each county and in 
Bucharest. He/she manages the deconcentrated services of the central administration in the 
respective administrative-territorial unit. As in detail presented in the chapter III, if until 
2006 the prefect was a political figure, from that date one this position needs to be fulfilled 
by a high civil servant, not politically affiliated.    
According to the mentioned legal sources, the principles set at the basis of the 
organisation and functioning of the Romanian public administration are: decentralisation, 
local autonomy and public services deconcentration.    
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CHAPTER III 
THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: HISTORY, 
ORGANISATION,  MODUS OPERANDI,  DECENTRALISATION 
PROCESS  
1 Introduction 
 
The rationale of this chapter is three-fold: firstly, in accordance with the MLG 
theory, informal realities in a country could significantly alter the formal image of a 
governance system51; this assertion matches very well to the situation in Romania, where 
“informal realities dominate by far the formal ones” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002b, 27). 
Secondly, the administrative capacity of central and local public institutions 
represent one of the strongest determinants of the timely, efficient and effective absorption 
of European funds, from both supply and demand sides: as funds suppliers, the (mostly 
central and regional) institutions in charge with the management and implementation of 
both Phare and SIs need to have the adequate capacity to carry out their tasks and to 
achieve the proposed output, results and impact of the programmes under their 
responsibility. On the demand side, as funds beneficiaries, the public institutions, at all 
layers, need to be able to access the funds made available for them, and implement their 
projects in conformity with the applicable rules and regulations in force. For both sides co-
financing capacity is important, especially in the context of SIs, where the additionality 
principle is very closely observed. 
Thirdly, the evolution, directions and effects of the public administration reform, in 
both its considered dimensions, i.e. “horizontal” and “vertical”, give real indications as 
regards the possible evolution of the regionalisation process in Romania. The limited 
progress registered in reforming the public administration and the status-quo in this field, 
in both organisational and mental-framework terms, will push for a delay of the 
regionalisation process, especially now, that the European influence in this direction 
disappeared. 
This chapter presents the factors hampering the public administration reform in 
Romania; subsequently, it explains, on one side, why the European Union as such chose to 
implement centrally the pre-accession aid (as it repeatedly emphasised in the 1991 
 
51 As William Riker has stressed, a narrow focus on formal institutions is likely to underestimate informal 
relationships. If decision makers at different levels of a polity are coordinated in a centralized political party, 
the polity may be far more centralized than it formally appears (quoted by Marks&Hooghe 2001a, 3). 
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Framework Agreement52 signed between the, by than, European Economic Community 
and Romania) and continues this approach for Structural Instruments. On the other side, as 
mentioned before, the state of affairs as regards public administration in Romania and its 
horizontal and vertical reform gives an indication about the “speed” regionalisation will be 
continued in this country in short and medium terms (5-10 years).    
 
Theoretically, to a political power freely elected in a certain territorial unit 
corresponds an autonomous and stabile administrative sector responsive to the orders of 
the respective political power (Ghinea 2002, 158). Due to a long tradition of administration 
politicisation, whose summit was represented by the communist regime, separating politics 
from administration in Romania has been difficult after the regime change.  
The Romanian public life is still dominated by informal institutions; two factors are 
determinant for this situation: 1. historic underdevelopment (in less developed societies 
the unwritten laws are more important than the written ones, most of the time imported and 
unfitted with the local traditions) and 2. communism, which developed so aberrant and 
unviable formal institutions, that eluding and substituting them with informal ones became 
a surviving strategy, e.g. the black market (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002b, 27). The totalitarian 
regime in Romania subordinated and prescribed its political, socio-economic and cultural 
development; the opposition against communism was feeble, insufficient for the building 
up of a generation of future leaders who could appropriately manage the post-communist 
period. Unfortunately, the post-communist regime hasn’t succeeded in excluding from its 
political-administrative and socio-economic life important actors which played an active 
role during the communist regime (Ionita, 2002, 123). Together with these actors, a mental 
framework and certain patterns of action survived within the political-administrative 
system and among the citizens. Even if significant changes have been operated at formal 
level, i.e. new legislation and reform strategies  were adopted and institutions for their 
implementation were created, these have limited impact, as we see from the last relevant 
official documents, i.e. the OP Development of Administrative Capacity, the 2007 
Monitoring Report on Romania (and Bulgaria) issued by the European Commission, the 
2008 Interim Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (February 2008), 
the 2008 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (August 2008), 
 
52http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/2002-000-586.01%20to%20586.06. 
pdf (pages 4-14) 
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the 2007 Transparency International Romania National Corruption Report and the 2008 
SAR Annual Analysis and Forecast Report. As in many incompletely modernised 
countries, Romania stays to a great part in the informal zone. The new formal laws have 
failed in many fields to accommodate the reality on the ground; therefore, they turned into 
another set of impractical rules the population resists the same way it did during the 
communist times, through reinforcing certain informal institutions, e.g. petty corruption in 
the public health system.  
 
The first part of this chapter makes an excursion into the history of Romanian 
public administration as its evolution in time determines its current construction and 
“modus operandi”. The permanent presence of the “judet” as territorial-administrative unit 
resulted in its solid anchoring in the people’s mental framework and identity, significant 
factor which needs to be taken into account when, and if, a more radical re-organisation of 
the territorial-administration system is planned. Further than simple presence, the “judete” 
make a clear case of “territorialisation” of power: a new, regional, governmental tier needs 
to fight the “judet” level, as the later will not accept easily to give up some of its 
competences in favour of a regional tier. The regionalisation type currently practiced in 
Romania already gives some indications that this is the general tendency; when they were 
set up, the RDAs encountered significant difficulties in trying to legitimise their activities, 
perceived as competition by the counties.  
In the third and fourth sub-chapters the “modus operandi” of the post-communist 
public administration in Romania, the efforts made by the Romanian Government (at the 
pressure of the EU and other international donors) to reform the public administration and 
their results will be analysed.   
The fifth sub-chapter will shortly address the issue of corruption, as a symptom of 
the defective functioning of the public administration and another informal “institution” 
altering the administrative act.  
The sixth sub-chapter will concentrate on administrative and financial 
decentralisation, respectively on the elements of the fiscal redistribution which instead of 
supporting the administrative decentralisation and implementation of the local autonomy 
principle, rather re-enforce the relationship of informal subordination which exists between 
the central-county-local levels, relation of subordination otherwise contradicting the 
legislative, formal regulations which provides for autonomy of each administrative level.    
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2 Local and regional public administration in Romania before 1990 
 
The dominant features of the current Romanian territorial-administrative system are 
determined by its historical evolution, marked by decisions taken in crucial moments in the 
development of the Romanian national state. The most striking characteristic of the 
decision-making process in this respect is the significant discrepancy between fundamental 
laws adopted in Romania and the reality on the ground in this country. More advanced 
political systems, i.e. especially the Belgian one, served as source of inspiration for the first 
Romanian Constitutions, adopted before the Second World War. After the Second WW the 
new fundamental laws turning Romania in a “popular/socialist republic” were obviously 
copying the soviet model. On the other side, changes in Romania have been operated by 
elite or a small, less representative, leading group, while the bulk op the population 
remained in obscurity. Politicians, including in the communist times, have been captivated 
by other, macro-level, more or less legitimate, goals and haven’t invested the necessary 
time and financial resources in addressing this problem; partially, their lack of action was 
deliberate, as the situation on the ground corresponded to their ascension and ruling 
ambitions.   
As previously mentioned, the permanent presence of “judet” as territorial-
administrative unit assures its very strong position in the current political-administrative 
system. Adding a new layer to this system will for sure clash with the interests of the 
“judet” and noteworthy efforts will be necessary to surmount their opposition to a re-
distribution of powers against their interests. In terms of layers we also notice the almost 
permanent presence in the past of a fourth tier, the “plasa/ocol”, i.e. “circle”, or the “tinut”, 
or the “raion”, tier which enjoyed more or less significant competencies, depending on the 
period. Theoretically, if reintroduced in Romania as a group of several communes, around 
a town or a bigger commune, the “plasa/ocol” might provide a solution to the problem 
rural communities face as a consequence of decentralisation, both in terms of financial 
power and specialised technical capacity. It might also increase the economic weight of the 
respective territory vs. county and the sums saved as a consequence of less administrative 
costs could be invested in local development projects. Politically these “circles” would be 
less dependant of the county council or the political party(ies) in power, not serving as 
their unconditional followers and supporters.    
Despite being guaranteed in fundamental or organic laws, the principle of local 
autonomy has been less applied in reality. The central institutions’ interference in the local 
authorities’ affairs has been tacitly accepted. The situation is slightly different in 
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Transylvania, to a certain extent also in Bucovina, where local autonomy of certain ethnic 
groups was very strong along the centuries and this situation perpetuated in the local 
mental framework. As we see further, the differences between the Old Kigdom and 
Transilvanya, despite being levelled (down) by the communist regime, still persist to a 
certain extent. The fact that these discrepancies don’t manifest themselves more strongly 
these days is not necessarily due to original fewer differentiations, but rather to the 
intrusiveness of the communist regime. 
2.1 Medieval Times: Moldova and Muntenia: Centralised Monarchies 53   
During medieval times in both Moldova and Muntenia the “domnitor”, i.e. the 
“ruler”, “voivode”, concentrated the legislative, executive and judiciary powers. He was 
carrying out his duties at central level assisted by a series of “dregatori”, the predecessors 
of the present days ministries. Members of the domestic nobility used to occupy these high 
positions. At local level the “judete” (counties), in Muntenia, and the “tinuturi”, in 
Moldova, were organised. In the later case, between “tinuturi” and towns/villages, 
“ocolul”, i.e. the “circle”, functioned. The administration of these territorial administrative 
units enjoyed several “soft” competencies, regarding trade, security and taxes, and they 
were highly dependant on the central administration. Some greater and more important, 
from a military point of view, cities and forts had more prerogatives, taking part in the 
sessions of the  “Parliament”, i.e. “Sfatul Domnesc”, which was gathering the high 
nobility of the country advising the Voivode on laws and other issues.  
The villages in the Medieval Eve continued the traditions from previous times, as a 
part of them were free villages. Nevertheless, next to their gradual decrease in number and 
despite having their own administrative bodies, they were still highly dependent on the 
central administration. The rest of the villages were owned by nobility (Closca, Asandului, 
2000, 58-70). 
The public administration in Transylvania evolved differently, as this Romanian 
province was successively an autonomous province under Hungarian domination (until 
1541), under Ottoman domination (until 1700) and part of the Hungarian and Austro-
Hungarian Empire for 200 more years (until 1918). Some traditional forms of Romanian 
territorial-administrative organisation were initially preserved, but the specific feature of 
this province is the local autonomy of the 3 privileged ethnic groups, and their territories, 
 
53 Matichescu, 2000, 81 
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living together in Transylvania, i.e. Magyars54, Szeklers55, and Saxons56, groups which 
were limiting the power of the Province Voivode (Closca&Asandului 2000, 74, 86). Until 
1541, next to the Romanian districts, medieval Transylvania was also organised in 
Hungarian Counties (“comitat”) and Szeklers and Saxons Chairs (“scaun”). Cities in 
Transylvania enjoyed in this period some autonomy, too.  
Between 1541 and 1683, as autonomous province under the Ottoman suzerainty, 
Transylvania witnessed a centralising movement, the prince of the province enjoying more 
competencies, legislative, executive and judicial, while the administrative-territorial units 
remain more or less the same.  
Under the Habsburg domination, the province as such enjoys enhanced autonomy 
in different policy matters; nevertheless, Vienna was, at the same time, trying thorough 
systematic linguistic and political measures, i.e. the Governor of the province was 
nominated by the Habsburg emperor, to integrate it into the empire. Iosif II, in an attempt 
to weaken the power of the local, autonomous counties, considered reactionary centres 
against the Emperor rule (Matichescu, 2000, 84, 111), divides the province in counties, 
with fewer attributions than in the past. A prefect nominated by the provincial government 
was the chief of the administration at this level and as a result the autonomy of the three 
privileged classes suffered a backlash. (Closca, Asandului, 2000, 71-87, 134). This reform 
failed once the Emperor passed away, as the Magyars, Szeklers, and Saxons refused to 
accept the situation and tried, successfully, to regain their rights and privileges. 
2.2 Modern Times 
The present administrative organisation in Romania finds its roots in the early 
XIXth century, when the first constitutions or constitutional laws were drafted. 
In 1859 the two Romanian Principalities, Moldavia and Walachia (Tara 
Romaneasca) united into one single country, ruled by one ruler, Al. I. Cuza. During his 
time, in 1864, the first Law of Administrative Organisation was adopted and implemented. 
Nevertheless, the need for administrative reform had been previously acknowledged, and 
the Organic Rules (1831), the first constitutional laws in the Romanian provinces, actually 
initiated the re-organisation process of the Romanian territory in both countries, on the 
base of the already existing, traditional territorial division; between the Organic Rules and 
 
54 a native or inhabitant of Hungary 
55 Or “sasi”, (a member of a Germans people which conquered England and merged with the Angles and 
Jutes to become Anglo-saxons, dominant in England 
56 Romanians, despite being the majority of the population,  were excluded, through the pact Unio Trium 
Nationum (1437), from the public life in the province.  
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the 1864 Law of Administrative Organisation both countries were divided into counties 
(“judet”), the cities (“oras”) and communes (“comuna”, i.e. rural municipality).  
Even if the two Provinces were different political entities and some denominations 
differed, this prior-1864 process evolved in parallel and its results were very similar. This 
offered a uniform base for the major administrative reform implemented by Al. I. Cuza 
beginning with 1864. The territory was divided into rural (for the first time with legal 
personality) and urban communes, judete, and “plasi/ocoale” (circles), an intermediary 
level between the first two. The plasa was grouping several rural and urban communes and 
it was drawn according to geographic and economic criteria, respecting previous territorial 
divisions. The decision-making power in this administrative-territorial structure continued 
to be located at central level, although the sub-national layers had the right to choose their 
mayors and councils (Closca&Asandului, 2000, 154). The urban or rural communes had a 
series of obligations, i.e. supporting the expenses related to the city-hall and church, 
orphan and handicapped children, fire brigade, probable supported by the necessary fiscal 
rights, but their decisions could have anytime been changed by the county prefect, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Voivode. The mayor, even elected by the local 
community, was also the representative of the government at the local level; the Voivode 
confirmed the city mayors in their place of duty, while the prefect enjoyed the same 
competency in respect to the rural mayors.  (Closca&Asandului, 2000, 154).  
The county council was elected by the county electorate, 2 for each “plasa”. It 
enjoyed budgetary and legislative rights. While this body met only once a year, a 
permanent committee, presided by the prefect, as the representative of the central 
government, was in charge with preparing the annual meeting of the county council and 
with the current problems. The “plasa’ was lead by a sub-prefect, with executive, 
coordinative and reporting (to the prefect) role. (Closca and Asandului, 2000, 157-8).  
Beginning with 1866, until the end of the Second World War, Romania was ruled 
by the German Hohenzollern family, for most of the time as constitutional-parliamentary 
monarchy57.  The 1866 Constitution referred very shortly to counties and communes in its 
IVth chapter58 and proclaimed “complete decentralisation and communal independence” as 
main principles of territorial-administrative organisation. As widely recognised, the 1866 
Constitution, inspired by the 1831 Belgian one, went far beyond the reality on the ground 
in Romania; these principles were not implemented or, at least, observed in the actual 
administrative act.  
 
57 After 1938, for a very short period, Romania was an absolute monarchy under the King Carol II.  
58 See the 1866 Constitution, http://www.constitutia.ro/ 
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  Until 1925 no major changes in this territorial-administrative organisation were 
operated, nevertheless, the Romanian territory as such transformed significantly following 
the Independence War (1877-1878), The Balkan Wars, and the First World War. The 1923 
Constitution confirmed the territorial-administrative organisation of the “Great Romania”, 
a lot larger now, into “judete” and “comune”, and set “administrative decentralisation” as 
main principle at the base of the system. The new 1925 Administrative Law divides the 
territory into 66 judete, each comprising between 1 and 6 urban communes and several 
rural ones. (Alexandrescu, Bulei, Mamina, Scurtu, 2000, 468). A  fourth administrative tier 
was introduced between counties and urban/rural communes, the “plasa” (Closca and 
Asandului, 2000, 171) without legal personality. 
Contrary to the principle of administrative decentralisation encompassed in the 
Constitution, the new administrative law actually re-enforced the centralized character of 
the administrative system (Closca and Asandului, 2000, 169). The position of the prefect, 
as representative of the central government and chief of the county administration, i.e. the 
county council, is strengthened, as he enjoyed controlling and supervising competencies 
above all cities and communes in the county (Closca and Asandului, 2000, 170-171). To 
balance the strong position of the central government, through the prefect, in the territory, 
the communal councils and the majors enjoyed legislative initiative and decision-making 
power on a series of issues of local interest: education, culture, roads, local administration 
regulations (Closca and Asandului, 2000, 173).59  
In 1929 further administrative laws were adopted, for both central and local 
administration. This body of laws resulted in further centralisation of the administration in 
the Great Romania (Matichescu, 2000, 145). The Local Ministerial Directorates, 
functioning as centres for local administration and control represent a novelty for the 
system and strengthen the position of the central administration in the territory 
(Matichescu, 2000, 160). 
The differences in the administrative systems in place in the three provinces prior 
to the 1918 Great Unification, especially between Transylvania and the rest of the country, 
hampered the smooth implementation of this unitary system, and reforms trying to further 
decentralise it were rather unsuccessful.   
 
59 In this context the issue of villages’ self-administration raises considerable attention. The 1925 Law tried 
to put together in a commune more villages than in previous times. The high costs this reorganisation implied 
for peasants who had to spend a lot of money and time to resolve their problems at the communal 
administration, determined a fast return to the traditional patterns. Villages under 600 inhabitants associated 
to a commune enjoyed self-administration, through village assembly or council (Closca and Asandului, 2000, 
173-4). Unfortunately, this strong traditional root of self-administration was fully destroyed by the 
communist regime. Presently communes depend of counties to a very large extent.   
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The 1938 Constitution, drafted to support the Carol II personal regime, changed 
again the territorial-administrative of the Kingdom. The system became more centralised, 
the Parliament was dissolved and the government played a formal role in the hands of the 
“head of the state”. The law maintained the “commune” and “circle” (429) and the “judet” 
(71) was transformed in a control circumscription (Closca and Asandului, 2000, 177). The 
law introduced 10 “tinuturi”60 (provinces), which enjoyed significant economic, cultural 
and social attributions and were administered by a royal resident. They reunited between 4 
and 10 judete, not necessarily taking into account historical borders, but rather real needs 
in terms of socio-economic evolution, geographical and economic criteria. The 
(considered) “parasite” smaller counties had to make place for fewer regional institutions, 
involving lower costs, meant to administrate budgets properly and to plan and implement 
more development investments.  
This reform intended also to eradicate the politicisation and corruption of the 
administrative system, having resulted from some of the provisions of the 1923 
Constitution61. Therefore, nomination became the main instrument for assigning persons in 
certain positions. The mayors at communal level were not elected anymore but nominated 
after a very serious selection process. The county prefects were as well career public 
servants, nominated through royal decree. The Province Governor enjoyed significant 
competitions, as the public services were deconcentrated. He was the chief of the local 
administration and of the several public departments united around his position. (Closca 
and Asandului, 2000, 176-7).   
Through weakening the judet, and strengthening of the commune and province 
levels, the administrative system was regionalised and some public functions 
deconcentrated. The professionals in charge with the administration at all levels supposed 
to address and resolve problems in an efficient way; the impact of these overhauling 
administrative reforms could not be assessed as the Second World War started and the 
system witnessed further changes during and in the immediate period after the war.  
2.3 The Communist Legacy  
After the years of the Second World War, when significant parts of the Romanian 
territory again left and/or re-entered the jurisdiction of the Romanian state, the 1948 
Constitution restated the units of territorial administrative organisation of the country: 
 
60 Jiu, Arges, Marii, Dunarii, Nistru, Suceava, Alba Iulia, Crisuri, Timis. 
61 One Senat member per county was elected by the county council (1923 Constitution, art. 69); this 
provision created the possibility for the Candidate to “buy” this position from the county council members.   
 81
communes, plasi and judete. Only 2 years later, following the regime change, the territory 
of the new Socialist Republic was again drastically differently organised into: regions, 
districts (raioane), cities and communes, in a relationship of subordination, according to 
the soviet model and with little connection with the Romanian traditional forms of 
administrative-territorial organisation. The existing 58 judete, 424 plasi and 6000 
communes were replaced with 28 regions, 177 raioane, 4052 communes, and 8 cities of 
national importance62, with a statute equal with the regions’ (Alexandrescu, Bulei, 
Mamina, Scurtu, 2000, 477). Until 1960 only 16 regions remained, i.e. Bacau, Baia Mare, 
Banat, Bucuresti, Cluj, Constanta, Craiova, Galati, Regiunea Autonoma Maghiara63, 
Hunedoara, Iasi, Oradea, Pitesti, Ploiesti, Stalin/Brasov, Succeava (Closca&Asandului, 
2000, 211). Through political representatives of the “unique party” responsible with 
controlling the administrative activity, the political interference in administration 
becomes a permanent and generalised practice. As we will se further, this rule continues 
to be applied nowadays in the Romanian administrative-political system, as unwritten law.      
Following the 1965 Constitution, which declared Romania a Socialist Republic, in 
1968 the regional units were abolished and the judete, cities and communes (the later as 
rural municipalities) were reintroduced. Some of the older, traditional counties were not 
recreated. The politicisation of the administration continues, as the prime-secretary of the 
communist party at county and city levels was also the chief of the administrative 
apparatus in their jurisdiction. This reform envisaged a further centralisation of the system, 
which permitted the Communist Party to continue the industrialisation process and the 
implementation of the “democratic centralism” principle. (Matichescu, 2000, 182) 
Nowadays the Romanian territorial-administrative structure does not differ from the 
one in place in 1970, despite the obvious necessity to adapt this structure to the new 
political and economic realities. The administrative experience of centralisation and 
political interference accumulated in the communist years marked considerably the 
Romanian mental framework. Despite 150 years of 4 levels-governance system ( taking  
the “plasa” into consideration) against 20 years (until 1989) of only 3 levels, the territorial-
administrative changes are difficult to operate. The year 2003, when the latest Romanian 
Constitution was adopted, represented a momentum for a real debate on regionalisation, 
and a possibility to upgrade the current statistical regions to an administrative-territorial 
structure. The changes operated in the 2003 Constitution only reinforced the already 
existing construction and functioning of the territorial-administrative system in Romania. 
 
62 Cluj, Constanta, Galati, Iasi, Ploiesti, Stalin, Timisoara, Bucuresti. 
63 Which enjoyed a large local administrative series of rights (Closca&Asandului, 2000, 212).  
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While regions still do not enjoy administrative-territorial status and the regional bodies do 
not represent a governance layer, the new Constitution underpins the principles of 
decentralisation and local autonomy, continuing the “tradition” of formal regulations vs. 
different informal reality set up in Romania by the 1866 Constitution.   
3 Administrative-political culture in Romania 
 
Notwithstanding the lips-service paid to principles as local autonomy and 
decentralisation, inserted in all Romanian ever adopted Constitutions, the Romanian 
administrative system has permanently functioned in dependance of its central institutions. 
During the communist regime centralism was openly admitted and pursued. Nevertheless, 
when this was not the case, the informal reality, i.e. dependency of lower levels of central 
administration, has contradicted formal legislative provision in force. Albeit, at EU 
pressure, several measures were taken to improve the situation, on the ground no 
significant, satisfying progress has been achieved. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002b, 28; European 
Commission Report on Romania, 2006, 10) 
The communist regime in Romania left us with a highly centralised and politicised 
public administration. The political power was concentrated in the hands of the 
Communist Party which subordinated the state apparatus. All policies were decided at 
central level, the local levels of political administration only enjoying implementation 
competencies. The administration was fully subordinated to political superiors, the 
employees being hired on ground of their affiliation to the Communist Party or to the 
personal “clientele” of an official. As in the communist economic system the state was the 
owner of the economic system, the tax system was almost non-existent. Only 9% of the 
salary was officially public tax, a contribution to the system of social insurance. As a 
consequence the people could not develop the belief that the public services they received 
were a result of the taxes they paid, and that the state was just an “administrator” of those 
funds, whose functioning is financed also by tax-payers. All public services were 
considered delivered by the “State” itself. This mentality persists even today, when in 
Romania a fiscal system exists and where taxes are rather high.    
Changes in the administrative structures should have followed the regime change in 
1989. Nevertheless Romania, contrary to other countries in the CEE, perpetuated the soviet 
model in respect to public administration organisation; for a long time the status quo as 
regards the administrative layers and their competencies was preserved; narrowly defined 
problems were delegated to national agencies, instead, eventually, to local government. 
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These agencies must satisfy a series of phases and budgetary lines already decided in detail 
by superior institutions. Efficiency in this model is measured in terms of input while, due 
to lack of emphasis on output, the real performances remain unknown. Reducing 
bureaucracy has been permanently on the agenda, but very few institutions have undergone 
real reforms (Ionita, 2002, 122).  
 
Due to the particular political-administrative history of the country, and especially 
to its last episode, the communist regime, and despite the reforming efforts undertaken in 
the last years (see further), the Romanian formal institutions are still insufficiently 
developed. As a result the public administration suffers from fragmentation, structures 
fluidity, lack of incentive for horizontal and vertical cooperation and communication64, 
lack of transparency in the decision-making process, corruption, conformism and 
opportunism. Politicisation of administration delivered by far the most significant 
damages. Due to the influence politicians enjoy, literally, on administration, a real, long-
term commitment towards reforming administration hasn’t been achieved yet.  
The “informal realities” beyond the legislative changes and other soft measures 
taken at central level are responsible for the “incremental” change in the Romanian public 
administration. As already exemplified above, one of the “algorithms” of the 
administrative behaviour is the permanent creation of formal institutions: when a problem 
appears or an already existing problem assumes wide public relevance, a new institution is 
set up in order to tackle it (Pasti, Miroiu, Codita, 1997, 102). Nevertheless, not only that 
this happens despite the existence of other bodies which already, at least tangentially, are 
in charge of resolving the respective issue, but also when the problem is resolved, the 
newly set up institution, together with its employees, remains in place (see also Ionita 
2002b, 124, 129). This “custom” results in a fragmentation of the range of actors 
supposedly in charge with a problem and in the weakening of these institutions which 
enjoy fuzzy roles and competences65; this malaise originates in the tendency to increase the 
bureaucratic apparatus in order to conciliate competing interests from different sectors and 
to iron conflicts among diverse pressure groups (Ionita, 2002b, 118). Weak inter-
 
64 Before 1989 the relationship between the state and society was dramatically broken by the high number of 
political intermediary organizations, which had the role of preventing associative phenomena outside the 
unique political party and, at the same time, to control and substitute any form of organized action. Romania 
is known as one of the most civically “fragmented” Eastern European countries. While Poland took 
advantage of its religious institutions to preserve and maintain some collective actions, Romania lost its 
“togetherness” culture. (Pop 2002, 27) 
65 Another example of this “malaise”, further than the PAR system presented earlier, is the expansion of the 
central government in 2001, i.e. a SDP Nastase government with 27 ministries.   
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ministerial and inter-county or cities horizontal coordination and cooperation augments the 
effects of this phenomenon of fragmentation.  
The numerous Romanian ministries and agencies appear and disappear or change 
their competences very often. The immediate consequence of this behaviour is the 
“fluidity” of the system: the institutional memory of these organisations is lost as fast as 
the continuity of programmes, personnel and documents; if continuous, these could lead in 
time to an improvement of the administrative performance.  (Ionita, 2002b, 124).  
The political class has often intervened in the composition and structure of the 
administrative apparatus, but these interventions were not carried out with the purpose of 
reforming the system. Their purpose was to take over power positions the new political 
representatives wanted to control (Ionita 2002, 123) and the instrument used to attain this 
goal is the development of personal support networks. To a great extent the bureaucracy 
pays lip service to the reform, while it tacitly acts against or neutrally towards it, as its 
main purpose is preservation; it prefers the facile status quo, daily instructions received 
from “above” and inter-institutional power-games based on informal relations (Ionita 2002, 
123). Subsequently, in the Romanian administration decisions are still made arbitrarily and 
the authority of the “leader” over his employees is almost total. This represents the major 
incentive for a civil servant to satisfy his superior and not the public, as his immediate 
professional well-being, and together with it his financial situation, depends on the former. 
Belonging to a political “clan” and not proper qualification is the best predictor to 
determine if somebody can occupy a position in Romania (Pippidi 2002, 45; Ghinea 2002, 
157; Pasti, Miroiu, Codita, 1997, 109). Despite the budgetary austerity, local 
administration seems unwilling to decrease the number of the civil servants hired 
(Ionita&Fartusnic, 2002, 108) as they represent existing or potential loyal supporters, but 
this does not decrease their dependency of the superiors. In such an instable environment 
the life of civil servants is harsh, incomparable with the one of their Western colleagues 
(Ionita 2002b, 125). The uncertainty combined with insufficient remuneration results in a 
body of civil servants less qualified, more heterogeneous, loyal to their superiors and not to 
the tax-payers.    
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The administrative politicisation66 continued also after 1999, the year of some 
major legislative change and especially after the 2000 elections when 1300 public servants 
were fired by the Nastase government (Pippidi 2002, 29; Ionita 2002, 124)67. Changing the 
civil servants was made under the mask of changing institutions, i.e. their internal structure 
or only their names was modified or more institutions were put together (Ghinea 2002, 
164). The significant change happened at local level, where these actions are less visible. 
Out of 1300 civil servants present in the data base of the National Agency for Civil 
Servants68 (NACS) as fired and in need to find another position in the administrative 
apparatus, only 200 had previously worked at central level.  In addition, out of these 1300, 
mostly hired after 1996 (sic!) only 10 had been redistributed in other positions, while most 
of the (new) ministries organised contest for several vacancies (Ghinea 2002, 169) ( The 
Public Manager 2, 2).  
The centralist “ideology” survived for a long time trough preserving the institution 
of “prefect” nominated by the government as its representative in the territory, which could 
annul all decisions taken by the local authorities until the Court  takes a final decision69. 
(Pippidi, 2002c, 41). In 2000 out of 115.000 civil servants, 32.000 were employed at local 
level. The fact that almost 2/3 of the civil servants belong to the central institutions of their 
territorial institutions confirms, one more time, the strong centralisation of the state in 
Romania (Ghinea 2002, 157).  
 
66 Politicising administration is not necessarily a negative issue, but it needs regulations and limitations. 
Indifferent which system is applied, the American, which permits politicisation of the administration, or the 
European, which differentiate clearly between political power and administrative apparatus, transparency has 
to be the ruling principle. The Law 188/1999 
(http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=21281) limits drastically the political interference 
within the administrative apparatus; starting with the general secretaries all the positions are considered 
administrative. The striking difference between the law provisions and the reality in the filed, where political 
leaders have always acted as the administration is their private domain, assures the failure of this regulation. 
If this regulation were enforced, it would block the access of a large political clientele to significant positions 
as state or Parliament secretaries.   (Ghinea, 2002, 159) 
67 The government in place after the 2000 elections, underwent institutional re-organisation with the purpose 
of replacing a significant series of civil servants active in the 1996-2000 administration and immovable after 
the 1999 Statute of Civil Servants. Using pretexts like changing the name but not the role of some 
institutions, or applying qualification test (not contests, as the law stipulates) the new government managed 
to replace 1300 civil servant, who, paradoxically, even if the ….organised contests for new vacancies and it 
was obliged to grant priority firstly to the “unemployed” civil servants in its data base, were never re-
distributed. (Ionita 2002, 124-5)  
68 The National Agency for Civil Servants was not involved in the process of “renewing” the public 
administration, which, on one side, raises suspicions on the credibility of the process per se, and on the other 
side, proves the fact that the NACV still does not take it role seriously in defending the statute of these group. 
( 2001 Commission Report on Romania). The Agency enjoys theoretically a wide series of competences, but 
these have been drastically limited with the help of new legislative acts adopted after the set up of the 
Agency. As it was totally subordinated to the Ministry of Public Administration by that time, (in the period 
following the 2000 elections) it did not initiate any interventions to support or protect the abusively fired civil 
servants of offer them juridical assistance. (Ghinea 2002, 162-3) 
69 As we will see further, beginning with 2006 the “prefect” position is de-politicised.  
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The centralist “ideology” matches the collectivist70 and paternalistic71 mentality of 
a part of the population and they obviously reinforce each other. The combination between 
paternalistic mental framework of a large part of the population and low trust in the state 
institutions is paradoxical, but it can be explained through low political and civic education 
of this group72, which perceives that some institutions do not function properly, but cannot 
figure out a viable alternative (outside church and army).  According to public opinion 
polls, politicians, civil servants and judiciary power enjoy the lowest level of trust from the 
population (Pippidi, 2002, 31). The proportion of municipalities where at least one NGO is 
active at local level is very low. In 82% of the municipalities no NGO is active. Taking 
into account only those municipalities where NGOs are active the data show that in about 
70% of the cases no NGO leader holds the office of counsellor. In those cases where at 
least one NGO leader does hold an office as local counsellor the average proportion of 
NGOs in this situation of the total number of NGOs is 60% (Pop 2002, 14). 
As having developed in a different political contexts (see the first sub-chapter), the 
historical regions determine to a certain extent the local administration capacity to reform 
and cooperate with other authorities. Ardeal and Banat are the most reforming and 
cooperating regions. Local administration in these two regions is more active and open 
towards the idea of reform (Ionita&Fartusnic, 2002, 106).  In Banat and Ardeal the mayors 
are also more open to privatisation of previously state-owned local enterprises and 
services. Institutional culture influences the capacity of the local administration in 
executing the budgets and communicating the results of this process, as Banat and 
Transylvania perform better in these respects, as well (Ionita&Fartusnic, 2002, 105-108, 
135). Moldova, with the highest average of financial transfers within total local revenues—
55%—differs significantly from Transylvania, Banat, Crisana-Maramures and Muntenia as 
regards the two considered variables: openness to reform and cooperation/communication; 
rent-seeking behaviour seems to be stronger in this region as well (Pop 2002, 14). 
 
70 “The totalitarian Romania survived inoculating people the idea that they are an instrument to reach a goal 
towards which their person means nothing”. (Pasti, Miroiu, Codita, 1996, 171). After 1989 this goal changed, 
but the idea of the “common, transindividual sacrifice” persisted. Nowadays this idea is still overtly brought 
up, especially in the relation with the reforms to be implemented to enter the EU (see the strike and protest 
movements in November 2005). Nevertheless, the general discourse characteristic to a part of the population 
(intellectuals, urban inhabitants, and thin middle class) reflects more liberal values. 
71 On the average, most municipalities (especially small or/and ethnically fragmented) support the mayor’s 
position unconditionally (69%), while 28% support the mayor depending on the issue. Only 3% of the total 
local authorities reported a lack of support for the mayor. That the mayor is always supported might reflect 
either a “strong” mayor or a weak and less involved local council (or both). More seldom are the situations 
where the support of the mayor is due to a good administrative team; more frequently the person of the 
mayor is important. (Pop, 2002, 24) 
72 2/3 of the population seems to be civically incompetent, i.e. they do not know where they have to 
complaint if their rights were infringed, don’t take measures if they are abused, and turn their back if they 
witness corruption cases. (Pippidi, 2002c, 98). 
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More worrying is the fact that this institutional culture perpetuates, in 
administration and among politicians. The generation change cannot alter the rules of the 
game as long as the recruiting process and socialization is organised according to old 
models: poorly prepared candidates are selected through clientele mechanisms, the 
efficiency of their work is not evaluated and promotions are the result of internal group 
fights (Ionita, 2002, 123). The same author proved in another study that younger or better 
educated mayors don’t behave differently in relation to resource management, institutional 
innovation, efficiency or good communication. It seems that a real change in the Romanian 
administrative-cultural mind frame needs more than a change of generation, as assumed 10 
years ago  (Ionita, Fartusnic, 2002, 115).    
4 An overview of the post-communist public administration reform 
 
The situation presented above persists currently in Romania despite the reforming 
measures taken after the regime changed. Especially in the last ten years, beginning with 
1998, several governmental bodies have been created and received competencies vis-à-vis 
the reform of the public administrative system, i.e. the Commission for the Civil Service, 
the Superior Council for Public Administration Reform, the Public Policies Coordination 
and Structural Change Units, the Inter-ministerial Group for Public Administration Reform 
(GIRAP), the Governmental Council for Monitoring the PAR, a National Agency for Civil 
Servants, a more recent (2003) Central Unit for Public Administration Reform (CUPAR). 
A Trade Union of Civil Servants was set up and the National Institute for Administration, 
with 8 regional centres was established in order to provide professional training to civil 
servants, element essential for a real reform in this field.      
 Several legal instruments and strategic documents were also drafted to guide this 
reform, i.e. the Civil Servants’ Statute (1999, revised in 2003), a 1999 “General Strategy 
Regarding the Acceleration of Public Administration Reform”, a Code of Ethics for Civil 
Servants (2004); since 2001, an annual PAR programme was implemented until the last 
year before accession (2006). Increased attention is given to public policy formulation 
process, and the General Secretariat of the Government, together with public policy units 
in all ministries, are directly responsible with this issue.   
As already noticed, the picture of the institutional structure in place for the public 
administration reform is confusing, as the institutions enumerated above are numerous, and 
their competencies frequently overlap. More confusing is the presence of other institutions, 
further than the ones enumerated, for example, in the OP Development of the 
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Administrative Capacity (OP DAC, page 12), which also have attributions connected to the 
public administration reform, among others the Inter-Ministerial Council for 
Administration, Civil Service, Decentralisation and Local Communities, the Inter-
ministerial Committee for the Coordination of the Public Policies Reform Process. This 
plethora of institutions in charge, in principle, of the same problem, illustrates one of the 
symptoms the Romanian public administration displays, respectively, the unjustifiable 
extending of its structures, by setting up new bodies with certain responsibilities, which are 
not dissolved when the issue they were created for was  tackled, and which do not 
coordinate their activity with other bodies dealing with the same matter.      
The last Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of 
Bulgaria and Romania, issued by the European Commission in September 2006, notified 
the progress Romania registered, again at legislative, formal level, in reforming the public 
administration, i.e. the law on local public finance, the law on civil servants, amending the 
Civil Service Statute, but also presented the steps still needed to be taken to complete this 
process, e.g. drafting of a new law on unitary pay for civil servants, completing the new 
Civil Service Statute. 
Although from a legislative level the reforming efforts seem to be almost 
completed, beyond this formal surface the situation hasn’t substantially changed. On one 
side, the powerful link between reforms and their initiators raises doubts regarding their 
self-sustainability (Alistar, 2007, 8), and on the other side, their implementation until the 
last commune will require augmented efforts, the results being noticeable in the best case 
in the medium run. The best example in this case is the de-politisation of the prefect office; 
the fact that the prefects in office simply resigned from their respective political parties and 
joined the civil service as high level civil servants at the time the new legislation imposing 
their political non-engagement entered into force severely reduced the effectiveness and 
credibility of this reform. The same is valid for the Law 249/2006 which supposed to 
penalise the political migration; this law was declared unconstitutional on grounds of 
retroactivity by the Romanian Constitutional Court, decision representing a step back in 
the efforts made to stimulate the responsible behaviour of the political class (Alistar, 2007, 
8;29)        
 
The formal reforms carried out in the last years were made on the pressure of the 
European Union. Even one year after entering the EU, Romania belongs to the categories 
of countries not fully consolidated from a democratic point of view, where the most 
important factor of changing, at least in some fields, e.g. high corruption, is the influence 
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of external factors (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002c, 20; Ghinea 2002, 157; see also the European 
Commission, 2008, and the Operational Programme Administrative Development, 2007, 
12) 
5 Corruption 
 
The medieval society in Romania, especially in the Old Kingdom (Moldavia and 
Walachia) tolerated and even promoted corruption from top to bottom, especially because 
of the financial obligation the Romanian provinces had towards the Ottoman Empire, 
obligations which stimulated abuse and dishonesty (Closca&Asandului, 2000, 69). The 
system of Phanariot rulers appointed by the Ottoman Empire worsened the situation 
(Closca&Asandului, 2000, 90), as these appointments were based on financial gifts; 
practically the highest political-administrative positions were bought from the Turkish 
Sultan. Once appointed, the new ruler was recovering his “investments”, eventually 
register profit, by “re-selling” several positions in his state apparatus. The “new” 
appointees were adopting the same strategy towards their subordinates. As a result, most of 
public positions were occupied by wealthy persons, who aimed to increase their economic 
power first and had only as second objective to fulfil the administrative obligations 
attached to their positions.   
 Inherited from the Turkish Empire or not, the certitude nowadays is that in 
Romania corruption has become an endemic problem. Romania’s index of perceived 
corruption as calculated by Transparency International represents 3.7 out of 10.00, way 
under the “passing” grade, i.e. 5; which renders Romania the most corrupt country in the 
EU. With this score Romania lands on the 69th place in the classification set up by the 
same organisation, even behind Turkey, positioned on the 64th (score: 4.1) (Perceived 
Corruption Index 2007, Transparency International73) 
Extended corruption in public administration is the direct consequence of its 
institutions incapable of offering services to the population, especially highly important 
public services, as justice and security.  It is the direct symptom of the lack of efficiency 
and weakness of the formal Romanian institutions74 (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002b, 30). The 
communist regime created all the conditions for a corrupted society, i.e. infinite restrictions 
and arbitrary, no rewards for upright behaviour, insufficiency of basic resources and a 
 
73 http://www.transparency.org.ro/politici_si_studii/indici/ipc/2007/index.html  
74 Here corruption is defined as a supplementary fee paid to obtain public goods, and, this is the reason for 
which it is rather an indicator of how the institutions to do their job than of local culture or mentality. The 
people offer bribe to public administration for public goods it should offer for the taxes the citizens pay 
already. (MP, inst cor, 2002, 140) 
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group of persons above the law (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002b, 77). The same author underlines 
that “what contributed to raising corruption in post-communist Romania was not 
reintroducing markets and liberal businesses, but the survival of administration and of its 
institutional culture from the communist times” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002a, 140).  
Neither mayors, nor entrepreneurs widely admit the existence of corruption. As a 
consequence, it proves difficult to measure it, and most studies, including the Transparency 
International publications, measure actually its perception (Ionita&Fartusnic, 2002, 113). 
Nevertheless, the fact that the population perceives clearly the wide practice of receiving 
and offering bribes seriously undermines the legitimacy of the public institutions in place 
and of their leaders, and even of the type of political organisation as such; this factor is one 
of the independent variables which explain the preference of a part of the population for 
communism and/or radical right parties or movements.   
Corruption obviously develops also due to the participation of the population 
having a low level of civic competence. Citizens accept to be inadequately treated by civil 
servants as they still perceive them as an extended arm of a total(itarian) political power, 
and not as functionaries paid from their own money, via the tax system, functionaries who 
should consequently work in their interest. Citizens consider it easier to offer bribe than 
make a stand in order to receive the proper treatment and they do not consider themselves 
defenders of public (= their own) interest. The public authority is still perceived as 
repressive and untrustworthy, and not the entity in charge with applying and defending the 
law and order (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002a, 141). The perceived procedural injustice and 
corruption is lower at the level of local administration, compared to any other institution 
(courthouses, police, hospital, school, work-place) (Pop, 2002, 32). As mentioned in the 
previous sub-chapter the control of the civil society on the government is weak, as the civil 
society itself. In such circumstances the governments’ main goals are to redistribute wealth 
from state itself to political clientele or to maintain the control on power, or both, and not 
the citizens’ well-being. An anti-corruption law has no sense in a country where political 
culture makes that no law is respected and nobody collaborates with the police, itself 
corrupt to a certain extent (Mungiu-Pippidi 2002a, 133-135)75. 
Almost 20 years after the regime change and despite the measures taken by the 
governments in power in this timeframe, under this surface the public administration 
“modus operadi” is practically unchanged (see also Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002a, 147). The 
latest Monitoring Report on Romania and Bulgaria issued by the European Commission in 
 
75 The definition the author work with is: corruption is breaching the norm of impersonal feature which has to 
characterise any modern bureaucracy (for any sort of profit, material or status). 
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September 2006 registered the progress made, at formal level, in fighting corruption, i.e. 
the National Strategy and Action Plan for fighting corruption continued to be implemented, 
new legislation tightening the rules on financing political parties was adopted, the number 
of corruption allegations investigated increased, the capacity of the National Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DNA) and Directorate General for Anti-Corruption was 
strengthened, two national campaigns were started to increase awareness among the public 
and civil servants, including the judiciary, of the negative consequences of corruption, but, 
at the same time, concludes that “corruption remains a general concern.” (Commission, 
2006, 36).  
After 1st of January 2007, as Romania became a EU member, the European 
Commission focused on high-level corruption, to be monitored in the framework of the 
Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification76. A more thorough analysis of the legislative 
and institutional measures and public policy development meant to address the 
phenomenon of corruption is made in the 2007 National Corruption Report 200777 issued 
by Transparency International Romania for the period April 2006-April 2007. Both the 
Commission and the TIR reports question the self-sustainability of the measures taken in 
the last three years to tackle corruption, as these are very powerfully linked to their 
initiators and a common political agreement and willingness across the entire political 
spectrum still hasn’t been reached yet.    
6 Local administration and the administrative and fiscal decentralisation 
process 
 
While at the beginning of the 90’s a high degree of centralization in decision-
making and high uncertainty at the local level were the rule, by 1997-98 a slow process of 
decentralization by ‘creeping’ took place78. On one side, successive governments have 
faced mounting external pressure to implement reforms packages, from the European 
Union and other international institutions and fora; decentralization was a crucial 
 
76 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/index_en.htm  
77 http://www.transparency.org.ro/  
78 Prior to 1998 the financial arrangements governing local administrations were stipulated by the Public 
Finances Act and the annual State Budget Acts. The process of establishing expenditure priorities and that of 
long-term budgeting were seriously impeded. For any investment expenditure the approval of the Ministry of 
Finance was compulsory. Credit and capital market access was more than limited. Revenues of the local 
budgets were established through the State Budget Act, which was annually passed not sooner than March, 
i.e. after the beginning of the fiscal year. Local administrations had to prepare a draft proposal for the 
expenditures of the next fiscal year, while the final decision came to be known only a few months after the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Thus the budgeting process was more of a mere ritual formality than an effective 
means of pursuing local objectives and responding to local needs. Local budgets were significantly 
dependent upon governmental transfers: more than 75% of local budgets’ revenues were due to governmental 
transfers from the state budget. (Pop 2002, 7) 
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component in all these packages. These requirements corresponded, to a certain extend, to 
the central government desire to get rid of some spending and administrative burdens, 
hence it transferred some responsibilities to the local governmental level. On the other 
hand, the central government was aware of the LGs’ poor managerial capability, 
possibilities of fraud or municipal bankruptcy, overall public debt, rising inequality, etc. 
How we already saw in the previous sub-chapter, the central government has entrenched a 
paternalistic attitude towards LGs, not regarded as its equals, despite the Constitution and 
the lip-service paid to the principles of local autonomy and no subordination of lower 
levels to higher ones (Ionita 2003, 8).  
The decentralisation process registered its ups and downs. By 2001 the legal 
framework for decentralising power to the local government was considered by the 
European Commission largely completed, including a new Law on Local Public 
Administration. After a period of stagnation two new pieces of legislation, a framework 
law on decentralisation and a law on the prefect institution were adopted in the 2004 in the 
spirit of the new 2003 Constitution, which introduced the principle of deconcentration and 
reinforced the principles of decentralisation and local autonomy. A strategy for managing 
the process of decentralisation in a transparent and stable manner was also adopted in May 
2004. Nevertheless, the 2003 and 2004 Regular Reports of the European Commission 
warned against the serious incompatibility between decentralised tasks and the transfer of 
resources. At the same time, the ability of the local governments to raise local revenues 
remained limited and legislation governing financial transfers towards these lacked 
transparency and gave the county councils the power to control the transfer of resources 
towards the local councils. 
The intergovernmental fiscal relations relied until 2006 on four main streams of 
legislation: The Law on Local Public Administration (LLPA), adopted in 1991 and 
amended many times afterwards, until it was replaced by a new LLPA in 2001 (215/2001), 
the Law on Local Taxes (LLT), adopted in 1993, and modified in 2002, the Law on Local 
Public Finance (LLPF), adopted in 1998, and the Annual State Budget Laws (ASBL).  
These changes in the Local Taxes norms increased LGs' control over their own 
revenues and authorized local councils to administer their own taxes. Firstly, monitoring 
and collection of local taxes were entirely transferred to the LGs. Secondly, an automatic 
formula of sharing the personal income tax (PIT) among the three tiers of government was 
introduced, which improved the predictability of the intergovernmental finance. A system 
of equalization grants was introduced, thus reducing central government’s discretion in 
earmarking sums for LGs (Ionita, 2003, 7). Besides these financial sources, an additional 
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possibility to increase local budget revenues was established: the possibility of borrowing 
from domestic and international credit markets. Nevertheless, few local governments took 
advantage of this possibility (Pop, 2002, 8). 
LLPA and LLT extended theoretically the local administrative autonomy and gave 
the LG the possibility to use own revenues sources. However, many fiscal issues had not 
been sorted out and the predictability of the allocation process remained low. The new 
allocation system increased the power at county level79, through the discretion they enjoy 
in redistributing PIT sums from central budget towards the local authorities: in some cases 
the localities were given next to nothing; others, large cities, got a disproportionate share. 
Rural communes, who are generally most in need, suffered the most from this erratic 
distribution. No obvious correlation between the general development level of counties and 
a specific pattern of allocation could be established, aspect which suggests that it was 
entirely up to the county councils to decide how to distribute the PIT. The sums were often 
used to reward political associates, and only sometimes as a lever to force localities into 
thinking broadly and cooperate more with each other (Ionita 2003, 22). As a result of this 
system, substantial interaction took place, through both formal and informal channels, 
between county and locality officials in the process of drafting the budgets and allocating 
the transfer funds. The same way the counties had to wait for the passing of the ASBL in 
order to see how much money they eventually were distributed, the localities had to wait in 
turn for the county councils to finalize the equalization process. Therefore, this process 
created many points of entry for political lobbying and the rent-seeking behaviour (Ionita, 
2003, 8). 
Local administrations were also subject to central control of the Ministry of Finance 
regarding their budgetary executions. Further, this dependence of the central level was 
reinforced by the practice of imposing a series of specific programs on local 
administrations, i.e. in education, social assistance (in part), health, and, to some extent, 
public utilities and town planning, by the line ministries (Pop, 2002, 6).  
 
In spite of its shortcomings, the equalization grants system introduced in 1998-1999 
represented an improvement when compared with the situation before this package of laws 
was passed. The notions of vertical and horizontal equalization were operationalised 
separately and one could estimate how much financial effort was made in each of both 
directions, and follow trends in time. The simple and clear allocation formula eventually 
 
79The judet council has a high discretionary power in re-allocating state transfers and the proportion of shared 
taxes (beginning with 2000, 15% of total shared taxes) collected for re-allocative purposes. (Pop 2002, 12) 
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reached was applied consistently in the first step of the equalization process: the 
distribution of funds from the central government, by county. Unfortunately this formula 
was not consistently applied in the second step − from counties to localities (Ionita 2003, 
28).  
These shortcomings were eliminated to a large extend in 2006, when a new package 
of laws for further decentralisation of public policies was adopted. This package includes: 
the Framework Law No. 195/2006 on decentralisation, Law No. 273/2006 on local public 
finance, Law No. 286/2006 for amending and supplementing the Law No. 215/2001 on 
local public administration, Law No. 251/2006 for amending and supplementing Law No. 
188/1999 regarding the civil servants statute, and the GEO No. 179/2005 regarding 
prefect’s institution. These laws ensure the premises for objectivity and uniform 
application of the principles governing the process of equalisation grants to local 
government, as it eliminates the political interference of the county councils in the funds 
allocation. In this sense, 80% of the funds for local budget equalisation are distributed by a 
decision of the Public Finance General Directorate, within the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, in accordance with a clear and transparent formula, while the remaining 20% is 
allocated by a decision of the County Council, exclusively for supporting local 
development programmes (Alistar, 2007, 28). The new law on local public finances also 
stimulates a more responsible use of public funds and the fiscal efforts of LGs by 
introducing the obligation to present annually an analysis of the extent of own revenue 
collection (Alistar, 2007, 28).    
It is too early to asses the impact of this new package of laws on the performance of 
the local public authority. Theoretically, the government encourages LGs to become more 
self-reliant, and the power of the county councils on local authorities was seriously 
diminished, nevertheless, a system overhauling will need some more time to take place. It 
is not sure if these formal legislative provision will be efficient against the rent-seeking 
mentality of local authorities, especially in rural communes and small towns, towards 
county and central government, as most of the time these fight with lack of financial 
resources necessary in order to deliver the public services they are responsible for or to 
elaborate and implement development programmes. And again, the political factor is the 
most important. The new legislation creates a favourable platform, and it is up to the local 
authorities and political leaders to make use of it, by acting as public managers with an 
entrepreneurial spirit.    
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7 Conclusions 
 
Multi-level Governance: informal aspects 
As Hooge&Marks state, “a weighted measure of multi-level governance must take 
account of formal and informal power relations among jurisdictions” (Hooghe&Marks, 
2001a:2). As we will see in the following two chapters, the formal relationships between 
jurisdictional levels in place for the implementation of regional development policy prove 
the centrality of the policy-making process and institutional setting related to this policy 
field. The elaboration on public administration history, culture, and “modus operandi”, 
without bringing hard evidence of systemic malfunctioning related directly to the SIs 
management and implementation institutional system, supports and even strengthens the 
conclusion of the formal analysis. The central authorities exercise, through political and 
administrative channels, a strong influence on local authorities, which are, at their turn, 
paternalistic and display a rent-seeking behaviour. The principles of “local autonomy” and 
“decentralisation” still need some time to become real basis for the public administration 
organisation in Romania and for the relationship between its layers.        
 
European funds absorption 
The financial and administrative capacity of the local authorities is of outmost 
importance for the absorption of European funds. As they benefit from a large part of the 
funds allocated to Romania, they need to have both the financial possibility to co-finance 
their projects and the technical capacity to receive and implement these funds. For both 
dimensions measures have been taken to assure absorptions, i.e. the 2006 law on local 
public finances and training programmes were organised at this level, financed mostly 
from pre-accession funds. Nevertheless, the localities still have to prove that they are 
capable of taking these offered tools and transform them in concrete results. A first 
concrete idea on the administrative and financial absorption capacity of local authorities 
will most probable be given by the first annual implementation reports (2008) and the first 
interim evaluations to be carried out in Romania in 2009, for all seven Operational 
Programmes.    
  
Regionalisation 
Setting up a new, regional, governmental tier in Romania needs to overcome 
considerable obstacles, most of them of political nature. Preoccupied with problems of 
national interest, the decision-making factors in Romania prefer at this moment the “status-
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quo” in the territory, while the changes operated by now in the public administration, even 
if it is about its qualitative improvement or decentralisation, have been made at the 
pressure of the European Union and still await full implementation. Contrary to the 
impression that the EU requires the new member states to install a regional governance 
level in order to implement the Structural Instruments, the only condition imposed to the 
candidate countries in the framework of the negotiations carried out for the 21st chapter 
was for these countries to have NUTS II structures capable of implementing the pre-
accession aid and, upon accession, structural funds. At the same time, the LGs are reluctant 
to give up some of their prerogatives; subsequently, the three-tiers administrative system 
currently in place, respectively communes/towns/municipalities, county and central 
government, will be most probably preserved in the medium run (10 years). 
On the other side, beyond this formal institutional engineering, a complex series of 
cultural factors support the administrative status-quo in Romania. The domination of 
politics on administration and of these both on the weak civil society hampers reform. 
Changing the present administrative culture still necessitates time and considerable efforts 
from the political leaders and intellectuals, and from the civil society’s representatives. The 
latest package of laws adopted in 2006, aiming to strengthen the administrative and 
financial capacity of the local authorities still need to prove their effectiveness, while their 
self-sustainability is questionable, due to the strong linkage with their promoters. At the 
same time, the 2008/2009 elections might change the political compositions of the 
coalition in power. The new set of laws eliminated the local authorities dependency of the 
county councils, in terms of resources distribution, but it is to be seen if this connection is 
created between local and central authorities, as the latest enjoy these competences after 
2006. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE PHARE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COHESION COMPONENT IN 
ROMANIA 
1 Introduction 
  
As presented in the previous chapter, Phare’s total ‘pre-accession’ focus was 
enhanced in 1998, in response to the 1997 Luxembourg Council, when the fifth and most 
momentous enlargement round was launched. The accession process for the new candidate 
countries officially begins in 1998; two years later Romania starts as well the negotiations 
with the European Commission, with a view to becoming a EU member.  
 
In this timeframe (1998-2006) we can distinguish 3 phases in the management and 
implementation of the Phare national programme): 
 
1. 1998-1999: characterised by limited financial amounts to be implemented, amounts 
focused on institution building projects meant to support Romania to implement the acquis 
communautaire and to prepare for EU membership;  
2. 2000-2003: as Romania started the accession talks, the EU financial assistance in 
these 4 years was directed towards clear accession-driven objectives, respectively on the 
priorities identified in the Accession Partnership; the yearly budget increased 
substantially from around 50-100 millions in 1998 and 1999, to approx. 250 millions 
yearly; as a consequence, the institutional frame for the management and implementation 
of these funds expanded accordingly;  
3. 2004-2006: characterised by multi-annual programming, partial transition towards 
a “structural funds-like system”.  
 
As narrowed down in the first chapter, this analysis concentrates on the institutional 
arrangements in place for the Economic and Social Cohesion Component of the Phare 
National Programmes, as within this component ERDF- and ESF-like measures have been 
implemented at regional level. The general institutional architecture in place for the 
management of pre-accession aid will be addressed as well, as the respective ESC 
Component unfolds in the general Phare framework and the institutions playing a role in 
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the Phare National Programme are relevant for the ESC component as well, e.g. the 
National Aid Coordinator, the National Authorising Officer etc.).  
 Therefore, this chapter is organised in 2 major parts. The first part sets up the 
background as it explains, on one side, how the programming of Phare funds is carried out, 
and, on the other side, the institutions involved in the management and implementation of 
the Phare National Programme, e.g. National Aid Coordinator (NAC), National 
Authorising Officer (NAO), and their concrete competencies in this respect. Further, other 
Romanian institutions fulfilling specific roles at national level in the management and 
implementation of the Phare National Programme are identified; the interlocking of these 
institutions and the evolution of these institutional arrangements are presented.  
In the second part of this chapter the specific institutional arrangements for Phare 
ESC will be analysed. Using the methodological framework set up in the introductory 
chapter, the competencies, i.e. in terms of EU funds programming, implementation, 
monitoring, evaluation, financial management and control, audit; of the Ministry of 
European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing, and especially 
of the regional, i.e. the Regional Development Agencies and the Regional Development 
Boards, and other actors, i.e. the National Board for Regional Development, involved will 
be analysed.   
In accordance with the dead-lines laid down in the 2004 Financing Memorandum, 
the Phare 2004 ESC projects had to be contracted until the end of the year 2006, 
November; consequently, the implementation of most of them began in 2007, process 
which needs to be rounded up by the end of 2008. Therefore, at the key-moment 1st of 
January 2007, the Phare ESC 2000-2003 programme and projects represented the bulk of 
EU regional development policy-like measures implemented in Romania, having a real 
impact on the design of the future regional development policy and on the expertise of 
the institutions in place for its management and implementation. For this reason, the 
analysis is concentrated, in the second part of this chapter, on the Phare ESC Component in 
place for the implementation of these programmes (2000-2003). The institution involved in 
the management and implementation of the Phare ESC 2004-2006, and their competencies, 
are almost identical, and only the few new elements are underlined when the Phare ESC 
delivery system is presented.      
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2 Phare Funds Programming 
 
The pre-accession assistance is given in the general legal framework of the 
Association Agreements80 (1) and taking into account the provisions of the Accession 
Partnerships (Guidelines for Implementation of the Phare Programme in Candidate 
Countries for the period 2000-2006, page 2).  
In accordance with the Council Regulation (EC) 622/98, the Accession 
Partnerships (2) represent the single framework comprising the priority areas where 
measures need to be taken in order for the candidate/accession country to fulfil the 
European requirements as set up in the 31 negotiation chapters. In the Accession 
Partnerships, the European Council decides the principles, priorities, intermediate 
objectives and conditions for assistance, and the financial means made available to 
candidate/accession countries81. By financial means the instruments for implementing the 
aid, not the financial allocations per se, are understood; the Council has a saying as regards 
these allocations, when deciding on the annual budget82.     
Taking the priorities set up in the Accession Partnerships as point of departure, 
Action Plans (3) have been elaborated for different sectors: administrative and judicial 
capacity, adoption of the aquis communautaire and the pre-accession fiscal surveillance 
procedure, the pre-accession economic programme, the pre-accession pact on organised 
crime, the national development plans, the rural developments plans, a national 
employment strategy in line with the European employment strategy, and sectoral plans 
necessary for the participation in the Structural Funds after membership and for the 
implementation of ISPA and SAPARD before accession. (Accession Partnership 2003, art. 
2). 
On the basis of these documents, Romania, as the other candidate/accession 
countries, initiates the programming phase for the Phare funds at national level, under 
the responsibility of the National Aid Coordinator, subsequently it elaborates and submits 
to the European Commission the Programming Documents (4), in the form of initial 
project and sector fiches. These project and sector fiches are elaborated under the NAC 
 
80 The Association/Europe Agreements, signed between the EC and all ten central and eastern countries at the 
beginning of the 90s, prepared the way for the EU and the candidate countries to converge economically, 
politically, socially and culturally. They covered political cooperation, favourable trade relations, economic 
activities and cultural cooperation (see chapter II for details). 
81 For Romania see: 2003/397/EC: Council decision of 19 May 2003 on the principles, priorities, 
intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Romania, 2002/92/EC: 
Council Decision of 28 January 2002 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions 
contained in the Accession Partnership with Romania, 1999/852/EC: Council Decision of 6 December 1999 
on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership 
with Romania (revised in 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/romania/key_documents_en.htm 
82 see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/budget/budget_glance/how_decided_en.htm  
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coordination, on the basis of the input (in respect of content) of the future managing and/or 
beneficiary institutions, in their quality of Implementing Agencies and Authorities. The 
Commission issues a Financial Proposal as departure point for negotiations with the 
candidate/accession country; the negotiations culminate in an “Annual Financial 
Decision” (including for each year of the Phare 2004-6, although in this period multi-
annual programming was practiced) which corresponds to both sides interests, a 
compromise between the national Programming Documents and the EC Financial 
Proposal. The Annual Financial Decision is legalised by signing the Financing 
Memorandum (5). (Guidelines for Implementation of the Phare Programme in Candidate 
Countries for the period 2000-2006, page 4) 
3 The Romanian institutional arrangements in place for the management 
of Phare National Programme   
3.1 From DIS to EDIS and competencies shifts in the Phare 
implementation system 
According to the “Practical Guide to contract procedures financed from the General 
Budget of the European Communities in the context of external actions” (PRAG 2006)83, 
there are three possible approaches to managing the programmes/projects financed under 
the external aid programmes of the EC: 
  1. Centralised: the European Commission is the Contracting Authority and takes 
decisions for and on behalf of the beneficiary country. In this case, actions to be performed 
by the Contracting Authority are carried out by the European Commission, acting for and 
on behalf of the beneficiary country.  
  2. Decentralised:  
   2.1. Ex-ante: decisions concerning the procurement and award of contracts 
are taken by the Contracting Authority and referred for approval to the European 
Commission.  
   2.2. Ex-post (EDIS): decisions prescribed in the Financing Agreement are 
taken by the Contracting Authority without prior reference to the European Commission 
(apart from exceptions to the standard procedures), but subject to ex-post control of the 
Commission. (Practical Guide to contract procedures financed from the General Budget of 
the European Communities in the context of external actions - PRAG, pages 5-6) 
 
83 The latest edition of PRAG, 2007, is not applied in Romania, as from 1st of January 2007 the Romanian 
law applies to all public procurement activities, carried out for all public funds, national and European. 
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In the context of the implementation and management and of the pre-accession 
funds after 1 January 2007, the Article 27 of the Accession Treaty stipulates:  
“The ex-ante control by the Commission over tendering and contracting shall be waived 
by a Commission decision to that effect, following an accreditation procedure conducted 
by the Commission and a positively assessed Extended Decentralised Implementation 
System (EDIS) in accordance with the criteria and conditions laid down in the Annex to 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999 on coordinating aid to the 
applicant countries in the framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 3 and in Article 164 of the Financial Regulation applicable 
to the general budget of the European Communities .“ 
   
During the last years of the pre-accession period, Romania intensively prepared its 
institutional system for the management and implementation of Phare programme in 
Extended Decentralised Institutional System. The Commission Decision on awarding the 
EDIS accreditation to the Romanian Phare institutional system was adopted on 14th of 
December 2006, for the Central Financing and Contracting Unit and the Ministry of 
European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing, as 
Implementing Agency for Phare ESC part 1. On 2nd of April 2007 the Ministry of Labour, 
Family and Equality of Chances was granted EDIS as well84, as Implementing Agency for 
Phare ESC part 2, Human Resource Development: employment and social services.  
EDIS is “granted” to the institutions involved in the management of the Phare 
programmes (and planned to be involved in the management and implementation of 
Structural Instruments), as a proof that they are able to fulfil their tasks independently, 
without the ex-ante control of the European Commission/its Delegation. Although 
Romania is in a far better case than other new Member States, which were not granted 
EDIS before accession, a division rather than a continuation of the two systems, 
Phare/Structural Instruments, can be observed. The institutions implementing Phare 
continue their activity in EDIS(ystem) beyond 2006 until all Phare funds are spent, i.e. 
2010-2011, while the SIs management and implementing institutions act separately since 
2004-5. For the latest, a “compliance assessment” of the SIs delivery system is required by 
the art.71 of the Council Regulation 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund. 
The first payments are made to Romania upon the completion, by the Audit Authority, and 
approval, by the European Commission, of this system audit.  
Granting EDIS to the institutions managing and implementing Phare is significant 
for these institutions as such, and a lot less for the SIs delivery system.  
 
84 See the web page of the Ministry of Labour, Family and Equality of Chances: 
 http://www.mmssf.ro/website/ro/comunicate/030507comunicat.pdf 
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3.2 Institutions managing the Phare National Programme 
implementation   
Several institutions, at different levels, are involved in the management and 
implementation of pre-accession funds, fulfilling specific roles: 
EUROPEAN LEVEL 
1. European Commission/Delegation of the European Commission 
NATIONAL-COORDINATION LEVEL 
2. National Aid Coordinator (NAC) 
3. National Authorising Officer (NAO) 
NATIONAL-IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL 
4. Implementing Agencies/CFCU 
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL 
5. Implementing Authorities 
3.2.1 The European Commission and its Delegation in Bucharest  
The European Commission administers the Phare programmes with the assistance 
of the Phare Management Committee. This Committee is composed of the representatives 
of the Member States (not of the candidate/accession countries!); a representative of the 
European Investment Bank participates as well in the PMC, as observer85. The PCM 
approves the Financial Proposal made by the European Commission to the aid recipient.  
According to art. 9 of the Council Regulation 1266/1999, the European 
Commission is responsible for coordinating the operations under the three pre-accession 
instruments and in particular for establishing pre-accession aid guidelines. Project 
selection, tendering and contracting by applicant countries is, under DIS, subject to ex-ante 
approval by the Commission, which also adopts rules for inspections, i.e. control and 
audit missions, and evaluation. Once EDIS is granted, this ex-ante control is waived; the 
Commission preserves only the competency of ex-post control of the management and 
implementation of pre-accession funds; from this moment, the evaluation function is 
decentralised towards the beneficiary states, as well.    
 
85 According to (art. 8, 9, Council Regulation 3906/89, 2004 consolidated text). See also 
http://www.fern.org/pubs/briefs/phare.htm#_edn11 : “the Phare Management Committee, made up of 
representatives from both Member States and the Commission, exercises programme-level oversight. The 
committee delivers an opinion, on the basis of a financing proposal and project summaries and in light of the 
candidate countries’ progress in implementing the Accession Partnerships. Taking this opinion into account, 
the Commission may continue, re-allocate or withdraw aid allocations on national plans on a monthly basis 
as well as all projects undertaken under these plans.” 
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The European Commission Delegation86 is the representative of the European 
Commission in the accession countries. In the early 1990s, the management of PHARE 
programmes was carried out exclusively at central level, i.e. the European Commission. In 
the late 1990s a series of responsibilities were progressively decentralised and transferred 
to the national authorities under the ex-ante control of the Delegations. Besides the system 
of implementation agencies linked to the National Funds created at national level, a 
substantial increase of Commission resources in the Delegations took place, necessary for 
the effective exercise of ex-ante control to be ensured (Guidelines for Implementation of 
the Phare Programme in Candidate Countries for the period 2000-2006, page 13, 14). 
Some decisions are still taken at the European Commission level, for example when a 
financial reallocation of more than 15% of the Financing Memorandum is proposed by the 
Joint Monitoring Committee (see further), reallocation which substantially affects the 
priorities of the Financial Memorandum (GD 1011/1999, annex 3 art. 5).   
 
At national level, the system for the management and implementation of the pre-
accession aid has been built up on the Commission requirements and the specific domestic 
necessities and characteristics of the Romanian administration. We can distinguish 
between three macro-competencies: 
1. coordination: National Aid Coordinator (technical coordination), National 
Authorising Officer (financial coordination), Joint Monitoring Committee 
(overall coordination)  
2. financial management and implementation : CFCU/Implementing Agencies 
3. technical management and implementation: Implementing Authorities (and 
different line ministries in the case of Phare ESC) 
As in the case of the delivery system in place for the management and 
implementation of structural instruments addressed in the fourth chapter, the 
programming, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, information and publicity, 
financial management and control, audit competences related to Phare funds are shared 
or divided among a series of institutions playing the roles mentioned above.  
3.2.2 The National Aid Coordinator (NAC) 
The National Aid Coordinator (NAC) is set up as a national focal point for the 
co-ordination of the pre-accession assistance. The NAC is embodied by the head of the 
 
86 The EC Representation after granting EDIS.  
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ministry where this institution is located or by a state secretary, as delegated by the 
minister. The NAC tasks are carried out by a general directorate under its direct 
coordination.    
In Romania the National Aid Coordinator (NAC) was initially localised in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in 2000, as Romania started the accession negotiations and 
the European support “enhanced” its accession focus, the NAC moved to the Ministry of 
European Integration, as this was also responsible for the accession talks. According to 
the NDP 2004-2006, between 2000 and 2004 the NAC/MIE assured also the coordination, 
programming and monitoring of ISPA and SAPARD funds (NDP 2004-6, page 293). In 
2004, when the preparations for structural instruments intensified and at the suggestion of 
the European Commission, the NAC was relocated to the Ministry of Public 
Finances/Ministry of Economy and Finance87. The NAC preserves the Phare 
competencies and coordinates the Managing Authority for the Community Support 
Framework/Authority for the Coordination of Structural Instruments, as well, general 
direction still responsible with the programming, monitoring and evaluation of Phare 
funds, next to programming, preparation for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of 
structural instruments.        
 
As regards programming, the specialised department of the MACSF/ACIS, i.e. 
Analysis and Programming Directorate, coordinates the elaboration of the project fiches 
drafted in accordance with the MACSF/ACIS guidelines by the Implementing Agencies 
and Authorities. The NAC negotiates and signs with the Commission the Financial 
Memorandum (covering the entire Phare National Programme, including the Phare 
Economic and Social Component).  
 
The monitoring function was decentralised very early. According to the Financial 
Memorandum 2001, although from the very beginning the FMa provided for a Joint 
Monitoring Committee (3), it is for the first time in 2002 that the Joint Monitoring 
Committee and the Sectoral Monitoring Sub-committees start their activity. The JMC is 
composed of the NAC, NAO, and Commission representatives (GD 1011/1999, annex 3, 
art. 15). It reunites at least once a year (in practice 2 times per year) and it analyses, based 
on the monitoring reports, drafted by the Implementing Authorities under the coordination 
of MACSF/ACIS, the progress registered in reaching the objectives of the envisaged 
 
87 Together with the National Coordinator of ISPA Programme. The SAPARD Agency was acredited and 
began functioning on its own. 
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projects, established through FMa. If necessary the JMC will recommend financial 
reallocations or priorities adjustments to be undertaken by the European Commission in 
agreement with the Romanian authorities. 
If the JMC monitors at a more strategic level the implementation of Phare funds 
and addresses horizontal problematic issues identified in this process, which could be 
brought back in the negotiation process, operational monitoring is carried out in the 
framework of the Sub-monitoring Sectoral Committees (SMSCs). For this purpose, the 
projects implemented under Phare National Programme are clustered in 10 Sectors88. The 
10 Sub-monitoring Sectoral Committees are nominated by the JMC, and they are 
composed of the NAC, NAO, PAOs, and representatives of the EC Delegation. In practice 
deputies of these officials are taking part in the SMSCs where the progress registered in 
implementing each project in the Sector is analysed in detail, on the basis of the monitoring 
reports elaborated within the NAC/MACSF(ACIS)/Monitoring Compartment and of the 
evaluation reports elaborated by expert evaluators under the coordination of the European 
Commission/Evaluation Central Unit within the MACSF/ACIS.      
If before granting EDIS the monitoring function was carried out jointly by the 
MACSF/ACIS and the European Commission; after 14th of December 2006, the 
Commission/its Representation in Bucharest enjoys only observatory status in the Sub-
monitoring and Joint Monitoring Committees.       
 
The evaluation of Phare programmes was decentralised to the MACSF/ACIS 
beginning with 1st of January 2007. The Evaluation Central Unit coordinates the evaluation 
exercises carried out by external evaluators on the basis of an Annual Evaluation Plan 
elaborated by MACSF and approved by the JMC. The follow-up of recommendations is 
ensured together by the ECU and the Monitoring Department of the MACSF, in special 
debriefing meetings and/or SMSCs.  
3.2.3 The National Authorising Officer  
The National Authorising Officer (NAO) is heading the National Fund (NF), 
established in most cases in the Ministry of Finance, which administers the funds allocated 
by the European Commission, and the national co-financing. The establishment of the 
Fund under the responsibility of a National Authorising Officer (NAO) reduces the parallel 
 
88 Economic and Social Cohesion and CBC; Public Administration, Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Justice, Home Affairs, Finance, Internal Market, Social Sectror, Environment, Transport  
 
 106
structures in the financial management of PHARE funds and enhances co-ordination, 
especially with regard to measures co-financed with the national budget (Guidelines for 
Implementation of the Phare Programme in Candidate Countries for the period 2000-2006, 
page 14). 
In accordance with the mentioned Guidelines, the Romanian National Authorising 
Officer (NAO) has permanently functioned in the Ministry of Public Finance, since its 
setting up in 1998. The NAO is authorised to manage the financial contribution of the 
European Community under the conditions established through the Agreement Memoranda 
concerning the establishment of the National Fund and the establishment of the Phare 
Central Finance and Contracting Unit (approved through GD no. 1011/1999), and through 
the Financing Memoranda concluded by the Commission and the Romanian Government 
(NDP 2004-6, page 291, see also GD 1011/1999, annex 3, art. 1).     
The NAO assures the respect for the rules, procedures and legislative provisions 
for Phare on public procurement and financial management and the functioning of a 
reporting system for all Phare funds, in order to facilitate the financial control and audit 
activities. The activity of the NAO/NF is based on the financial management and 
implementation activity carried out by the Implementing Agencies, subject to an 
implementing agreement between the NAO/NF and the IAgs. The NAO requests the 
funds from the European Commission, through standard Request of Funds elaborated on 
the basis of the financial tables reflecting the contracted and paid amounts for each 
programme/component/project and the anticipated payments needs89 (GD 1011/1999, 
Annex 3, art. 6) and transfers to the IAgs the necessary funds, assures the financial flux 
from national resources (co-financing), recovers unutilised funds from Implementing 
Agencies, reports to EC, EC Delegation, JMC, SMSCs on a monthly/quarterly basis.  
The National Fund DG keeps accountancy of all advance payments and regular 
payments made by the Commission for each programme/project. If recommended by the 
JMC, the NF can reallocate between sub-programmes in the framework of the same 
Financial Memorandum, after their endorsement by the European Commission or its 
Delegation in Bucharest90. The European Commission (OLAF) is informed, by the 
National Fund, through NAO, as regard all suspected and actual cases of fraud and 
irregularity and related measures taken by the national authority. The NF may investigate if 
the irregularities reported by the IAgs are accurate. 
 
89 As communicated by the IAGs. 
90 If the reallocation affects less than 15% of the FM value and the objectives of the FM are not affected, the 
Delegation may endorse the respective changes. 
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3.2.4 The Romanian Court of Accounts 
The external audit responsibility in Romania rests with the Romanian Court of 
Accounts. The accounts and operations of the NF and all CFCU/IAs may be as well 
audited at the EC discretion by an outside auditor without prejudice to the responsibilities 
of the EC and the European Court of Auditors. In addition, the Commission may conduct 
on-the-spot checks and inspections in accordance with the procedures laid down in the 
Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96. The controls and audits described above 
shall be applicable to all contractors and subcontractors who have received Community 
funds. (Guidelines for Implementation of the Phare Programme in Candidate Countries for 
the period 2000-2006, page 4) 
3.2.5 Implementing Agencies/CFCU 
The number of Implementing Agencies (IAgs) through which PHARE is 
implemented in each country under the authority of the NAO can vary (Guidelines for 
Implementation of the Phare Programme in Candidate Countries for the period 2000-2006, 
page 14). Central Finance and Contracting Units (CFCUs) are used in the accession 
countries to carry out the tendering and contracting of specific programmes addressing 
multiple sectors (Guidelines for Implementation of the Phare Programme in Candidate 
Countries for the period 2000-2006, page 15).  
In Romania, the IAgs are basically responsible with the financial management and 
implementation of projects, i.e. tendering, contracting91, paying, financial control, 
internal audit of projects for and in the name of the Implementing Authorities (IAus) 
which are responsible solely for their technical management (PND 2004-6, 291). 
Currently, the three IAgs for Phare are: 
1. Central Finance and Contracting Unit (CFCU),  
2. Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public 
Works, and Housing (Phare ESC, part 1),  
3. Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family/Ministry of Labour, 
Family and Equality of Chances (Phare ESC, part 2)92 
 
 
91 Contracting EU funds has been done until 1st of January 2007 in accordance with PRAG, “Practical Guide 
to contract procedures financed from the General Budget of the European Communities in the context of 
external actions”, beginning with the date of accession, the Romanian legislation regarding public 
procurement, GO 34/2006, already in place beginning with June 2006 and fully harmonised with the 
European legislation in the field, applies (see also May 2006 Monitoring Report on Romania, page 18).   
92 For Sapard funds the Sapard Agency is responsible with tendering, contracting, etc, while for ISPA, the 
CFCU acts as IAg.  
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The latest two, together with the Implementing Authorities under their 
coordination, enjoy programming competencies; they are also responsible with the co-
drafting of the project and sector Phare fiches, finalised and negotiated by the NAC with 
the European Commission. 
The Implementing Agencies are headed by Programme Authorising Officers 
(PAO), responsible for the functioning of the IAgs and for the proper financial 
management of the projects under the IAg jurisdiction (GD 1011/1999, Annex 3, art.1). 
The PAOs are responsible for preventing irregularities, overpayments and fraud, 
detecting them (in particular through on-the-spot checks), for taking action against them 
and recovering the funds unduly paid due to irregularities or negligence.  At the same time, 
the IAgs assist the NAO with the elaboration of the necessary financial documentation 
which accompanies the NAO payment claims to the Commission: financial tables 
reflecting the contracted and paid amounts for each programme/component/project and the 
anticipated payments needs.  (GD 1011/1999, Annex 3, art. 6). 
If the CFCU is exclusively an IAg93, the other two ministries share the role of IAs 
for the projects under their responsibility. After 2007 the MIE/MDPWH and 
MLSSF/MLFEQ act as Managing Authorities of the Regional Operational Programme, 
respectively, Human Resources Development OP. The Phare, respectively ROP, 
programmes are managed within the MDPWH by two different general directorates, while 
the MLFEQ functions similarly to the NAC, one general directorate, respectively the MA 
of the HSD SOP is responsible with both Phare and SIs management and implementation 
The CFCU remains a directorate general specialised in contracting and financial 
management activities, which will disappear when pre-accession programmes under its 
responsibility are closed.  
 
93 The CFCU was initially set up in order to assure the fiscal administration, accountancy and payment of 
(all) Phare funds in the name of the Romanian Government (GD 1011/1999, art.1). As the level and 
complexity of funding increased, the contracting function was shared among CFCU and other institutions. 
According to the GD 1011/1999, the competencies of CFCU are: public procurement: the CFCU receives 
the tenders dossiers from Implementing Authorities, assures their conformity with PRAG or GO 34/2006, 
launches the procurement process and coordinates the projects appraisal and selection process, from the point 
of view of procedures to be followed; contracting: once a bid ranks the first after the appraisal process, the 
CFCU  prepares and signs the contract with the company selected to carry out the services, works or 
investments involved. Before EDIS was granted, the contract was endorsed also by the European 
Commission/its Delegation; accountancy: maintaining the accountancy system, registering appropriately all 
payments at programme, project, contract level; payments: carrying out payments on time and correctly; the 
CFCU receives and verifies  payments claims from contractors and requests their endorsement by the IAus; 
reporting: elaborating and disseminating to all stakeholders monthly reports regarding the financial situation 
of each programme; Phare account: operating a separate bank account for each programme, preparing the 
requests for advance payments to the Commission; training; audit: supports the audit missions organised 
for CFCU by national or European authorised institutions. 
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3.2.6 Implementing Authorities 
If the Implementing Agencies are responsible for the projects financial management 
and implementation, the management of the technical implementation94, i.e. 
project/programme selection, management, monitoring falls entirely under the 
responsibility of the Implementing Authorities. (Guidelines for Implementation of the 
Phare Programme in Candidate Countries for the period 2000-2006, page 15). 
As in other Phare countries, in Romania the IAs are headed by a Senior 
Programme Officer (SPO), an official within the IAs responsible with the technical 
implementation of programmes/projects (GD 1011/1999, Annex 3, art.1). 
According to the GD 1011/1999, Annex 1, the responsibilities of the Implementing 
Authorities are:  
PROGRAMMING 
o identifying, programming and detailing programmes and projects, based on the 
priorities identified (see above “Programming”); 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o implementing from technical point of view the projects on time and appropriately; 
o providing (to the IAgs) information regarding the projects implementation state of 
art, on a regular basis 
o managing the projects and the corresponding contract 
o reporting (to the IAgs) on future public procurement and bids evaluations; 
elaborating the tender dossiers, appraising and selection of the offers; 
 
MONITORING 
o Preparing the monitoring reports 
  
EVALUATION 
o Contributing to the evaluation exercises related to the Phare projects under their 
jurisdiction 
 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
o Approving the invoices submitted by contractors, before their transmittal to the 
IAG for payment  
 
As we see in the Annexes 3, 4, 5, and 6, the role of Implementing Authorities is 
assumed in most cases by the beneficiaries of the programmes/projects, or by their 
coordinators. These are mostly central government institutions, with some exceptions, 
where IAs are located at regional level, i.e. the Regional Development Agencies.  
 
Table 4. Institutions involved in the management and implementation of the Phare National 
Programme 
 
94 The project management per se is conducted within Project Implementation Units, directions within the 
particular institution.  
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FUNCTION/LEVEL INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION/DELEGATION/REPRESENTATION 
 
NATIONAL AID COORDINATOR 
                                                        MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE 
                       
NATIONAL AUTHORISING OFFICER  
 
NATIONAL STEERING COMMITEES 
 
 
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES 
MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND HOUSING 
MINISTRY OF LABOUR, FAMILY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 
CENTRAL FINANCE AND CONTRACTING UNIT (MEF) 
 
IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITIES 
MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND HOUSING 
MINISTRY OF LABOUR, FAMILY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR EMPLOYMENT 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND YOUTH  
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES AND COOPERATION 
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCES 
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT  
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
ETC.!!! 
 
JOINT MONITORING COMMITTEE 
AUDIT AUTHORITY 
OLAF 
}
4 Phare Economic and Social Cohesion (ESC) Component 
 
As presented in the first part of this chapter, the Phare ESC programmes 
subscribe as well to the classification made for the Phare National Programmes: 
 
1. Between 1998-9 limited amounts were deployed in the framework of this 
component; the funds were mainly directed at institutional building of the RDAs 
and NARD;   
 
2. Most of 2000-2003 Phare projects are implemented, as their contract 
execution dead-line according to Financial Memoranda and their addendums are 
passed (end of 2006/2007). In terms of “lessons learned”, they are the most 
relevant for the SIs programming and especially implementation 
arrangements.   
 
3. Phare 2004-6 multi-annual programme comes as the closest to the future 
structural instruments to be implemented, in terms of programming, type of 
interventions and institutional arrangements. As most of the projects financed 
under Phare 2005 were contracted in 2007, and in 2008 only the projects 
financed under Phare 2004 are in the process of being implemented, their impact 
on the structural instruments management and implementation system  is rather 
limited95.    
 
As a result of the governmental restructuring and of the European Commission 
suggestions, the institutional arrangements in place for the implementation of regional 
policy have suffered numerous changes in this timeframe. Regional development/Phare 
ESC competencies passed from the National Agency of Regional Development to 
Ministry of Development and Forecasting and further to the Ministry of Integration 
renamed, in 2007, Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing96. 
Nevertheless, despite the changes in the system, the final responsibility of Phare ESC 
 
95 An example is the Phare 2004 programme, implementing a Training Strategy 2007-2013 for Structural 
Instruments implementation, launched only on 26th of April 2007.    
http://www.mie.ro/stiri.php?s=332, downloaded 13.05.2007, 12.30    
96 See Annex 1 for an over view of these institutional changes. 
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and the decision-making power relevant to this policy field/programme have remained 
permanently at national level, and, consequently, the RDAs’ position hasn’t been 
strengthened through transferring more competencies from the central institutions; 
nevertheless, their expertise increased as a result of the institutional building activities 
they took part in and through practical implementation activities they carried out.  
   As already mentioned, the Ministry for European Integration/Ministry of 
Development, Public Works and Housing played in 2003-2004 both the role of 
National Aid Coordinator and Implementing Agency and Authority for Phare ESC, 
fulfilling the tasks related to the elaboration of National Development Plan, 
programming function for both National Phare Programme and Phare ESC, and 
implementation of Phare Economic and Social Cohesion.  
As a result of the negotiations with the European Commission, the 
reorganisation of the institutional arrangements for implementing Phare programme and 
preparing for Structural Instruments lead to the transfer of the NAC function from MEI 
to Ministry of Public Finances/Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Ministry of 
European Integration remained, together with the Ministry of Labour, Family and 
Equality of Chances, Implementing Agencies and Authorities for Phare Economic and 
Social Cohesion Component, and further, Managing Authorities for the Regional 
Operational Programme and Human Resources Development OP 2007-2013.    
4.1 Phare 1998 and 1999 Economic and Social Cohesion Components 
4.1.1 Short Description  
In the first years after the re-orientation of the Pre-accession aid towards directly 
assisting the candidate countries in preparing for the EU membership, more importance 
was given to institution building in the field of regional development, as the Romanian 
NUTS II regions and the regional institution involved in the funds implementation had 
to be created from scratch.    
The aim of the 1998 programme was “the establishment, in accordance with the 
objective defined in the Accession Partnership, of a comprehensive framework for 
regional development incorporating policy, legislation and instruments, together with 
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the administrative capacity to manage ISPA, SAPARD and Phare in an Objective 1 
context.” (Financing Memorandum 1998, page 1)97. 
By the time of the signing of the 1998 Financial Agreement, the Law on 
Regional Development no. 151/1998 was drafted and was waiting for Parliament 
approval. The 1997 and 1998 Institution Building Phare programmes relevant to 
Regional Development Structures were most probable implemented simultaneously.  
Phare 1998 concentrated on three axes98:   
1. Regional Development Support aimed to provide “Objective 1”-type support 
through a number of regional and sectoral programmes; investments made under this 
component were targeted at industrial restructuring and human resources; 
2. ISPA Project Preparation Facility (preparation of projects in environment, 
transport infrastructure with technical assistance); 
3. Special Preparatory Programme (SPP) (technical assistance concentrated on 
institutional building, especially future SAPARD). 
 
Phare 1999 had the lowest budget among all national Phare programmes (50.2 
MEuro). The sub-programme Economic and Social Cohesion concentrated on 
unemployment issues, as its main objective was “to address unemployment in Romania 
in a systematic way by establishing a National Action Plan for Employment and by 
improving the ability of the employment and education institutions to respond to labour 
market needs.” (Project Fiche RO 9908.01, 199). The Plan was meant to provide the 
policy framework for European Social Fund-type measures to be implemented in the 
context of regional development programmes in Romania (Financing Memorandum 
1999, page 11).  
4.1.2 Implementing Arrangements 
In these two years the institutions created for the implementation of the Phare 
ESC were mainly involved in capacity building activities; they were supported in 
managing the investments made under the programme by external experts, as a first 
exercise for the implementation of the more complex Phare ESC programmes to come.   
 
97 This programme was preceded, nevertheless, by the Phare 1997 Regional Development Institution 
Building Programme (RDIBP) (1.5 MEURO), aimed to establish and ensure the first year’s operation of 
the National Agency for Regional Development, and to assist with the creation of Regional Development 
Agencies. The same programme facilitated the design of the 8 regional development plans and of the first 
National Development Plan. See Sector Fiche Regional Development 
http://www.caravanafs.ccina.ro/PDF/DPR/dpr26.pdf, page 13 
98 As only beginning with 2000 ISPA and SAPARD will become separate instruments, Phare 1998 and 
1999 cover also preparatory measures for their implementation.   
99http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/ro9908-01-employment.pdf  
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The National Agency for Regional Development, acting on the basis of the Law 
on Regional Development 151/1998 fulfilled the role of Implementing Agency for the 
ESC Component until 2001, when the NARD became a part of the newly created 
Ministry of Development and Prognosis. The National Board of Regional Development 
supposed to play, according to the Law no. 151/1998, an essential, decision-making 
position in implementing the regional development policy. Nevertheless, its 
involvement has been very limited in this process (see further)100.  
 The National Agency for Regional Development was not involved in the 
implementation of Phare 1999 ESC, as the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, in 
charge with the drafting of the National Action Plan for Employment, was responsible 
with the technical management of the programme, as Implementing Authority, while the 
CFCU took care of the financial and contractual matters, as Implementing Agency.  
(Project Fiche RO 9908.01, 5).  
4.2 Phare 2000-2003 Economic and Social Cohesion Components 
4.2.1 Short description of the four sub-programmes 
Between 2000 and 2003 the same approach  was applied to the Phare ESC 
Component: investment measures were adjoined by institutional building projects, in 
the form of technical assistance101 or twinning102, to directly support the central, 
regional and local public institutions with the implementation work related to ESC 
investments, i.e. the National Agency of Regional Development/Ministry of 
Development and Prognosis, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Tourism, 
Ministry of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Co-operatives, Ministry of 
Labour and Social Solidarity, Regional Development Agencies etc.  
Phare 2000 Economic and Social Cohesion had two major parts: the first part, a 
large Twinning programme, supported the Romanian government, i.e. National Agency 
of Regional Development and the RDAs to strengthen their institutional capacity for the 
 
100 This aspect has been confirmed by most of the interviewed representatives of the RDAs and MEI.  
101 Operational or/and management assistance given to institutions responsible with the adoption and 
implementation of acquis communautaire and/or management of EU-funded projects by team of experts 
(on the private market), selected after a public procurement procedure.  
102 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assistance/institution_building/index_en.htm: Twinning 
projects involve the secondment of EU experts, known as Resident Twinning Advisors (RTA) to the 
acceding, candidate and potential candidate countries on specific projects. The RTAs are made available 
for a period of at least one year to work on a project in the corresponding Ministry in the beneficiary 
country. They are supported by a senior Project Leader in their Member State home administration, who 
is responsible for ensuring project implementation and co-ordination of input from the Member State.  
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implementation of an integrated regional development policy in line with the provisions 
of the National Development Plan (NDP) adopted within the context of the pre-
accession process (Project Fiche Phare RO-0007.01, 1). 
 The second part of the Phare 2000 Economic and Social Cohesion represented a 
regional development plan “in micro”, practically the first “predecessor” of the 
Regional Operational Programme. 75 MEuro were invested through this sub-
programme in four priority areas (sub-components): 
A. Human Resources Development in the context of industrial restructuring 
B. Assistance to small and medium sized enterprises 
C. Local and regional infrastructures. 
D. Awareness Campaign, Selection, Monitoring, Supervision and Evaluation 
Source: Project Fiche 2000, RO-0007.02, page 1 
 
These priority areas were preserved next year, while also a social services 
investment scheme was financed with Phare 2001103 funds: 
A. Assistance to small and medium sized enterprises 
B. Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) 
C. Social Services investment scheme 
D. Regional/large-scale infrastructure 
E. Small-scale local infrastructure scheme 
F. Awareness Campaign, Projects Appraisal and Selection, Monitoring and  
Evaluation 
Source: Project Fiche 2001, RO-0108.03, page 1 
 
Phare ESC 2002 investments are more streamlined and focused on urban and 
business infrastructure, further than vocational education and human resources:   
A. Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) 
B. Human Resources Development 
C. Regional/large-scale infrastructure 
C.1 Business-related Regional infrastructure 
C.2 Small and Medium Towns Infrastructure Development Programme 
(SAMTID) 
D. Awareness Campaign, Selection, Monitoring and Site Supervision (Technical 
Assistance) 
Source: Standard Project Fiche, 2002, RO-2002/000-586.05.02, page 1 
 
103 For the first time in 2001 the ESC sub-programme concentrates on 11 priority zones/target areas (see 
the table below). This concentration was necessary, as the discrepancies between the NUTS II regions 
were not that high, compared with the ones inside the regions. In each NUTS II region exists more and 
less developed areas, while the NUTS II regions have approximately the same level of development. The 
11 target areas shared two characteristics: undergo the negative impact of industrial restructuring on one 
side, but have economic growth potential on the other side. The localities selected in these areas, 
according to GD 399/2001 are only urban localities (sic!). The overlapping with SAPARD and ISPA is 
avoided, rural and large, national-wide infrastructure projects being financed through these two last 
instruments. 
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Phare 2002 facilitates the pilot phase of SAMTID, a very complex multi-annual 
programme, financed from various sources, i.e. local public and central budget, 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and Phare funds, dedicated to water and 
wastewater services provision in small and medium towns. The programme was 
managed by the Ministry of Public Administration, in collaboration with the wide range 
of actors, in the framework of a Steering Committee104.   
In 2003, Phare ESC focused again, as in 2001, on SMSEs, next to the same 
objectives as in the previous year: TVET, Human Resources and Infrastructure, i.e. 
project which are not financed under ISPA. The SAMTID programme continued as 
well. A sub-programme on waste management targets the small and medium 
communities and assists them in reaching the European standards in the field: 
A. Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) 
B. Human resources development 
C. Small-scale waste management investment scheme 
D. Large-scale infrastructure 
D.1 Regional and local infrastructure 
D.2 Small and Medium Towns Infrastructure Development Programme 
(SAMTID) 
E. Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Support Grant Scheme 
F. Awareness Campaign, Selection, Monitoring and Site Supervision 
Source: Standard Project Fiche, 2003, RO-2003/005-551.05.03, pages 1-2 
 
 
104 In the case of the SAMTID programme, the Ministry of Public Administration is the Coordinating 
Body for the overall SAMTID program, including loan and grant components104.  In 2003 the roles of 
each institution involved in the management and implementation of the programme are clarified. The 
Ministry of Development and Prognosis will be the Implementing Agency for the Phare financed 
component for investments, including the 25 percent co-financing from the National Fund. In this 
position, it serves as the Contracting Authority and Paying Agency for Phare resources; ensure that the 
objectives of this proposal for Phare resources are met; participate in the SAMTID Steering Committee, 
elaborate the selection and implementation procedures in accordance with the guidelines set by the 
European Union; report to National Board for Regional Development and EC Delegation on the stage of 
implementation of the programme; arrange framework agreements with Regional Development Agencies 
that will ensure public awareness of the program, monitor the implementation of the projects, evaluate 
project performance and report to the Regional Development Board, MoPA and MDP, conclude 
framework agreements with each beneficiary for the management of Phare financed work contract. 
The established structure delegates considerable autonomy on investment decisions to Regional 
Development Agencies as Implementing Authorities for the Phare grant component. The implementation 
of this component should build on the previous relevant RDAs experience achieved during the 
implementation of the Phare 2000 and 2001 regional and local infrastructure components. Regional 
Development Agencies will keep their important role in promoting SAMTID, sharing information and 
guiding the potential beneficiaries. Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) /Regional Development 
Boards (RDBs) and regional offices of national regulator will take part in the pre-screening process with 
support of technical assistance. RDBs and/or RDAs representatives will participate also in the final 
national selection of the pilot projects. (see the Source: Project Fiches, Phare ESC, investment 
component, 2001, 2002, 2003) 
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Although the principle of multi-annual programming was not applied between 
2000 and 2003, the continuity and coherence of the Phare ESC 2000-3 priorities is 
obvious. Measures planned are built up on the previous programme and thought to 
complete and bring added values to investments already made in the respective 
domains.     
4.2.2 Implementing arrangements  
In accordance with the dead-lines laid down in the 2004 Financing 
Memorandum, the Phare 2004 ESC projects had to be contracted until the end of the 
year 2006, November; consequently, the implementation of most of them began in 
2007, process which needs to be rounded up by the end of 2008. Therefore, at the key-
moment 1st of January 2007, the Phare ESC 2000-2003 programme and projects 
represented the bulk of EU regional development policy-like measures implemented 
in Romania, having a real impact on the design of the future regional development 
policy and on the expertise of the institutions in place for its management and 
implementation.    
For Phare ESC 2000-2003 most of the Institutional Building  projects were 
initially contracted by the CFCU/Ministry of Finances as Implementing Agency, the 
beneficiary institutions being in charge with their technical implementation, as 
Implementing Authorities: Ministry of Development and Forecast, Ministry of SMEs 
and Cooperation, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Tourism etc. 
Beginning with 2002, the CFCU acted as Contracting Authority only for the Twinning 
contracts under the ESC, as National Twinning Contact point (see also Financing 
Memorandum 2003, pag. 62). 
  For investments in Economic and Social Cohesion, the NARD/MDP/MEI acted 
as Implementing Agency105, with all the competencies and relational obligations 
towards the National Aid Coordinator, National Authorising Officer, European 
Commission and its Delegation described in the first part of this chapter.  
 
 
105 As we will see later, the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family became Implementing 
Agency beginning with Phare 2004. This is/might be one of the reasons for which it was also granted 
EDIS a few months later than CFCU and Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and Housing.     
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4.2.2.1. National Level of the management and implementation system of 
Phare 2000-3 
 
The Implementing Agency 
 
For the Phare programmes 2000-2003, the Implementing Agency changed its 
location in accordance with the governmental restructurings carried out in this 
timeframe, from the National Agency of Regional Development, through the Ministry 
of Development and Forecast, to the Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of 
Development, Public Works and Housing. The centrality of the IAg location, i.e. at 
ministerial level, is salient. The same goes for the fact that the competencies of the IAg 
do not suffer major changes in this period, being subscribed to the general institutional 
arrangements set up for the management of Phare programmes.  
The NARD/MDP/MIE(MDPWH) bore the final responsibility of the 
management of the programme, especially with the financial circuit. In order to fulfil its 
obligations, the IAg elaborated the selection and implementation procedures in 
accordance with the guidelines set by the European Union; bore the overall 
responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of the programme and components106; 
contracted107 the selected projects; acted as paying agency, i.e. making the necessary 
payments towards the IAus; carried out the financial control; ensured the link with the 
National Fund and with the RDAs; reported to National Board for Regional 
Development and EC Delegation regarding the stage of implementation of the 
programme, coordinated the establishment of and chaired the National Steering 
Committees (see further) set up for each sub-component of the project.108 The IAg was 
also responsible with the project identification (for large projects) and programming of 
 
106 As input into the monitoring and evaluation activity carried out actually at NAC and European 
Commission/its Delegation level, as described in the first part of this chapter. 
107 The issue of contracting is rather complex. For the projects and grant schemes managed regionally by 
the RDAs, these bodies organise the project evaluation and selection process and they conclude the 
contract with the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the final approval and endorsement of the projects selected 
has been done at central level as well, the third signature on all the contracts under Phare ESC being the 
one of the NARD/MDP/MIE(MDPWH). At the same time, as seen further, major infrastructure, and later 
on (beginning with 2003), human resources projects are pre-approved by the National Board for Regional 
Development and the project evaluation and contracting process are carried out at IAg level.      
108 As stipulated in the Standard Project Fiches, 2000-3 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/ro-0007-
02_regional_development.pdf 
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Phare ESC and with providing the Implementing Authorities with all appropriate 
support to ensure that they fulfil their task properly. 
As the elaboration of the National Development Plan 2002-2005 was a more 
complex exercise than the previous one (NDP 2000-2002), the MEI became responsible 
also with the overall co-ordination between governmental strategies, policies and 
programmes (National Development Plan) and the regional level (Regional 
Development Plans).  
 
The National Regional Development Board 
 
According to the, than in force, Law on Regional Development, No. 
151/1998109, the National Board for Regional Development represents the highest, 
strategic, decision-making body for regional development policy, as it was meant to be 
presided by the prime-minister110.     
According to art. 11 of the abovementioned law, the NBRD approves the 
national strategy for regional development and the national programme for regional 
development, presents to the Government proposals for the composition of the National 
Fund for Regional Development, approves the criteria, priorities and allocation 
mechanisms of the NFRD, monitors the appropriation of the funds allocated to the 
RDAs from the NFRD, pursue the regional development goals, including the external 
cooperation of development regions, i.e. cross-border and interregional. 
In practice, and as shown by the programming documents for Phare ESC and the 
information available of the web-page of the MIE/MDPWH, the NBRD fulfils two 
major roles: it approves the procedures for projects selection, implementation and 
monitoring of the selected projects, procedures also endorsed by the EC Delegation and 
it endorses the list of large Human Resources Development and infrastructure 
projects that have been identified during the programming phase and enlisted in the 
agreements, i.e. Financing Memoranda, with the European Commission.  
The only meeting of the NBRD mentioned on the web-page of MIE/MDPWH 
took place on 9th of August 2005. The agenda concentrated on issues correlated with 
 
109 The new Law on Regional Development, 315/2004, applies for the Phare programmes 2004-6. 
110 See chapter 2 for background information regarding the composition and competences of the NBRD, 
as provided for by the Law 315/2004. 
 120
Phare ESC 2004-6, but, at the same time, the list of infrastructure projects to be 
financed by Phare 2003 was approved111.       
As repeatedly underlined, although the NBRD was projected initially as the 
highest, strategic, body for pursuing the goal of regional development in Romania, it 
ended up by playing a formal role in the management of Phare, and did not go beyond 
this in stimulating and promoting a “regional approach” to socio-economic development 
in Romania. This conclusion was confirmed also by the discussion with Mrs. Pompilia 
Idu, director of the Programme Monitoring and Evaluation Direction within the DG 
Regional Development, Phare Funds (see Annex 11, Interview 2008 Mrs. P. IDU). The 
NBRD met more often at the beginning of the years 2000, as the National Development 
Plan, the overarching, strategic document only for the Phare ESC Component, needed 
its approval. In the last years, the NBRD convened to the extent this was necessary and 
parallel institutions, e.g. the National Coordination Committee for the SIs preparation 
(see chapter VI), of the Phare National Steering Committee (see further), gradually took 
over its attributions, as the same institutions, at least at central level, are represented in 
these committees as well. This gradual evolution proves also that the NBRD sphere of 
activity was limited to management of EU regional development funds as such, but it 
did not go beyond this formal competency, towards promoting genuine regional 
development in Romania.              
 
The National Steering Committee 
 
According to the Financial Memoranda 2000-2003, a National Steering 
Committee, was set up in 2000112 in order to support the implementation of the 
programme. The purpose of the Phare ESC Steering Committee was to ensure inter-
ministerial co-ordination in the programming, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of Phare ESC programmes. The National Steering Committee had a 
participative/consultative role, offering advice for the selection and implementation of 
the projects, securing that the actions implemented under the Economic and Social 
Cohesion Phare 2000 are in line with the National Development Plan and other relevant 
strategies, giving advice and information to identify financing sources for projects and 
on strategic directions to be taken in the Programme as a result of evaluation findings. 
 
111 See above the issue of contracting and implementaion dead-lines set up in the Financial Memoranda.   
112 And it became fully operational in the following year, in 2001. 
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The members of the Steering Committees participate in the monitoring and in the ex-
post evaluation of the programme, as well.  
The composition of the NSC changes in order to mirror the institutional system 
in place for managing Phare ESC: representatives of the Ministry of Development and 
Prognosis/MEI, RDAs, Ministry of SMEs and Co-operation, Ministry of Education and 
Research, Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity, Ministry of Public Works, 
Transport and Dwellings, National Administration of Roads, the Ministry of Water and 
Environment Protection, National Centre for Vocational and Technical Education 
Development, Ministry of Youth and Sport, EC Delegation and other relevant 
stakeholders identified at the national level for each component. 
As its secretariat, the MDP/MIE undertook all the necessary administrative tasks 
connected with the activity of the SC. According to the newly, in March 2003 adopted 
Regulation for its Organization and Functioning, the Phare ESC Steering Committee 
was meant to serve as the basis for the future Monitoring Committee under Structural 
Funds, as it was given the competency to approve the procedures for projects selection, 
implementation and monitoring of the financed projects, and the list of human resources 
projects, SMEs support and of small-scale waste management projects selected at 
regional level.  
As we can see the National Steering Committee is one of the parallel institutions 
which shadowed the activity of the National Board of Regional Development. 
Nevertheless, although this NSC did consitute the base for the ROP Monitoring 
Committee, Mrs. Pompilia Idu, director of the Programme Monitoring and Evaluation 
Direction within the DG Regional Development, Phare Funds (see Annex 11, Interview 
2008 Mrs. P. IDU) underlines the fact that the Committee, as institution, became 
unattractive for its members, as it did not enjoy decision-making power; for the Phare 
2004-6 the NSC was not convened at all, despite the fact that the PPD 2004-6 mentions 
the committee as a significant institution in the Phare ESC delivery system. 
The NSC had three Phare ESC Steering Sub-Committees: for Human Resource 
Development, Infrastructure and Business development, especially SMEs; in the first 
two cases, Human Resources Development and Infrastructure, these sub-committees 
met with significant success, and constituted the basis for the Monitoring Committees of 
the succeeding OPs. In the third case the National Agency for SMSEs and Cooperation 
had its own committee supervising all programmes for the SMSe implemented in 
Romania, and the Phare investments were included on the agenda of this committee. 
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 4.2.2.2. Regional Level of the management and implementation system of 
Phare 2000-3 
 
Regional Development Agencies 
 
The eight RDAs113 acted as Implementing Authorities for most of the sub-
components of Phare ESC 2000-3114 (see the Annexes 3, 4, 5 and 6). According to the 
Financing Memoranda 2000-3, they bore the overall responsibility for implementation 
and monitoring of the projects unfolding in their region; they chaired the Regional 
Steering Committee; accomplished the tasks regarding the project evaluation reports 
and invoices115 and ensured the link with National Agency for Regional Development/ 
MDP/MEI; reported to Regional Development Board and the Implementing Agency 
(NARD/MDP/MEI) the stage of implementation of the programme116.  
 After 2000 the controversial financial situation of the RDAs was resolved117. A 
service contract between MDP and each RDA sets up specific both tasks and 
responsibilities for RDAs, and indicators of achievement and reporting obligations. This 
contributed to the financial sustainability of the RDAs, ensuring also a better control of 
the implementation of projects. 
 
113See chapter 2 for background information regarding the composition and activities of the RDAs, in 
accordance with the Romanian legislation in place. 
114 for all of them in the case of Phare 2000 (Standard Summary Project Fiche Phare ESC investment 
2000, page 24-5) 
115 As mentioned in the first sub-chapter, the RDAs (as the other IAs) need to endorse the invoices before 
sending them to the IAg/MEI for payment.   
116 In 2001 the Regional Development Agencies act as Implementing Authorities for three sub-
components out of 6: A. Assistance to small and medium sized enterprises, C. Social Services investment 
scheme and E. Small-scale local infrastructure scheme. They share this responsibility in two other sub-
components with the Ministry of Education and Research (B-measure, TVET) and with the National 
Authority for Roads (D-measure, Regional/large scale infrastructure). The MDP implements the F-
measure, the technical assistance. In 2002 the Regional Development Agencies had a more limited role, 
as they acted as Implementing Authorities only for the sub-component B, Human resources, and shared 
this role with the National Authority for Roads for the C1 sub-component, i.e. Regional infrastructure and 
with the MDP as regards the D sub-component, technical assistance. As in the previous year, the 8 
Regional Development Agencies acted in 2003 as Implementing Authorities for the sub-components: 
Small scale waste management investment scheme, (4 million €) and D1, Regional infrastructure (36 
million €). They share this role with the MIE in the F, technical assistance sub-component (5.6 Million €). 
In total the RDAs are directly responsible for the implementation of 40+5.6 million €, approximately 50% 
of the Phare funds for 2003 ESC Investment (92.505 mil euro). They also play an indirect role in the 
implementation of the other components of the INV sub-programme. 
117 As mentioned before, initially the RDAs supposed to be financed by the local authorities in the 
regions. As not all of them could or were willing, i.e. as not all of them received approval for their 
projects, to support the functioning of the RDAs, the government took the decision to renounce at this 
mechanism.   
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As regards the technical and financial appraisal of grant applications, at this 
task the RDAs are assisted by Regional Selection Committees, approved by the 
Regional Development Board. In accordance to the FMa and Project Fiches for Phare 
ESC investments 2001-3, the Regional Selection Committee comprises one or more 
experts agreed by EC Delegation, as independent voting members, and compulsory 
members from line ministries and MDP/MEI (as IAg for Phare ESC). The Ministry of 
European Integration (as NAC) and the EC Delegation may also participate in the 
Regional Selection Committee as observers. The projects evaluation reports were 
submitted to the Ministry of Development and Prognosis/MEI and endorsed by the EC 
Delegation. The list of the selected projects was approved by the Regional Development 
Board and the National Board for Regional Development, (if it was the case), and 
endorsed by the Delegation of the European Commission. 
 
Regional Development Boards 
 
The Regional Development Boards118 approve the specific objectives and 
priorities in the target areas and the projects lists prepared by the RDAs, with the 
exception of the large infrastructure projects, which need the approval of the NBRD as 
well119. 
The RDBs also appoint the Regional Selection Committee. They also approve 
the supplementary selection criteria; the weightings of selection criteria and the list of 
projects under B, C and E components120; endorse the TVET schools and resource 
centres selected at regional level and the infrastructure projects to be financed under 
the Economic and Social Cohesion programme (FM 2003, 50).  
 
118See chapter 2 for background information regarding the composition and activities of the RDBs, in 
accordance with the Romanian legislation in place. 
119 As mentioned before, also the MIE endorses all contracts signed at regional level 
120 Practically the RDBs have jurisdiction on the components implemented by the RDAs, as emphasised 
also by representatives of the Ministry of European Integration/MDPWH (see Annex 11, Interview 2008 
Mrs. P. IDU) 
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4.3 The Phare Economic and Social Cohesion Programme 2004-2006 
4.3.1 Short Description of the Programme 
 The Phare Programming Document for Economic and Social Cohesion 2004-
2006 (PPD)121 reveals the progress the Romanian institutions in charge with the 
management of the pre-accession aid have made along the years in terms of 
programming. This progress is even more visible taking a look at the yearly sectoral 
fiches of the ESC component. Nevertheless, the same yearly fiches reveal the fact that, 
even if programming was done multi-annually for the 2004-2006 period,  
implementation still takes place on a yearly basis, as the same system of yearly 
Financial Memorandum and contracting and executing dead-lines for each year is 
applied.    
 The PPD 2004-6 clearly tries to bridge between pre-accession and post-
accession as regards both investments and technical assistance/twining. Structural funds 
terminology is used to a certain extent, with the same purpose, e.g. “measures”, 
“implementing bodies”.  
 The Phare ESC 2004-6 priorities build up on the previous programmes and take 
into account the future operational programmes through which structural instruments 
are implemented: 
A. Improving regional infrastructure to support economic development 
B. Human Resource Development 
C. Developing the productive sector through support to SMEs 
D. Environmental protection at regional level 
E. Regional development policy design and implementation 
 
The last priority represents the TA/Institution Building component, horizontal 
priority helping the involved institutions to strengthen their managing and implementing 
capacity for the Structural Instruments. 
We need to underline the fact that the “learning effect” initially aimed at through 
the Phare ESC implementation is limited. Practically, elaborating most of the 
Operational Programmes 2007-2013 started in 2004, very close after the finalisation of 
Phare ESC Multi-Annual Programming Document (2004-6). The implementation of 
Phare ESC started late; Phare 2004 programmes were contracted to a large extend only 
 
121 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/2004-016-
772.04%20Economic%20and%20social%20cohesion.pdf
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in 2006122, and their implementation unfolds along the years 2007 and 2008. The same 
is valid for the Phare 2005 projects, contracted mostly in 2007, in a difficult context, i.e.  
EDIS was awarded, the Romanian public procurement legislation, and not PRAG, was 
applied for the first time to the contracting procedures and the sums to be contracted 
increased considerably. In some cases, e.g. Regional Operational Programme, a limited 
number of staff involved in its preparation were previously involved in Phare 
management and implementation, as the two issues are addressed by two different DGs 
within the Ministry. In other Ministries, i.e. Ministry of Labour, Family and Equality of 
Opportunities, the management of remaining Phare projects is done in the framework of 
the Managing Authorities, this organisation assuring, theoretically, a smother transfer of 
knowledge, from Phare to structural instruments. 
4.3.2 Implementing arrangements 123: 
Considering the continuity of priorities and measures financed in the framework 
of Phare ESC, with slight differences the same institutions are involved in the 
implementation of Phare ESC 2004-2006, the institutions intended to become Managing 
Authorities and Intermediate Bodies for SIs (see Annex no. 6). The setting up of a 
second Implementing Agency, i.e. Ministry of Labour, and the narrowing down of the 
RDAs competencies more or less to the fields they will be responsible for under the 
Regional Operational Programme are the most significant changes vis-à-vis the 
previous yearly programmes.      
The Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and 
Housing continues to be Implementing Agency (Contracting Authority and Paying 
Agency) for Investment in Economic and Social Cohesion Programme (Priority A, a 
small part of Prority B, Priority C and D), with administrative and financial 
responsibilities. 
As in the previous years, the main tasks of the Implementing Agency are: 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o The overall responsibility for the technical and financial implementation of the 
programme, ensuring that the objectives are met and that the selection procedures 
 
122 Late contracting of Phare 2004 projects was the reason for late signing of the 2005 Financial 
Memorandum (27th of July 2006), see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/2005%20-
%20017-553%20National%20Programme%20FA.pdf
123 According to the SECTOR PROGRAMME FICHES PHARE 2004-2006 for ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COHESION, sub-chapter 6.4. Implementing Tools 
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are efficient, clear and transparent. 
o Elaborating the selection and implementation procedures in accordance with the 
guidelines set up by the European Union 
o Nominate the evaluation committee and the assessors, in consultation with the 
implementing authorities and the relevant technical ministries. The experts will be 
nominated "ad personam" on the basis of their technical and professional expertise 
in the relevant area 
o Conclude framework agreements with Implementing Authorities and provide them 
appropriate support to ensure that they achieve their task properly (templates and 
guides for (project) ex-ante evaluation, monitoring and (project) ex-post 
evaluation, common understanding of selection criteria and eligibility criteria, etc). 
o Contracting the grants with the selected applicants. 
o Coordinating and chairing the National Steering Committee and reporting to the 
National Board for Regional Development and the EC Delegation on the state of 
implementation of the programme.  
o Supervise the activity of the Sub-Committees and reporting to the National 
Steering Committee.  
 
MONITORING and EVALUATION 
o The overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of the programme and 
sub-components 
 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
o Acting as paying agency and ensuring the link with the National Fund, RDAs/PIUs 
and with the contractors/grant beneficiaries 
 
The second Implementing Agency is the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity 
and Family/Ministry of Labour, Family and Equality of Chances, which is also 
coordinating and chairing the Human Resource Development Steering Sub-Committee 
and is reporting to the National Steering Committee on the state of implementation of 
the measures under HRD priority. The CFCU is Implementing Authority of the last 
priority, E.  
The Human Resource Development Steering Sub-Committee met for the first 
time in 2003, and intensified its activity in 2006, when it was transformed in the 
Monitoring Committee for the SOP Human Resources Development (see Annex 11, 
Interview 2008 Mrs. P. IDU).    
The National Regional Development Board plays the same role and enjoys the 
same competencies as for the previous Phare programme; the same is valid in the 
case of the Regional Development Boards and Agencies.  
At national level, the PPD 2004-6 continues to mention the Phare ESC Steering 
Committee as playing the same inter-ministerial coordinating and advisory role, chaired 
by the MDPWH. It supposed to include representatives of the institutions involved in 
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the programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of PHARE ESC124. As 
mentioned before, as this Committee didn’t have decision-making power and the same 
competencies were allocated to other coordinating bodies, as well, it was not convened 
anymore for the 2004-6 period. Nevertheless, despite this gap, it did constitute the base 
for the Monitoring Committee of the ROP, which met twice in 2007, as “shadow” MC 
(before the programme was officially approved).     
The new programming period presents also some peculiar elements. For the first 
(A) priority, i.e. regional infrastructure, the SIs approach is applied: each beneficiary is 
actually responsible with the technical implementation of the project, while the RDAs 
only “assist in implementation” (PPD, 2004, page 30). In the framework of the second 
(B) priority, i.e. HRD, with the exception of its fourth measure (TVET), the MIE and 
RDAs have a limited role, as expected after the setting up of the new Implementing 
Agency and the separate implementation system, i.e. the Programme Coordination Unit 
at ministerial level and the 8 Project Implementation Units at regional level. In this case 
the National Agency for Employment, acts as Implementing Authority for the B 
priority, measures a, b, c, under the Investment schemes while the 8 PIUs at regional 
level act as the intermediate bodies responsible for the implementation of the HRD 
component, measures a, b, c, under the Investment schemes. For social services, the 
specialized directorate within MoLSSF/MLFEQ has been involved. National Agency 
for Employment and the 8 PIUs are the bodies responsible with the implementation of 
the strategies in employment and social policies; to strengthen the social dialogue 
bringing together all relevant actors, social partners, other interested bodies and 
nongovernmental organizations, in particularly in creating employment and ensuring 
employment opportunities for all; to put into practice the social protection measures to 
meet people’s basic needs and promote access to social rights within the universal spirit 
of many conventions, recommendations and regulations, particularly in the field of 
employment, education and social services. 
 
124 MDPWH, RDAs, Ministry of Public Finances, National Agency for SMEs and Cooperation, Ministry of 
Education and Research, Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family, Ministry of Transport, 
Constructions and Tourism, National Administration of Roads, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
rural Development, Ministry of Environment and Waters Management, Ministry of Economy and Trade, 
National Center for Vocational and Technical Education Development, Ministry of Administration and 
Interior, EC Delegation; other relevant institutional stakeholders and social partners, identified at the 
national level for each ESC component. 
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5 Role of the line ministries in the implementation of Phare Economic 
and Social Cohesion Component 
 
Several line ministries are involved in the implementation of Phare funds, as 
Implementing Authorities (see Annexes 3 to 6). 
For the 2001 Phare ESC, together with the RDAs, the Ministry of Education 
and Research was IAu for B sub-component (TVET) and the National Authority for 
Roads was IA for D sub-component, Regional/large scale infrastructure. In the next 
year the Ministry of Education and Research fulfilled again the role of Implementing 
Authority for the equipment supply services contract of the TVET component. As the 
very complex SAMTID programme was launched in 2002, the Ministry of Public 
Administration, Coordinating Body for the overall SAMTID Program, assumed the 
responsibility of Implementing Authority for the municipal water infrastructures (C2 
SAMTID). For the 2003 projects, the same line-ministries enjoy the same competencies 
for a series of sub-components: the Ministry of Education and Research (Component A, 
TVET), The Ministry of Public Administration (Component D2, SAMTID) and newly 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (component B, HRD). 
For Phare 2004-2006, other national institutions, i.e. the National Agency for 
Employment (and its 8 regional offices which will act as regional IBs after 2007, see 
next chapter), the National Agency for SMESs and Cooperation (currently the Ministry 
of SMSEs), the Ministry of Environment and the Regional Agencies for 
Environmental  Protection are responsible with the technical implementation of 
different sub-components of the programme, as Implementing Authorities.    
As a result, these institutions had the opportunity to built up their programming 
and implementation capacity in the process of implementing the Phare ESC 
Component. All these institutions are currently involved in the management and 
implementation of structural instruments as Managing Authorities or Intermediary 
Bodies. The only notable exception is the Ministry of Economy, beginning with 2007 
combined with the Ministry of Finances in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
which is the MA of the one of the most significant Operational Programmes, i.e. SOP 
Competitiveness and which was not very much involved in the management and/or 
implementation of the European pre-accession funds.   
 8 Regional Consortia were set up for the Phare ESC 2001 TVET sub-
component and they will be extended to the entire Human Resource Development sub-
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component. In accordance with the Standard Summary Project Fiches for Phare ESC 
2001, 2002 and the PPD 2004-2006, these consortia are advisory bodies representing 
institutions at the regional level, formed by Regional Development Agencies, which 
play a leading role,  Local (County) Committees for Social Partnership Development in 
VET, County Councils, and the County School Inspectorates. They are mainly 
responsible with the identification of specialised didactic equipment to enable training 
relevant for regional development and of the HRD priorities, the identification of the 
HRD priorities; the development of the Regional Employment Action Plan, which 
includes the relevant employment priorities at regional level. Members of the Regional 
Consortia participate in the evaluation committees for HRD projects. As detailed in the 
next chapter, the RCs form, at least in some regions, e.g. North-West, the basis of the 
Regional Committees for Strategic Evaluation and Correlation (see page 158).    
6 Analysis of the institutions involved and of their weight in each 
policy-making step identified  
 
The Phare National Programme proves very complex from the point of view of 
the myriad of institutions involved in its management and implementation and of the 
competencies allocation among all these institutions, especially when its budget is 
compared with the structural funds assigned to Romania for 2007-2013.  
The Economic and Social Component of the Phare Programme has a life of its 
own. It is actually, comparable with the National Strategic Reference Framework, from 
the point of view of the strategic level, diversity of the priorities and institutions 
involved in its programming and implementation. Both documents are rooted in and 
substantiated by a National Development Plan (2004-2006, 2007-2013).  
On the other side, the Phare ESC Component needs to “subordinate” general 
Phare rules, as presented in the first part of this chapter. Subsequently, a series of 
institutions enjoy decision making power on the programme, in all its phases, i.e. 
programming (the NAC, European Commission/its Delegation in Bucharest); 
monitoring (the NAC,  European Commission/its Delegation in Bucharest, the NAO 
through the SMSCs and Joint Monitoring Committee), evaluation (the European 
Commission until 01.01.2007, subsequently, the NAC), financial management and 
control (the NAO) and audit (the Romanian Court of Accounts).     
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From the institutional point of view, the most important element in this 
comparison Phare ESC-NSRF is the change of the Ministry of European Integration 
from the Implementing Agency and co-Implementing Authority, (as it bore the final 
responsibility also for the technical implementation of the entire ESC Component into 
its successor, the Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing, which 
represents only the Management Authority of the Regional Operational Programme, one 
of the 7 OPs implementing the NRSF, OP which deploys less that 20% of the total 
NSRF 2007-13 budget. The re-location of the National Aid Coordinator to the Ministry 
of Public Finance/Ministry of Economy and Finance weakened the position of the 
MEI/MDPWH, as well.      
 
 Programming 
 
 The programming of the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion is more complex 
than the programming of other components of Phare, as it involves, further than 
institution building activities, investments projects as well, i.e. ESF- and ERDF-like 
measures. This means that not the concrete projects, but the types of projects to be 
financed are known beforehand, and that the institutions responsible with the respective 
measures do not carry out only the process of public procurement and project 
implementation, but also the launching of the programme measures, the process of 
projects appraisal, selection, approval and the monitoring of the beneficiaries, in a 
similar way as for the Regional Operational Programme. 
 In accordance with the general principles regarding Phare programming, the 
Phare ESC annual fiches and the Phare Programming Document 2004-6 were drafted by 
the ministries fulfilling the role of Implementing Agency, i.e. the National Agency for 
Regional Development/Ministry of Development and Prognosis/Ministry of European 
Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing under the 
coordination of the National Aid Coordinator, i.e. the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs/Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
Nevertheless, the Implementing Authorities have a substantial input into the drafting of 
the sector and project fiches, as well. The European Commission, supported by the 
Phare Management Committee, has the final word on the contents and budget of the 
programming documents.      
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 The priorities of the Phare ESC programmes, annual or multi-annual, are chosen 
on the basis of the analysis and strategy of the National Development Plans, to whom 
the Regional Development Plans, elaborated by the Regional Development Agencies 
and approved by the RDB, contribute substantially, as well. Nevertheless, as it is the 
case also for the Regional Operational Programme, the Phare ESC does not finance all 
priorities set up in the Regional Development Plans; some priorities are financed from 
other instruments, e.g. SAPARD, and the RDAs and the RBDs, as regional institutions, 
have no competencies vis-à-vis their management or implementation; at the same time,  
no monitoring or evaluation of the RDPs as such, on the basis of a monitoring system of 
indicators and procedures, is carried out.  
 As the discussion with representatives of the Ministry of European 
Integration/MDPWH revealed, the contribution of the regional actors in the 
programming phase was limited to the elaboration of the RDPs as source for the NDPs, 
but the priorities of the Phare ESC Component were decided between the MEI 
(IAg)/MPF (NAC) and the European Commission (see Annex 11, Interview 2008 Mrs. 
P. IDU). Nevertheless, the principle of “partnership” was more closely observed every 
year along the repeated programming exercises. 
       
 Implementation  
 
 As we will see in the next chapter, if in the case of the ROP the implementing 
task is clearly shared by two institutions, respectively the Ministry and the RDAs, more 
institutions are involved in the implementation of the Phare funds (see the Annexes no 
3, 4, 5, 6). Nevertheless, the institution bearing the final responsibility in this respect 
was the Implementing Agency, in its form as National Agency for Regional 
Development/Ministry of Development and Prognosis/Ministry of European 
Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing. In this position the 
Ministry assumed the responsibility of contracting, carried out with the assistance of 
the Implementing Authorities, on the basis of the PRAG, i.e. “Practical Guide to the 
contract procedures for EC external actions”, until 1st of January 2007, and on the basis 
of the Romanian public procurement legislation, beyond this date.  
 The same moment marks also the waiving of the ex-ante control of the EC 
Delegation upon the implementation process, carried out in all phased of the project 
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implementation, from the preparation of the tender documentation until the project final 
report.    
 The project appraisal and selection criteria are established by the Implementing 
Agency, and are approved by the EC Delegation and the National Board for Regional 
Development. The Implementing Agency launches the calls for proposals, as well.  
 The RDAs, as Implementing Authorities, organise the appraisal and selection 
process of the projects under its direct jurisdiction, and participate in the appraisal 
process organised for the rest of the projects to be implemented under Phare ESC in the 
region. The projects appraised and selected by the RDAs are approved by the Regional 
Development Board, the Implementing Agency, the EC Delegation (under DIS) and the 
National Board of Regional Development (for large projects).  
 The RDAs monitor the implementation of the projects implementation, as well.  
 
 Strategic And Operational Monitoring 
  
 The monitoring function in the framework of the Phare programme is differently 
organised as for the Structural Instruments; as for the Phare programme and projects 
performance indicators were designed rather late, and most of the time they were not 
quantified, monitoring is mainly financial, input-oriented respectively, if the allocated 
resources were contracted and spent in the dead-lines set by the Financial Memoranda. 
Both the monitoring activities carried out by the Implementing Authorities, and the 
discussions in the framework of the Sub-monitoring Sectoral Committees (SMSCs) 
(presided by the NAC (deputy) and the EC Delegation) represent rather an overview of 
the implementation process, i.e. if the tender documentation is prepared and projects 
contracted on time, if the implementation of the project is unfolding/finalised without 
problems and according to the schedule. Eventual implementation problems are 
identified and the National Aid Coordinator pressures the involved institutions to take 
appropriate measures in order for these obstacles to be cleared. Recurrent and horizontal 
issues are addressed to the Joint Monitoring Committee, and, in this case, it is the EC 
Delegation or the Commission itself which ask the responsible institutions to take 
appropriate measures, in order for the projects to be successfully finalised.  
 Before granting EDIS, the European Commission/Delegation and the National 
Aid Coordinator shared decision making power in the framework of the monitoring 
process. After 1st of January 2007, the European Commission and Representation take 
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part as observers in the two Committees, leaving the NAC fully responsible with the 
Phare monitoring.       
 The Implementing Authorities, including the RDAs, do play an operational role 
as regards monitoring, as they contribute to the elaboration of the bi-annually 
Monitoring Reports, under the coordination of the Monitoring Department of the NAC. 
 
 Evaluation  
  
 The particular concept of monitoring under Phare led to a particular role of 
evaluation in this framework. Evaluation of Phare components is strongly connected to 
monitoring, organised regularly on the basis of the 10 clusters of projects monitored by 
the SMSCs through bi-annual monitoring reports, and comes to assess the relevance, 
efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of the projects under implementation 
(interim evaluation) and completed (ex-post evaluation).  
 Until 1st of January 2007, the European Commission was responsible with both 
interim and ex-post evaluations; after EDIS was granted, the National Aid Coordinator 
took over this responsibility. The Implementing Agencies and Authorities play a limited 
role in this function; they have to submit to the NAC and evaluators the necessary 
documentation and offer them further information for the accurate completion of this 
function.   
 
 Financial Management  
 
 In accordance with the national legislation in place, i.e. the Government 
Ordinance no. 119/1999 on Internal Audit and Financial Control, introduced in August 
1999, modified by the Law no. 672/19.12.2002 and Law no. 84/2003 regarding the 
internal public audit, each institution carries out an internal financial control, both 
preventive, i.e. before an operation starts, and during the unfolding of this operation. In 
this respect both the RDAs and the Ministry, in the implementation process, pays 
adequate attention to financial aspects as legality and adequacy of the invoices 
submitted by the contractors, and may carry out on-the sport checks to verify in practice 
these aspects. Nevertheless, while the RDAs role is more operational, at project level, it 
is the Implementing Agency which is held responsible of the financial health of the 
programme implementation, by the National Authorising Officer. If the function of 
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financial control is shared among the three institutions, it is the latest, the NAO, bearing 
its final responsibility. 
 The same is valid for certifying and paying competencies. The NAO, with the 
support of the data collected by the Ministry and the RDAs, and upon their verification, 
asks for funds from the European Commission and transfers them further to the 
Implementing Agency, responsible with making the necessary payments to the 
contractors and beneficiaries.  
 Both the European Commission, though external experts, and the OLAF can 
financially control any projects at any moment, as well.     
 
 Audit  
 
 As in the case of financial control, the projects are audited internally, at all 
levels: all involved institutions, the RDAs, the Ministry and the NAO, i.e. the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance, have internal audit units carrying out these activities. 
Externally, the Romanian Court of Accounts, through the Audit Authority, the 
European Commission, through external experts, and the European Court of Auditors 
may carry out at discretion audit missions.  
7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter aimed to present and analyse the weighting of all institutions 
involved in the policy-making process unfolding for the Economic and Social Cohesion 
Component of the Phare National Programme. The focus laid on the role of the 
Regional Development Agencies and the Regional Development Boards, as their 
competencies in the framework of this regional development policy is determinant for 
the degree of regionalisation currently registered in Romania.       
Being a part of the National Phare Programme, the Phare ESC component, even 
if it has its specificity, must comply with the general Phare rules; consequently, the 
institutions directly involved in the management and implementation of this component, 
i.e. the Implementing Agencies and Authorities, act under the authority of the National 
Aid Coordinator, National Aid Officer and Joint Monitoring Committee.     
As proved in this chapter, the institutional system created for the management 
and the implementation of Phare ESC is complex and registered regular changes since 
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its setting up. Nevertheless, despite these changes, the European and the central 
governance level permanently retained the decision-making right on the programme 
and projects, and the final responsibility of their implementation.  
 
The Ministry of Public Finance/Ministry of Economy and Finance 
concentrated, especially after 2004, a significant number of competences as regards the 
Phare ESC Component: programming, monitoring, (later) evaluation, through the 
National Aid Coordinator, financial management and control, through the National 
Authorising Officer, and partially audit, through the internal audit structure.    
 
The Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works 
and Housing was, for one year (2004), the most important institution for Phare ESC, as 
in this year both the National Aid Coordinator and the Implementing Agency for Phare 
ESC acted in its framework. After 2004 the MEI preserved only the later position; the 
elaboration of the National Development Plan left the MEI together with the NAC; in 
this context, the MEI/MDPWH  was responsible with the drafting of the Phare 
Programming Document 2004-6, under the coordination of the Ministry of Public 
Finance/NAC. The MEI/MDPHW bears the final responsibility as regards the technical 
and financial implementation of the Phare ESC 2004-2006. 
In its role as Implementing Agency, the MEI/MDPWH enjoys decision-making 
rights in all phases of the policy cycle: it coordinates the drafting of the RDPs, and 
elaborates the Phare ESC Programming Documents, it sets up the project appraisal and 
selection mechanism, it launches the measures/calls, it approves the list of projects 
selected by the RDAs and it coordinates the monitoring and the financial management 
of the component.       
From the point of view of the delivery system, the Phare ESC Component 
evolved proportionally with the increase in funds. With some insignificant variations, 
the same institutions were involved in its implementation, as Implementing Authorities, 
as the Phare ESC priorities has remained almost the same every year. These priorities, 
and consequently, their implementation system, were refined for the period 2004-2006, 
so that they reflect, as much as possible, the future Operational Programmes.  
 
In this context, the Regional Development Agencies fulfilled the 
Implementation Authority role only for some of the Phare ESC priorities; not all these 
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priorities were taken over in the ROP, e.g. the environmental measures, which the 
RDAs implemented in partnership with the Regional Agencies for Environmental 
Protection. The competencies of the RDAs are manly limited to project 
implementation, and they cannot take any decision whatsoever as regards the Phare 
ESC Component as programme or on the projects they are appraising and selecting. 
They do contribute to the programming phase, but indirectly; the Regional 
Development Plans elaborated by the RDAs serve as source for the National 
Development Plan, and the Phare ESC priorities were decided by the MEI/MDPWH 
with the European Commission taking into account the RDPs priorities, but not 
reflecting them completely. 
 
The Regional Development Boards do enjoy decision-making rights both in 
programming and implementation of the Phare ESC, as they approve the RDPs and the 
lists of projects appraised and selected by the RDAs. Nevertheless, we should not forget 
that these boards are composed of representatives of the local authorities, mostly 
promoting their local interest. 
 
As repeatedly mentioned, the National Board for Regional Development hasn’t 
been very successful in carrying out its strategic tasks related to the promotion of 
regional development. Its role was limited to the approval of the NDPs until 2006, of 
the appraisal and selection criteria for the Phare ESC and of the large infrastructure and 
HRD projects, and, as a consequence, it was convened rarely, respectively when it 
needed to exercise these two competencies.    
As we will see in the next chapter, the role of these three regional institutions, 
especially of the Boards, decreased under the Regional Operational Programme.              
 
It goes without saying that the role of the European Commission/EC 
Delegation in Bucharest was paramount for the programming, management, 
implementation, financial control, audit, monitoring and evaluation of the Phare ESC. 
As regards programming, the EC had a last word on the sector and project fiches 
submitted by Romania, including the Phare ESC and the allocation of funds. Before the 
1st of January 2007, in the Decentralised Implementation System, the EC/its Delegation 
endorsed all documents, from changed fiches, list of selected projects, to tender 
documentation, project evaluation reports, contracts, audit, monitoring and evaluation 
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reports. After EDIS was granted, the EC/its Representation concentrated on “ex-post” 
competences in financial control, audit and evaluation.        
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CHAPTER V 
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
REGIONAL OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME IN ROMANIA 
1 Introduction 
 
Becoming a member of the European Union, on 1st of January 2007, meant for 
Romania taking fully part in the Cohesion Policy of the EU, with all the rights and 
obligations following from this position.    
 
As seen from the previous chapter, Romania’s participation in the Cohesion 
Policy of the EU was prepared to a certain extent during the pre-accession period. For 
this purpose, the involved national institutions received technical support, i.e. in the 
form of technical assistance or/and twining projects financed through Phare, aiming to 
enhance their capacity to carry out the preparation, technical and financial management, 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation, control and audit of Structural Instruments 
upon 2007. On the other side, the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion Component was 
meant as a practical exercise, which gave the possibility to most future Managing 
Authorities and Intermediary Bodies to gain experience in (multi-annual) programming, 
programme implementation, and to a more limited extent monitoring, evaluation and 
audit as the European Commission, the National Aid Coordinator and the Romanian 
Court of Accounts/Audit Authority enjoyed these two competencies under Phare. The 
financial management, control and audit functions related to the implementation of EU 
structural instruments were shaped also during the negotiation process carried out in the 
framework of the Chapter 28, i.e. “Financial Control”, among other related aspects125. 
As regards financial management and control, significant more coherency and 
continuity between pre- and post- accession periods can be observed, in both 
institutional and procedural terms; audit at national level is a rather recent creation, as 
the Audit Authority started its activity in 2005, in the framework of the Romanian Court 
of Accounts, but acting independently.     
 
125 Chapter 28 focused on 5 aspects: Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC), External Audit, Control 
Measures relating the EU Own Resourses,  EU Pre-accession funding and future Structural Action, 
Protection of the EU financial interests, see European Commission web page: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulgar
ia_romania/chapters/chap_28_en.htm   
 
 139
 This fourth chapter follows the same structure as the previous one. In order to set 
the background, the New Cohesion Policy of the European Union will be shortly 
presented, with a clear focus on the changes operated in comparison with the previous 
financial framework, 2000-2006.   
 
Although the analysis concentrates on the regional development policy in 
Romania as defined in this study, i.e. the Regional Operational Programme, at higher 
programmatic and institutional layers a series of overarching planning and 
programming documents are determinant for this programme; the same is valid for a set 
of institutions enjoying decision-making competencies related to the ROP and vis-à-vis 
the authorities and bodies involved in its management and implementation. These 
overarching institutions, respectively the coordination mechanisms for the NSRF 
implementation, the Authority for the Coordination of Structural Instruments within the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Certifying and Paying Authority within the same 
ministry and the Audit Authority, associated to the Court of Accounts, need to be 
presented and their competencies related to the Regional Operational Programme 
analysed.   
 
The bulk of the chapter will concentrate on the Regional Operational Programme 
and the roles of the national and regional institutions involved in its preparation, 
implementation and management, as related to the requirements of the new Council 
General Regulation no. 1083/2006 and the Romanian Law on Regional Development 
no. 315/2004. In accordance with the methodology elaborated in the first chapter, the 
same competencies approach will be used: the institutional “loci” of the core 
competencies in the policy-making process, i.e. programming, implementation 
(including project generation), strategic and operational monitoring, evaluation, 
information and publicity, financial management and control, audit, will be 
identified, and the position of the RDAs in this institutional structure will be clarified.   
2 The new Cohesion Policy of the European Union  
 
The negotiations carried out in 1998 and 1999 on the country allocations for the 
2000-2006 Financial Framework already anticipated the challenges an enlarged 
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European Union with 27 members will raise to the objectives and structure of the EU 
Cohesion Policy. For the 2007-2013 programming period, this policy needed to answer 
to an entire set of demands coming, on one side, from the new, socio-economically 
lagging behind countries, on the other side from the older member states, “victims” of a 
statistical effect126 or facing difficult structural change, and further on from its critics, 
who pointed out the limited impact 15 years of significant investments had on the 
development discrepancies in Europe. At the same time, the urge towards turning 
Europe more competitive at global level pressured the Cohesion Policy to firstly deliver 
a certain direct outcome/results, i.e. “jobs”, and impact, i.e. “growth”, in other words, 
the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda. This new context shadowed the regional 
dimension of the EU Cohesion Policy, fact admitted for the first time by the European 
Commission (see Andreou, 2007, 2).   
 
A more strategic approach to programming, and the 
concentration/simplification and decentralisation and proportionality of the 
management and implementation system are meant to lead to an efficient and effective 
delivery of the 2007-2013 EU Cohesion Policy. 
 
1. A more strategic approach to programming 
  As mentioned before, the Cohesion Policy integrated the Lisbon objectives into 
its own thinking: “cohesion policy in all its dimensions must be seen as an integral part 
of the Lisbon strategy” (4th Cohesion Report, page 127). This development was called 
the “Lisbonalisation” of the Cohesion Policy (see also Andreou, 2007). The main goal 
of the investments made under the Cohesion policy is job creation and, subsequently, 
growth. With this purpose significant amounts were “earmarked” in each MS, i.e. 
around 60% of the national allocation, to be spent in areas like research and 
development (R&D), physical infrastructure, environmentally friendly technologies, 
human capital and knowledge.   
In comparison with the previous financial framework, the programming cycle 
underwent some adaptations in order for the Member States to answer adequately the 
need to coordinate Cohesion Policy with the Lisbon agenda. At EU level the Common 
Strategic Guidelines were issued, with the main aim of linking the Cohesion Policy with 
 
126 Regions whose per capita gross domestic product (GDP) measured in purchasing power parities is less 
than 75 % of the Community average, but not because they registered a significant increase of their 
GDP/capita, but because the Community average decreased as a result of enlargement. 
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the Lisbon jobs and growth objectives. The National Strategic Reference Frameworks, 
i.e. formerly the Community Support Frameworks, constitute the main planning 
instrument for cohesion policy and translate the CSGs into national policy goals; in 
order for the Cohesion Policy to deliver its goals related to the Lisbon Agenda, the 
coherence of the NSRF with the National Reform Programmes127 is assured. Only parts 
of the NSRF are validated by the European Commission, i.e. list of individual OPs, the 
indicative financial allocation, and, for the Converge objective only, the verification of 
the additionality principle and the actions envisaged for reinforcing administrative 
efficiency (Andreou, 2007: 22). The Operational Programmes drafted for the 
implementation of the NSRF require Commission’s full approval, while Programme 
Complements are not mandatory anymore. 
In this framework, the strategic approach is enhanced by the strategic reports the 
member states need to present to the EU Commission in 2009 and 2012; at its turn the 
Commission will present in 2010 and 2013, a synthesis of these reports to the European 
Parliament, in order to inform this institution on the overall progress in achieving the 
new Cohesion Policy objectives.    
 
2. Concentration and simplification 
As the European Union with 27 members faces a series of different problems 
than the “older” Europe, the new Cohesion Policy focuses on three new objectives: 
Convergence, i.e. previously Objective 1, directed at lagging behind regions. Eighty 
percent of the total CP budget for 2007-2013 is allocated to the regions fulfilling the 
specific “Convergence” criteria laid down in the Art. 5 of the Framework Regulation. 
The second objective of the new CP is “Regional Competitiveness and Employment”, 
deploying 15 % of the total allocation; in the framework of this objective other regions 
than the ones eligible under the “Convergence” Objective are supported in order to 
strengthen their “competitiveness and attractiveness” and foster employment by 
anticipating economic and social changes (see Art. 3 (2)(b) of the Framework 
Regulation). Previously a Community Initiative, “INTERREG” was transformed into 
 
127 The NRP represents the framework for drawing up and implementing (at national level) specific sector 
policies with a view to the Lisbon Objectives; the NRP is set up in accordance with the Commission 
Communication COM(2005)24 of 2.2.2005 Working together for growth and jobs, A new start for the 
Lisbon Strategy (LS) and The Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-2008) - COM(2005)141 
of 12.4.2005. 
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the third CP objective, “European Territorial Cooperation”, channelling the rest128 of 
the budget towards strengthening cross-border, transnational and interregional 
cooperation among local and regional actors across the EU.    
This concentration on the regions mostly in need is complemented by a 
simplification at instruments level: following the separation made between the Cohesion 
and the Agricultural Policy, the former is implemented between 2007-2013 through 
only three instruments: the European Regional Development Fund, European Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund, all three applying the same rules, set up in one single 
Framework Regulation, implemented through one, and not 10 implementing regulations 
this time (see also 4th Cohesion Report, page 128).  
At the same time, the mono-fund-principle was introduced: each operational 
programme is financed through one single instrument, ERDF or ESF129. Only the CF 
and the ERDF can be combined in the case of the OPs for the Transport and 
Environment sectors.           
 
3. decentralisation and proportionality 
As mentioned before, the new planning and programming cycle gives the 
member states more room for manoeuvre in managing, implementing, monitoring and 
evaluation of the structural instruments.  
As regards financial management, if in the previous Financial Framework the 
financial allocations, intervention rates and reimbursements were decided at measure 
level, for the 2007-2013 programming period these are set up at higher level, of 
programme or priority axis (4th Cohesion Report, page 127). This enables the member 
states to manage the funds with a certain degree of flexibility, and reallocate between 
key areas of interventions under a priority axis, without complex approval procedures to 
be launched in Brussels.  
The Member States enjoy more freedom as regards monitoring and evaluation, 
too. In the former case, a limited number of indicators need to be monitored for 
reporting purposes (from the member States towards the European Commission), the so 
called “programme indicators”, i.e. inserted in the OPs, and these relate to the outputs 
 
128 The budget for the third objective of  the EU Cohesion Policy is 7 750 081 461 Euro, in 
accordance with the Art. 21 of the Council Framework Regulation.  
129 With the exception of 10% of the programme budget, which can be spent on type of expenditures 
eligible for the other instrument (ESF in the case of an ERDF-financed programme and the other way 
around). 
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and results of the programme, and not to its impact. Member States are advised to 
monitor more indicators for themselves to be sure that the programme implementation 
is following the right path, but it is up to the Member States to decide which other 
indicators, if any, they should chose.  
Linked with monitoring, the new provisions on evaluation try to mould on the 
needs of the Members States and offer them a new, flexible instrument, i.e. the ad-hoc 
evaluations, to be carried out when a “significant departure from the goals initially set” 
is registered, in place of the rigid mid-term evaluation and its update provided for in the 
previous programming period. The members states are encouraged to draft Evaluation 
Plans in order to make efficient use of the evaluation as management tool in optimising 
programme implementation, and in this sense the Commission set up a series of 
guidelines for the MSs130, but these plans do not require the approval of the European 
Commission.         
As regards control, in the case of smaller programmes, i.e. under 750 million 
eligible expenditure, with a limited EU co-financing (under 40%), national bodies may 
carry out the required control activities, with no Commission involvement.  
These new competencies might strike against the Member States, especially if 
the responsible institutions in place do not have the necessary capacity to manage, 
implement, monitor and evaluate the structural instruments implementation. At the 
same time, this freedom might prove illusory, and not only for the new members states, 
as the European Commission participates in the Monitoring Committees’ meetings131 
and it retains significant competencies in interim and ex-post activities, as financial 
control, audit and evaluation.  
Differently from the previous programming period, the eligibility rules are not 
commonly decided at European level anymore, but each country is free to set up its own 
categories of eligible expenditures at national level.   
3 The National Tier of the Structural Funds Implementation: 
Coordination Mechanisms for the National Strategic Reference 
Framework, Authority for the Coordination of Structural 
Instruments, Certifying and Paying Authority, Audit Authority  
 
 
130 See the WD no. 5 of the European Commission, Indicative Guidelines On Evaluation Methods: 
Evaluation During The Programming Period, page 12  
131 As non-voting member 
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As presented in the second chapter, the preparatory work for the 2007-2013 
Cohesion Policy programming period started early in Romania, in the framework of the 
negotiation with the European Commission of the Chapter 21 „Regional policy and the 
coordination of structural instruments”. As these technical discussions were based on 
the legislation in place at that date, i.e. Council Regulation 1260/1999 and the 
subsequent Funds-specific regulations, a (national) development plan needed to be 
drafted by the Romanian government, to include the analysis of the socio-economic 
development of the country, in the light of the objectives of the Cohesion Policy, and 
the strategy, the planned priority actions, their specific objectives and the related 
indicative financial resources (Council Regulation 1260/1999, Art. 9). 
In December 2005 the Romanian National Development Plan was finalised, after 
almost two years of intensive, horizontal and vertical, collaboration with a majority of 
its stakeholders. As explained also in the plan as such, the NDP was developed 
specifically for the implementation of the EU Cohesion Policy and, despite its title, it 
was not meant to replace the overall, national strategy for economic development, 
embodied by the National Economic Development Strategy132, but to plan how the 
European Funds, including agricultural ones, are to be deployed in Romania between 
2007-13.  
The National Strategic Reference Framework, drawn on the NDP analysis and 
strategy, is implemented through 7 Operational Programmes under the Convergence 
Objective and 11 OPs under the European Cooperation Objective. An overview of these 
operational programmes, their managing authorities and intermediate bodies, and of the 
European fund they are financed through is presented in detail in the second chapter 
(page 63).  
 
Given the significant amounts to be implemented, and the complexity of this 
process, the coordination of the NSRF implementation is undertaken in a series of 
committees, at political and technical level (see also the National Strategic Reference 
Framework, pages 161-2): 
1. National Coordination Committee for Structural Instruments, established in 
order to provide strategic guidance and decision-making at political level; 
 
132 As regards the National Economic Development Strategy, as mentioned by the NDP, it was difficult to 
identify exactly its existence for the current period. The only identified NEDS covered the time span 
between 2000-2004, see http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/strategie.pdf  
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2. Management Co-ordination Committee, which will address management, 
administrative and horizontal issues with relevance to the OPs; 
3. Regional coordination committees, established in the 8 Regions, in order to assist in 
the correlation of interventions amongst the Operational Programmes. 
4. Working Groups 
3.1 The National Coordination Committee for Structural 
Instruments (NCC) – political level 
The activity of the NCC was preceded by the National Committee for the 
Coordination of the SIs management process, which met regularly between 2004 and 
2007, on the basis of the G.D. No. 1200/2004 for its setting up and functioning. The 
purpose of this committee was to coordinate at political level, i.e. prime-minister and 
minister/state secretaries level, the preparation of the institutional, legislative, and 
procedural framework for the management and implementation of structural 
instruments. Its members were the political representatives of the Ministries involved, 
as MAs, in the management and implementation of the Structural Instruments and rural 
development funds (see Annex 1 of the G.D. 1200/2004). As the preparatory phase 
came to an end in 2007, this preparatory committee was transformed in the NCC, in 
accordance with the new Governmental Decision 457/21.04.2008 regulating the 
institutional framework for the coordination and management of structural instruments, 
which replaced the older one, respectively GD 497/2004.   
 In accordance with the GD 457/2008, the NCC assures, under the presidency of 
the Prime-Minister, the correlation between the SIs and the European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development (EAFRD) and European Fisheries Fund (EFF) interventions; 
nevertheless, the ministries in charge with these two policies are not members of the 
NCC, but only the ministers coordinating the MAs of the Cohesion Policy Operational 
Programmes. The main competencies of the NCC are: 
o to define the strategy for the development of the institutional, legislative and 
procedural framework necessary for the SIs implementation and monitors its 
functioning; 
o to decide on measures to strengthen the administrative capacity for the SIs 
implementation, to improve the management and increase the OPs efficiency; 
o to decide on measures to correlate the interventions carried out under various 
OPs, with the aim of increasing the SIs impact in Romania 
o approves funds re-allocations among OPs, before submitting these for the 
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European Commission’s approval 
o analyses and approves the National Annual Report (NAR), reports regarding 
administrative capacity, strategic reports, and other plans, reports; 
o analyses and approves the National Multi-annual Evaluation Plan and examines 
the results of the evaluations provided for by this plan; 
o takes decisions regarding aspects raised by the Management Committee for the 
Coordination of the SIs Management (MCC); 
o analyses and approves correlation measures between the SIs and EAFRD and 
EFF interventions.       
3.2 Management Co-ordination Committee – technical level 
The Management Co-ordination Committee (MCC) did not exist as such, i.e. in 
an institutionalised form, before 2007. Nevertheless, between 2004-2007 the Authority 
for the Coordination of Structural Instruments together with the Managing Authorities, 
sometimes joined by the Intermediate Bodies, convened regularly to discuss and decide 
issues on programming, implementation, eligibility issues, project appraisal and 
selection mechanisms, monitoring, indicators, indicators system, SMIS, data collection 
and evaluation.  The activity of the MCC will carry on this intense collaboration which 
took place in the preparatory phase and concentrate in the next years on implementation 
specific issues.        
In accordance with the G.D. 457/2008, the members of the MCC, representatives 
of the ACIS, MAs and CPA, meet monthly under the coordination of the ACIS General 
Director and decides on technical, institutional and procedural measures to be taken for 
the increase of the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the SIs implementation.     
The activity of the Management Co-ordination Committee is supported at 
technical level by working groups (4), organised thematically around subjects as: 
SMIS, implementation systems and manuals, information and publicity, evaluation, 
technical assistance. They are organised and chaired by ACIS and gather the 
representatives of each MA responsible for the specific topic; the purpose of the WGs is 
mainly to work in practice the EC requirements for the respective field, to carry out 
specific capacity building activities and to draft specific procedures.       
3.3 Regional coordination committees 
The Regional coordination committees, i.e. the Regional Committees for 
Strategic Evaluation and Correlation (RCSECs), are consultative bodies, created in each 
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region with the participation of the local public administration and socio-economic 
environment representatives. Their main task is to assure, at regional level, the 
coherence between the interventions carried out in the region under different OPs and 
other programmes, i.e. the National Plan for Rural Development or other governmental 
programmes. Nevertheless, considering the limited mandate agreed politically for these 
bodies, the RCSECs rather form a sort of Regional Monitoring Committee and is not 
empowered in any way to decide upon the projects financed through other programmes 
than ROP but having an impact on the development of the regions (see further). 
 
Further than the mechanisms in place at national level for the coordination of the 
NSRF, and, subsequently, of the OPs implementation, a series of other institutions 
impact on the MAs, ROP including, activity. These institutions have coordination 
competencies, both for technical, institutional, procedural issues, i.e. Authority for the 
Coordination of Structural Instruments, and financial issues, i.e. Certifying and Paying 
Authority,  and audit, i.e. Audit Authority, aspects.   
3.4 Authority for the Coordination of Structural Instruments 
The Authority for the Coordination of Structural Instruments (ACIS) is the 
institution entrusted with the coordination of the management and delivery of the 
Structural Instruments in Romania, assuming the responsibilities assigned to the “CSF 
Managing Authority” by the Government Decision No 128/2006 modifying G.D. No 
497/2004 (NSRF 2007-2013, page 162). Beginning with 2004, when this GD was 
created in the framework of the Ministry of Finances, following the transferring of the 
NAC function from the Ministry of European Integration, ACIS has coordinated the 
entire preparatory activity for the Structural Funds implementation: programming, 
implementation systems and mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation.   
As in 2007 the preparatory work was finalised and the real implementation work 
started, a new Governmental Decision no. 457/21.04.2008 regulating the institutional 
framework for the coordination and management of structural instruments in Romania 
was adopted. Further than clarifying the national institutions acting as management 
authorities and intermediate bodies for the 7 operational programmes, the new decision 
revises, as mentioned before, the coordination mechanism in place for the structural 
instruments implementation, respectively the ACIS, the National Coordination 
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Committee (NCC) and the Management Coordination Committee for Structural 
Instruments (MCC), and presents in detail the competencies of each of these institutions 
and committees.     
In according to this new Governmental Decision, the ACIS enjoys the following 
competencies: 
COORDINATION 
 
o Initiates, elaborates and modifies the legislation regarding the institutional and 
procedural framework for the coordination and implementation of SIs; 
o Assures the development and functioning of the coordination mechanism for 
the SIs management; 
o Assures the secretariat of the National Coordination Committee; 
o Assures the presidency and the secretariat of the Management Coordination 
Committee; 
o Coordinates and presides the working groups set up in the framework of the 
coordination mechanism; 
o Takes part in the RCSECs meetings; 
o Coordinates, monitors and supports the development of the administrative 
capacity of all structures involved in the SIs management, through action plans 
and regular reporting to the NCC; 
o Elaborates guides and manuals for the development of the SIs management 
procedures; assuring a unitary approach of the procedural framework; 
o Elaborates or modifies/approves the legislation regarding expenditures 
eligibility;  
o Coordinates and monitors the partnership framework developed during the 
NSRF elaboration and implementation. 
 
PLANING and PROGRAMMING 
o Coordinates the elaboration and updating of the National Development Plan, 
NSRF and Operational Programmes and Framework Documents for 
Implementation, assuring their correlation with the other national and European 
policies and legislation; 
o Coordinates the NSRF and OPs negotiation process with the European 
Commission; 
o Analyses, approves and assures the approval by the MEF and by the Ministry 
coordinating the respective OP, of the Framework Documents for OPs 
Implementation.   
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o Oversees and supports the project pipeline preparation by the MAs, and 
assures, at national level, the coordination of the TA Programme JASPERS. 
 
MONITORING 
o Monitors the NSRF implementation and coordinates the monitoring process of 
the OPs; 
o Assures the harmonisation of the legal and procedural framework for the 
functioning of the OPs Monitoring Committees and participates as member in 
their reunions;   
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o Coordinates from a methodological point of view the elaboration of the annual 
implementation reports and of the final implementation reports; 
o Participates at the annual meetings with the European Commission, organised 
with a view to analyse the OPs implementation, and coordinates the actions to 
be taken regarding the AIRs, as a result of the Commission feed-back; 
o Elaborates the National Implementation Report regarding the implementation 
of the SIs and submits it for approval to the NCC; 
o Coordinates the elaboration of the Strategic Reports in accordance with the art. 
29 (a) of the Framework Regulation, to be submitted to the NCC, Romanian 
Government and the European Commission, and participates in the elaboration 
of the National Reforms Programmes annual implementation reports section 
which presents the contribution of the OPs; 
o Assures the setting up, the development and functioning of the electronic 
monitoring information system (SMIS).  
 
EVALUATION 
o Coordinates the evaluation of the SIs management and implementation process 
and the related capacity building measures; 
o Elaborates evaluation standards and guides for the interventions financed with 
structural instruments; 
o Assures the legislative and procedural framework for the cost-benefit analysis, 
as instrument for project appraisal and selection; 
o Coordinates the indicators system utilised in the monitoring and evaluation of 
the OPs and NSRF; 
o Coordinates the elaboration and implementation of the multi-annual evaluation 
plans and assures their correlation with the National Multi-annual Evaluation 
Plan; 
o Elaborates and implements the NMEP and assures that this is used as strategic 
management instrument during the SIs implementation.          
 
COMMUNICATION 
o coordinates the elaboration, update and implementation of the National 
Communication Strategy regarding the SIs, and assures the coordination of the 
information, communication and publicity activities; 
o manages the setting up, development and functioning of the SIs Information 
Centre, web page and call centre.     
 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
o Analyses, together with the Certifying and Paying Authority and the 
Management Authorities the necessity and opportunity of funds reallocation 
between OPs, and formulates recommendations in this sense for the NCC; 
o Approves, together with the Certifying and Paying Authority, the documents 
elaborated by the Managing Authorities for the budgetary planning, made for 
both the European funds and the national contribution to pre-, co- and financing 
the non-eligible expenditures; 
o Coordinates the ex-ante, annual monitoring and ex-post verification of the 
additionality principle 
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In a first phase, as the ACIS was the contact point for the European Commission 
as regards its input in the preparatory work to be carried out in Romania, the managing 
authorities were somehow in a dependence relationship with ACIS. This relationship  
started to change at the moment the Operational Programmes were in the last phase of 
elaboration, when the MAs intensified their direct contacts and collaboration with the 
relevant tasks managers in the DG Regio. The more experienced the MAs were in 
managing and implementing pre-accession assistance, the faster this “emancipation” 
took place i.e. especially the Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing (MA 
ROP), Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MA SOP Environment) 
started acting more independently, and, to a lesser extent, Ministry of Labour and Equal 
Opportunities (MA OP Human Resources Development).       
This development is not surprising, as this was the purpose of a large part of the 
pre-accession funds deployed in Romania and as the institutional and competencies 
arrangements for SIs implementation, although different in certain respects, encompass 
several continuities and similarities with the Phare ESC implementing rules. The 
ACIS/Ministry of Economy and Finance has prime responsibility for the adequate, 
efficient and effective SIs implementation in Romania and in this sense it assumes the 
coordinating role. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the MAs started going their own 
way, and this process will accelerate as the implementation process will unfold, because 
ACIS competencies are shared with the MAs in respect to programming and evaluation, 
but the MAs enjoy almost exclusive powers as regards operational implementation and 
monitoring. Especially in the case of monitoring and evaluation, the competencies 
division/sharing is different in comparison with the pre-accession funds, for which the 
NAC enjoyed full responsibility, as counterpart, until 2006, and successor, beyond 1st of 
January 2007 of the European Commission.       
 
As for the Phare ESC Component, two other institutions are a part of the 
national mechanisms put in place for the implementation of SIs:  
3.5 Certifying and Paying Authority 
As regards financial management and control, the Certifying and Paying 
Authority within the Ministry of Economy and Finance is responsible for drawing up 
certified statement of expenditure and applications for payment and submit them to the 
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European Commission. The same CPA receives the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund 
payments from the European Commission in respect to all OPs. The payments  are 
made directly to the Beneficiaries by the Certifying and Paying Authority in the 
framework of the SOP Environment and SOP Transport (in the case of direct payments) 
and firstly to the Paying Units established in the ministries which have the role of 
Managing Authorities (for the indirect payments). The CPA is located within the 
National Fund, as presented in the previous chapter. As in the case of the NDP 
programming, this is another field were the pre-accession activity certainly resulted in 
experience usable and used for the Structural Instruments Implementation.    
Verification of expenditures takes place also at IB and MA level, (NRSF, page 
173), and the MAs feed information into the CPA applications for payment, and, as 
mentioned before, make the payments towards the beneficiaries. 
3.6 The Audit Authority and the Central Harmonizing Unit for 
Public Internal Audit 
The institution in charge with the SIs audit is the Audit Authority, an associated 
body of the Romanian Court of Accounts acting independently from the Court, the MAs 
and the CPA. At operational level the audit competency is shared by the Managing 
Authorities and Intermediate Bodies, as they have their own audit structures, as well. 
Nevertheless, the Audit Authority bears the final responsibility for the SIs audit; in 
accordance with its legislative base133, it carries out the required system and funds 
audits, (including the system assessment prescribed by the art. 71 of the Framework 
Regulation, compulsory with a view to the first payment made by the European 
Commission towards the member state), verifies the eligibility of the declared 
expenditures and the national co-financing (on the basis of samples).  
 The Internal Audit Units (IAUs) within the MAs, including the IUA within the 
MDPWH, are coordinated from a methodological point of view by the Central 
Harmonizing Unit for Public Internal Audit (CHUPIA), localised in the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. The CHUPIA mostly develops and implements uniform 
procedures and methodologies based on international standards agreed by the European 
 
133 Law 200/2005, regarding the approval of the governmental Emergency Ordinance no. 22/2005, issued 
for the completion of the Law no. 94/1992 regarding the organisation and functioning of the Romanian 
Count of Accounts.  
 
 152
Union, including internal audit manuals and audit trails, and elaborates ethical codes, 
methodological norms and reporting systems for the IAUs.  
4 Post-accession Regional Development Policy in Romania: The 
Regional Operational Programme. Institutional arrangements, roles 
and competencies 
 
Following the methodological approach presented in the introductory chapter, 
after identifying the institutions playing a role at a higher (than the MAs) level in the 
Structural Instruments implementation and their competencies in this respect, we 
continue with the analysis of the delivery system in place for the implementation of the 
Regional Operational Programme as such. 
4.1 The Regional Operational Programme 2007-2013 
The Regional Operation Programme is rooted in the preparations Romania has 
undergone for more than 10 years for the actual implementation of the Structural 
Instruments, as tools of the EU Cohesion Policy. As previously mentioned, the concept 
of regionalisation and regional development were introduced in this political, territorial-
administrative two-levels, highly centralised, country in the context of the EU 
integration.   
Nevertheless, if during the 1994-1999 programming period the idea of a “Europe 
of Regions” was still at the core of the Cohesion (by then the Regional) Policy 
implementation, this changed during the last two programming periods, 2000-6 and 
especially 2007-2013. One of the reasons for which the regional tier is less present in 
the forming and implementation of the EU Cohesion Policy is its very position and 
capacity in some Member States, especially new ones. On one hand, the European 
Commission requires a sound institutional system for the funds implementation, 
including a NUTS II level, nevertheless, on the other hand, this system should respect 
the administrative tradition of the member states. On the other hand, the very 
“Lisbonisation” of the Cohesion Policy places the emphasis on growth and jobs and, 
subsequently, on growth poles, no matter which governance levels are involved in the 
socio-economic development process, and less on regional development, balancing and 
catching up. 
Therefore, one can say that the ROP is “caught” between the “quest” for regional 
development (and regionalisation) as understood in the middle of the 90s and the 
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current “quest” for turning the Cohesion Policy into an efficient and effective tool for 
reaching the Lisbon objectives. The fears expressed by some RDAs directors at the 
beginning of 2004, that the ROP will rather represent a “leftover” programme, seem 
partially justified. Most of the funds committed to Romania for the 2007-2013 
programming period are to be invested in national socio-economic development 
programmes, with only 19,4% going into regional development. The financial 
distribution of the ROP resources is meant to serve the aim of the ROP, respectively, the 
funds are allocated indirectly proportional with the development level of each region, in 
order to support the less developed ones in catching up134. As the ROP itself phrases: 
“…it privileges Regions relatively lagging behind and less developed areas in ensuring 
them the existence of a minimum set of preconditions for growth but does not have 
redistributive purposes per se.” (see the ROP official version, page 9).  
 
Regional Operational Programme’ priority axes 
Priority axis 1: Support to sustainable development of urban growth poles  
1.1 Integrated urban development plans 
Priority axis 2: Improvement of regional and local transport infrastructure 
2.1 Rehabilitation and modernization of the county roads and urban streets network – 
including construction/rehabilitation of ring roads135  
Priority axis 3: Improvement of social infrastructure 
3.1 Rehabilitation, modernization and equipping of the health services’ infrastructure 
3.2 Rehabilitation, modernization, development and equipping of social services     
infrastructure 
3.3 Improving the equipments of the operational units for public safety interventions 
in emergency situations 
3.4 Rehabilitation, modernization, development and equipping of pre–university, 
university education and continuous vocational training infrastructure 
Priority axis 4: Strengthening the regional and local business environment 
4.1 Development of sustainable business support structures of regional and local   
importance 
 
134 See the press release of the MDPWH, 17.08.2007, downloaded 21.01.2008 
http://www.inforegio.ro/index.php?page=MEDIA_ARCHIVE  
135 The building of national roads and motorways is financed in the framework of the SOP 
Transport.  
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4.2 Rehabilitation of unused polluted industrial sites and preparation for new activities  
4.3 Support the development of micro-enterprises  
Priority axis 5: Sustainable development and promotion of tourism 
5.1 Restoration and sustainable valorization of cultural heritage, setting up and 
modernization of related infrastructure 
5.2 Creation, development, modernization of the tourism infrastructure for sustainable 
valorization of natural resources and for increasing the quality of tourism services  
5.3 Promoting the tourism potential and setting-up the needed infrastructure in order 
to increase Romania’s attractivity as tourism destination  
Priority axis 6: Technical assistance  
6.1 Support for the implementation, overall management and evaluation of the ROP 
6.2 Support for the publicity and information activities of the ROP 
Source: ROP 2007-2013, page 10 
 
4.2 Institutional actors involved in the management and 
implementation of the ROP  
The institutional structure in place for the management and implementation of 
the ROP is developed, as intended, upon the institutional arrangements built up for the 
implementation of the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion Component136, and 
respecting the European Regulations in force for the Cohesion Policy during the 2007-
2013 programming period. Respectively, the Ministry of EI/DPWH fulfils the role of 
Managing Authority137, while the Regional Development Agencies act as Intermediate 
Bodies138. Both the financial management and control and the audit functions are shared 
between the IBs/MA and the national, overarching institutions responsible, i.e. the 
Certifying and Paying Authority, and the Audit Authority.    
An important shift in the competencies of the institutions involved in regional 
development took place. The National Board of Regional Development played a role 
 
136 Phare ESC first part, managed by the MIE/MDPWH; the second part, i.e. human resources 
development/ESF-like projects, is managed by the Ministry of Labour, while the third part encompasses 
horizontal projects for the preparation of SIs implementation, currenlty managed by the ACIS and CFCU 
(see also previous chapter).  
137 As a continuation of its position as Implementing Agency and Authority for the Phare ESC 
Component. Currently, due to the overlapping of the two programmes, i.e. Phare ESC and the ROP, the 
Ministry carries out both roles, through two separate general directorates.  
138 With one exception: for the PA 5, KAI 3, the Ministry for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
Trade, Tourism and Liberal Professions is the IB (see further).  
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only during the consultations carried out in the elaboration of the ROP, as stakeholder; 
it is not involved, as separate institution, in any way in the approval, management and 
implementation of the ROP. On the other side, the Regional Development Boards 
representatives are voting members of the Monitoring Committee, and they are not 
involved anymore in the project approval, as it was the case for Phare Economic and 
Social Cohesion Component. These shifts indicate clearly the fact that regionalisation, 
regional development and regional development policy currently do not represent 
priorities list for the Romanian government, but socio-economic development in its 
entirety.  
4.2.1 Managing Authority – Ministry of Development, Public Works 
and Housing 
In accordance with the Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 and the 
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1828/2006, and the GD 361/2007, published in the 
Official Journal No. 285/2007, regarding the organisation and functioning of the 
MDPWH, GD No. 128/2006 published in the Official Journal No. 90/31.01.2006, 
modifying the GD No. 497/2004 regarding the setting up of the institutional framework 
for the coordination, implementation and management of structural instruments, the MA 
of the ROP bears the ultimate responsibility as regards the successful implementation of 
the ROP. In this respect, it has the following main competencies (see also the ROP,  
page 168):   
 
PROGRAMMING 
o Drafts in partnership and submits the ROP for approval to the 
Government/European Commission.  
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o Prepares and signs agreements with the Intermediate Bodies for the effective 
implementation of the ROP at regional level; 
o Elaborates the project selection criteria, and submits them for the ROP MC approval 
o Establishes the launching schedule of the calls for proposals;   
o Prepares and updates the ROP Implementation Procedures/guidelines; 
o Takes the final decision with regard to the financing of the project applications and 
send this decision to the IBs; 
o Works in cooperation with Ministries and other members of the public sector, and 
with economic and social partners in order to correlate the implementation of the 
ROP with the other operational programmes.  
 
STRATEGIC MONITORING 
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o Sets up a Monitoring Committee for the ROP (ROP MC) within three months of the 
notification of the decision approving the ROP; agrees with the ROP MC the 
adoption of its rules of procedure within the Romanian institutional, legal and 
financial framework; elaborates procedures concerning the organization and 
functioning of the ROP MC; provides the secretariat of the ROP MC;  
 
OPERATIONAL MONITORING 
o reports to the ROP MC with regard to the ROP implementation on progress and the 
manner the agreements with the Intermediate Bodies are respected; 
o Coordinates the elaboration of the Annual Implementation Reports and Final 
Implementation Report. 
 
EVALUATION 
o Carries out the evaluations of the ROP and coordinates the elaboration of the 
evaluation report. 
 
PUBLICITY AND INFORMATION 
o Elaborates and implements the Communication Action Plan. 
 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
o Carries out sample checks of the projects financed through ROP; 
o Authorizes the eligible expenditure based on the checks performed on the progress 
reports and other relevant documents received from the Intermediate Bodies;  
o Takes corrective measures in case of irregularities; 
o Performes the control of EU/national funds allocated through the ROP, in 
accordance with the national/EU legislation; 
 
AUDIT 
o Ensures the existence of adequate audit trails of the operations  
4.2.2 The Intermediate Bodies – Regional Development Agencies 
 The Regional Development Agencies and the Ministry of Small and Medium-
Sized Companies, Trade, Tourism and Liberal Professions are the Intermediate Bodies 
of the Regional Operational Programme.  
The 5th PA of the ROP, “Sustainable development and promotion of tourism” 
was initially covering only a series of operations to be implemented at local and 
regional level. The SOP Increase of Economic Competitiveness initially planned to 
finance the creation of a series of National Tourism Information and Promotion Centres 
in areas with significant touristic potential. During the negotiations of the Operational 
Programmes with the European Commission, the DG Regio suggested that investments 
in tourism should be carried out under the same OP, respectively the Regional 
Operational Programme. Due to this adjustment at programme level became the 
Ministry of Small and Medium-Sized Companies, Trade, Tourism and Liberal 
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Professions IB for the ROP KAI 5.3. “Promoting the tourism potential and setting-up 
the needed infrastructure in order to increase Romania’s attractivity as tourism 
destination”.  
   
As provided for also in the Law on Regional Development, the RDAs act as 
ROP IBs upon a signed agreement with the MDPWH, agreement stipulating the tasks 
the RDAs must fulfil in this position, and the financial implications of this 
collaboration, i.e. the RDAs render a series of services to the Ministry; in exchange, 
their operational costs need to be covered. The MDPWH, in its quality as MA, monitors 
the extent to which the RDAs fulfil their contractual obligations. The RDAs as ROP IBs 
fulfil the following main tasks (see also the ROP,  page 165): 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
o Launch the calls for proposals, according to the schedule established by the ROP 
MA; 
o Ensure the development of project pipelines;  
o Provide guidance to potential applicants in project preparation, respecting the 
principle of segregation of functions; 
o Receive and register applications for funding support under the ROP, according to 
the relevant procedure; 
o Check the administrative compliance and the eligibility of the applications 
submitted, in conformity with the criteria established by the ROP MA; 
o Organize the technical and financial evaluation sessions, with the support of the 
independent evaluators; 
o Report to the ROP MA on a regular basis with regard to the results of the evaluation 
process; 
o Notify the applicants with regard to the stage of the evaluation process of their 
application;  
o Conclude financing contracts with beneficiaries, following ROP MA’s decision to 
finance the proposed projects; 
o Organize the strategic evaluation and provide the secretariat support for the 
Regional Committees for Strategic Assessment (RCSA). 
 
MONITORING 
o Monitor the implementation of approved projects, present technical progress reports 
to the ROP MA; 
o Contribute to the elaboration of the Annual Implementation Reports and Final 
Report. 
o Maintain up-to-date financial and statistical data at project level using the Single 
Management Information System (SMIS). 
 
AUDIT 
o Ensure that all the documents and procedures for the establishment of an audit trail 
are in place, in accordance with the relevant procedures. 
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EVALUATION AND REPORTING 
o Contribute to the ROP evaluation reports. 
  
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT  
o Receive payment claims from beneficiaries, verify (not certify) the accuracy and 
actuality of the expenditure, approve it and submit the report to the ROP MA 
together with payment endorsement; 
o Carry out on-the-spot checks of projects 
o Take action as agreed together with the ROP MA in the case of fraud, irregularities, 
and financial corrections 
o Take action for funds recovery and send to the ROP MA reports concerning the 
debits to be recovered 
 
INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY 
o Contribute to the delivery of the ROP Communication Plan at a regional level 
including local publicity, information and training events 
 
 As we can se from this table, the RDAs activity concentrates on projects  
implementation and on the operational level of monitoring and financial management. 
As regards the audit, programme evaluation , information and publicity, the RDAs have 
“soft” tasks, of preparing or making information available to the institutions responsible 
with the respective activities. The de-coupling between the Regional Development 
Plans and the ROP become obvious from this table, as the RDAs do not have any irect 
competencies regarding the Regional Operational Programme; as mentioned before, 
their contribution to this programme is made through the National Development Plan, 
which encompasses the RDPs, as well, in its analysis. As in accordance with the 
Council Framework Regulation 1083/2006 the National Development Plan is not 
required anymore, the role to be played by the RDAs in the programming exercise to be 
carried out for the future financial framework, 2014-2020 is unclear. In any case, this 
role will be determinant for regionalisation and regional development in Romania, as it 
will indicate to which extent willingness exists on the side of the central government to 
devolve some more competencies to a regional tier in the future.        
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4.2.3 The Regional Committees for Strategic Evaluation and 
Correlation 
As mentioned before , eight Regional Committees for Strategic Evaluation139 
and Correlation140 (RCSECs) are set up at regional level, i.e. one for each region.   
The Regional Committees for Strategic Evaluation and Correlation, had, 
initially, an ambitious mandate. These committees supposed to ensure the coherence 
and synergy among the projects financed through all Operational Programmes in a 
region, and relate these back to the regional development strategies and plans, by 
deciding, at regional level, on all these projects. Nevertheless, as the other Managing 
Authorities were reluctant at conferring to the RCSEs decision-making rights on their 
programme implementation, it turned into a consultative body, with decision-making 
powers only as regards the ROP projects, a body which forms a sort of Regional 
Monitoring Committee, not empowered in any way to decide upon the projects financed 
through other programmes having an impact on the development of the region.  
In accordance with the G.D. 764/2007, the legislative base for the RCSECs, two 
representatives of the local public authorities within the counties being a part of the 
region are members of the RCSES, in average 8-14 persons. An equal number of 
representatives of the socio-economic environment, i.e. NGOs, trade unions, 
professional associations, within the region are also invited as members of this body. 
Depending on the number of counties, the RCSESs have between 18141 and 28 
members142. The president of the RCSES is a County Council President, and member of 
the RDB. The representatives of the ACIS, Managing Authorities and IBs may take part 
as observers in the RCSES. The RDBs name, by decision, the composition of the 
RCSEC. 
 In accordance with the Art. 5 of the Framework-Regulation for the organisation 
and functioning of the RCSEC, approved by the same GD 764/2007, the main 
competencies of this Committee are (see also www.inforegio.ro):  
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
139 Strategic evaluation: the process of establishing the extent to which the projects financed through ROP 
correspond to the regional development strategy, and their prioritisation. 
140 Correlation: the process of arranging, in time and space, the results of the projects proposed to be 
financed through all public programmes, in order to respond to the development strategy in a certain 
region.   
141 The RCSES Bucharest has 18 members, with a composition adapted to the specificity of the Region: 
each sector and the General Municipal Council are represented in the RCSES.  
142 For an example of RCSECs, see the web page of RDA South-East: 
http://www.adrmuntenia.ro/doc1/pdf/Componenta%20CRESC%20Sud%20Muntenia.doc  
 160
o To evaluate the projects received at regional level, from a strategic point of 
view, establishing their priority;  
o To approve for financing through ROP the list of projects that are a priority for 
the region;  
o To correlate at regional level the projects that receive or could receive money 
from public funds;  
o To recommend to the Managing Authority of ROP improvements of 
replacements of the strategic evaluation criteria, as identified in practice, with 
a view to their re-approval by the Monitoring Committee;  
o To send to the Managing Authority of ROP the list of decisions taken for each 
project that went through the strategic assessment;  
o To send to the Managing Authorities opinions and conclusions of assessment 
sessions regarding the relevance of projects funded through ROP.  
 
PROGRAMMING 
o To recommend to the Managing Authority of ROP possible reallocations of 
funds, either between key areas of intervention within the same priority axis or 
between the axes;  
o To recommend lines of action for correlating the programmes implemented in 
the region. The recommendations will be presented to the Managing 
Authorities / Intermediary Bodies of Operational Programmes, to the National 
Plan for Rural Development and institutions that manage programmes funded 
from public funds.  
 
Consequently, the main role of the Regional Committee for Strategic Evaluation 
and Correlation is to evaluate project applications from a strategic point of view, namely 
assessing whether the proposed projects are in line with the ROP objectives and with 
the Region’s development strategy. “In addition, the Regional Committees for Strategic 
Evaluation and Correlation will examine in general the correlation of the projects that 
are financed under ROP with those financed under other sectoral operational 
programmes, National Rural Development Programme, the OPs under the European 
territorial cooperation Objective, and other publicly funded programmes.“ (ROP, page 
170). The activity of the RCSEC results in two lists of projects: on one side, a list of 
projects recommended, and, on the other side, a list of projects not recommended to be 
implemented in the region from a strategic point of view. Nevertheless, we need to 
underline that the final decision on the projects to be financed remains with the MAs of 
the relevant programmes, therefore, the RCSEC activity might not have an impact on 
the projects which will unfold, in the end, in the region, and subsequently, to the 
development of the region.     
With a more comprehensive mandate, the RCSECs could have had an essential 
role in assuring the necessary coherence and synergy of the projects implemented in the 
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region, with an impact on the development of the region as such. The need for such a 
correlation has been felt for a very long time by the Regional Development Agencies. 
During the discussion taken place at their headquarters in 2004 (see annexes 11-20) the 
need for a unified, general development strategy of the region, which would encompass 
all policies, programmes and finances involved in all counties was signalled by several 
RDAs directors. The RCSECs, although they have a weak mandate, are a first step in 
this direction. Another merit of this construction is the transparency and partnership it 
ensures in implementing the ROP, as the RCSECs brings together the civil society and 
socio-economic environment representatives. 
4.2.4 The Monitoring Committee of the ROP 
As provided for by the Council Regulation (EC) 1083/2006, a Monitoring 
Committee is set up for the Regional Operational Programme, as for each of the seven 
OPs. The Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing chairs the ROP MC and 
the Managing Authority act as its secretariat.     
The MC is composed of members with voting rights and observers143: to the 
first category belong the  representatives of the Regional Development Boards, of the 
other Managing Authorities, including ACIS, and of the socio-economic environment at 
regional level, i.e. one representative per region. The representatives of the European 
Commission, of the Regional Development Agencies, Audit Authority, Certifying and 
Payments Authority and other institutions as Romanian Chamber of Commerce, 
National Institute of Statistics, National Forecast Commission, Romanian Associations 
of County Councils, Municipalities, Communes etc. take part in the MC meetings as 
observers. Although formally the representative of the European Commission is a non-
voting member of the MC, in practice it has an important word to say in the decision 
taken by this committee. 
 In accordance with article 4 of the governmental decision no. 765/2007, for the 
setting up and functioning of the Monitoring Committee, this body:  
IMPLEMENTATION 
o examines and approves the evaluation and selection criteria for the ROP 
implementation proposed by the MA, and their revision; 
o examines and approves the annual and final ROP implementation reports, as 
submitted by the MA; 
 
143 See http://www.inforegio.ro/user/file/Componenta%20CM%20POR%20-
%20anexa%201%20regulament.doc, downloaded 18.12.2007, 18.40 
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o examines and approves the technical assistance strategy as elaborated by the 
MA. 
 
STRATEGIC MONITORING 
o regularly analyses the progress registered in achieving the objectives of the 
ROP, on the basis of the documents provided by the MA, and, if necessary, 
makes recommendations; 
o examines the implementation results for each priority axis, and the evaluation 
results, in relation with the proposed objectives, and makes 
recommendations. 
 
EVALUATION 
o examines and approves the Multi-annual and Annual Evaluation Plans of the 
ROP, as proposed by the MA. 
 
AUDIT 
o it is informed as regards the results of the yearly audit mission on the ROP 
implementation, and on the opinion of the European Commission on these 
results. 
 
PROGRAMMING 
o it may propose to the MA to revise/update the ROP, with a view to reaching 
its objectives and/or improving its management, including financial; 
o examines and approves the proposals to re-allocate finances between PAs, 
KAIs, and regions. 
 
INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY 
o it is informed as regards the communication plan and its implementation, and 
about the horizontal themes. 
o modifies and approves its rules of organisation and functioning, when 
necessary.       
 
In accordance with the European Council Regulation (EC) 1083/2006, art. 65 
and 66, the main role of the Monitoring Committee is to approve the projects appraisal 
and selection criteria elaborated by the MA, and their revision, if necessary. Further, it 
examines and reviews the implementation of the ROP, on the basis of the data collected 
for the set up indicators system and in the light of its objectives and set targets, approves 
the implementation of the annual and final reports, and may propose revisions of the 
programme, if considered necessary for a better fulfilment of its objectives, on the basis 
of undergone evaluations as well. It also approves the MA proposals for financial 
reallocation submitted to the European Commission.    
 The MC has a very similar role with the Joint Monitoring Committee convening 
for the Phare programme, especially after 1st of January 2007, when, after passing to the  
Extended Decentralised Implementation System, the European Commission started 
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playing a diminished role in the framework of this body. The strategic monitoring 
carried out within the Monitoring Committee is underpinned by the operational 
monitoring carried out by the RDAs, under the coordination of the MA, with the 
support of the SMISystem. As Mr. Friptu, the General Director of the MA ROP said 
during the first meeting of the MC, this body is a management committee and the 
discussion during its meetings will focus on the programme level as such and not on the 
project-level, respectively on individual projects implemented though ROP144. 
5 The Human Resources Development OP and the SOP Environment: 
programmes implemented, fully of partially, at regional level  
  
 As presented in the previous chapter, the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion 
component represented a programming, management and especially implementation 
“exercise” for a series of institutions envisaged to be involved in similar activities, but 
related to structural funds, upon Romania’s accession to the European Union. Although 
we delimited here regional development policy as being only one programme out of the 
seven which implement European Cohesion Policy at national level, respectively the 
Regional Operational Programme, due to the initial rooting of the Phare ESC 
Component in the (by than named) Regional Policy of the EU, the idea of 
regionalisation was preserved after 2007 in the case of two other Romanian OPs: the 
SOP Environment and SOP Human Resources Development.          
 
 The SOP Environment145, whose MA is the Ministry of Environment and 
Sustainable Development, is implemented through 8 Intermediate Bodies, organisations 
subordinated to MESD, financed from the state budget and set up for each of the eight 
development regions, within the Regional Environmental Protection Agencies. 
According to the SOPE (page 104, 107), their main responsibilities are related to 
programming, monitoring, controlling and reporting activities as they have also been 
involved in the monitoring of ISPA projects in their region and in the development of 
grant schemes of environmental projects run under PHARE. As in the case of the 
Regional Operational Programme, respectively the relationships between the MDPWH 
 
144 See the minutes of the MC meeting on 16th of August 2007, page 4, 
http://www.inforegio.ro/user/file/proces%20verbal%20CMPOR%2016%20aug_07_final.doc, 
18.01.2008, 12.30. 
145 For an overview on the Priority Axes and Key Areas of Interventions of the SOPE, see Annex no.7 
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and the RDAs, the delegation of activities from the MESD as MA to the IBs is regulated 
by a written agreement.  
 In the case of the SOPE, the beneficiaries, mainly local public authorities, play 
the main role in the management and implementation of the approved interventions, 
including the tendering and contracting of the services and works related to their 
projects. The 8 IBs for the SOPE are: 
o IB for SOP ENV Bacau for Region North-East 
o IB for SOP ENV Galati for Region South-East 
o IB for SOP ENV Pitesti for Region South-Muntenia  
o IB for SOP ENV Craiova for Region South-West 
o IB for SOP ENV Timisoara for Region West 
o IB for SOP ENV Cluj-Napoca for Region North-West 
o IB for SOP ENV Sibiu for Region Centre 
o IB for SOP ENV Bucuresti for Region Bucharest-Ilfov 
  
 Despite having as jurisdiction the NUTS II development regions, and alleged 
strong collaboration with the Regional Development Agencies in the same region (as 
regards European funds implementation), only in three out of eight cases the REPAs are 
located within the same city as the RDAs. Choosing a particular location for the REPAs 
had a political background and it is the result of inter-counties negotiations; however, 
this choice of a different location may impact negatively on a permanent 
communication and cooperation between the two regional institutions, needed for the 
coherent stimulation of regional socio-economic development.  
 
 A more complex implementation structure was put in place for the SOP Human 
Resources Development, as the interventions financed under this SOP are more divers ( 
see Annex no 8). The Managing Authority, i.e. the Ministry of Labour, Family and 
Equal Opportunities, implements this OP with the support of several IBs: 8 Regional 
IBs under the MoLFEO subordination; the National Agency for Employment; the 
Ministry of Education, Research and Youth; the National Centre for Technical and 
Vocational Education Development; 2 Intermediate Bodies to be designated based on a 
public procurement process in respect of the EU regulations and national legislation. 
 In accordance with the SOP HRD, (page 128) the rationale of setting up 8 
regional IBs was for the programme to tackle more effectively and efficiently the 
regional disparities on adaptability of workers, entrepreneurship, access on the labour 
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market and social inclusion. For this purpose the 8 Regional IBs are responsible for the 
implementation of Priority Axis 3 “Increasing adaptability of workers and enterprises”, 
Key Areas of Intervention 1 “Promoting entrepreneurial culture” and 2 “Training and 
support for enterprises and employees in order to promote adaptability”; Priority Axis 5 
“Promoting active employment measures”, Key Area of Intervention 1 “Developing 
and implementing active employment measures” and Priority Axis 6 “Promoting social 
inclusion”, Key Areas of Intervention 2 “Improving the access and participation of 
vulnerable groups to the labour market” and 3 “Promoting equal opportunities on the 
labour market” (totalling approximately 865 million Euro, close to 20% of the entire OP 
financial allocation). 
 As in the case of the SOPE, the 8 Regional IBs correspond to the 8 development 
regions and function under the MoLFEQ subordination and support the implementation 
of SOP HRD in those areas where experience was gathered during the implementation 
of Phare Programme 2004-2006 (SOP HRD, page 128). 
6 Analysis of the institutions involved and their weight in each policy-
making step identified  
 
 If in the previous sub-chapters we identified all actors involved in the 
management and implementation of the ROP, here we will analyse their power position 
in accordance with the competencies identified in the methodological framework: 
programming, implementation, strategic and operational monitoring, evaluation, 
audit, financial management (certification, payment and control), information and 
publicity. 
 
 Programming 
 
 The programming competency is the most “shared” among different institutions. 
Nevertheless, each of them have different weights in this respect. In terms of decision-
making, the most important players are the European Commission, which approves the 
NSRF (partially) and the Operational Programmes, including the ROP and, at national 
level, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, as coordinating body, and the Ministry of 
Development, Public Works and Housing, i.e. as Managing Authority, which draft the 
ROP in collaboration, with the input from the Regional Development Agencies and 
other socio-economic actors. As explained in the previous chapter, the RDAs input is 
not fed directly in the ROP, but, in a first phase, in the National Development Plan 
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2007-2013. The Regional Development Plans 2007-2013, far more complex than the 
previous ones, serve as main sources for the Regional Operational Programme, 
nevertheless, they set up a series of priorities which are to be financed from different 
OPs and other (than the ROP) budgetary sources, including the National Plan for Rural 
Development. In practice, drafting the RDPs proved a good exercise for the RDAs, but 
they play a limited role in its implementation, i.e. only to the extent the RDPs priorities 
are financed from the ROP. In addition, the RDPs, for the current and previous 
programming cycles, limit themselves to analysis and strategy and do not set up a 
separate, RDP specific, implementing, monitoring, evaluation, audit, financial 
management mechanisms. Even the RDP 2007-2013 of the North-West Regions, the 
most complex and comprehensive of all, describes the ROP implementation 
mechanisms and the contribution of the RDA to this process, rather than an overall 
approach to the regional plan achievement. According to the same plan, the RCSEC is 
the body monitoring the RDP implementation, while the RDB is mentioned only shortly 
as it approved the RDP (see section IV implementing system, page 222). 
 As underlined before, the ROP mentions the National Board for Regional 
Development as one of the institutions consulted during the drafting process, but no 
decision-making competency is attributed to this body in this respect.     
 
 Implementation  
 
 The Regional Development Agencies, as IBs,  play a significant role in 
implementing the programme. Nevertheless, the MDPWH is deciding on the evaluation 
and selection criteria, approved by the Monitoring Committee; it also decides the 
implementation schedule, prepares the necessary documentation, i.e. applicants guides 
etc., and has a final word on the projects to be approved under the ROP. Taking into 
account the composition of the Monitoring Committee, it is important to underline that 
the Regional Development Boards enjoy the competence of approving the appraisal and 
selection criteria, but formally, they do not play any role in deciding the projects to be 
financed under ROP.    
 
 Strategic and operational monitoring 
 
 As closest to the implementation level, the Regional Development Agencies are 
supplying the SMIS with data regarding the projects approved and financed under ROP, 
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along their unfolding, on the basis of the indicators and targets decided in the ROP and 
FDI by the MDPWH and European Commission. Nevertheless, the data is aggregated at 
Ministry level in the annual implementation reports to be submitted for approval to the 
Monitoring Committee and the European Commission.   
 At strategic level, the Monitoring Committee oversees the peace of the ROP 
implementation (from the macro-perspective), in all its aspects, including evaluation 
and audit, and eventual re-programming and re-allocations.  
 
 
 Evaluation  
 
 The MDPWH is responsible for the evaluations to be carried out for the ROP. 
Nevertheless, this happens under the close coordination of and in collaboration with the 
Evaluation Central Unit within ACIS/MEF, which organises and/or offers the necessary 
assistance to the Evaluation Unit within the MA, as regards the drafting of procedures, 
evaluation plans, terms of references, coordination of evaluation projects  and providing 
overall quality assurance activities to ensure the quality of all evaluations. The RDAs 
have limited input into evaluation, they mostly make themselves available to evaluators, 
if approached. Nevertheless, the Monitoring Committee approves the evaluation plans, 
multi-annual and annual, and examines the evaluation reports; on their basis it may 
make recommendations for re-allocation and/or re-programming.        
 
 Audit  
 
 The audit competence is shared at national level between the MDPWH and the 
Audit Authority. As in all Management Authorities, an Internal Audit Unit is 
established within the MDPWH, independent from the general directorate performing 
the tasks of MA, and directly subordinated to the Ministers. The IAUs within the MAs, 
including the IUA within the MDPWH, are coordinated from a methodological point of 
view by the Central Harmonizing Unit for Public Internal Audit (CHUPIA), localised in 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The CHUPIA mostly develops and implements 
uniform procedures and methodologies based on international standards agreed by the 
European Union, including internal audit manuals and audit trails, and elaborates ethical 
codes, methodological norms and reporting systems for the IAUs.  
 According to the ROP, as in the case of evaluation, the RDAs have a limited 
input in the audit activities to be carried out for the ROP, despite the fact that each of 
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them have their own audit unit, created for the implementation of the Phare ESC 
Component (see previous chapter).  At the same time, the MC is only informed as 
regards the results of the carried out audits.   
 
Financial management (certification, payment and control)146  
 
 The Ministry of Economy and Finance, through the Certifying and Paying 
Authority is finally responsible with the ROP implementation from a financial point of 
view; nevertheless, expenditure verification is firstly done at RDAs and Ministry levels. 
Both institutions, the MDPWH and the RDAs, are also actively involved in controlling, 
identifying irregularities and taking remedial actions; regarding payments; the RDAs 
collects the payment claims from the beneficiaries, and transmits them to the MA; the 
Ministry makes the approved payments towards the beneficiaries, upon the 
disbursements managed by the CPA.   
 
 Information and publicity 
 
 As this aspect has become increasingly important, ACIS/MEF elaborated a 
General Communication plan and coordinates the activity of the MDPWH and of the 
RDAs in this field. The Communication Plan elaborated by the MDPWH specifically 
for the ROP and its stakeholders, with input from the RDAs, is submitted for 
information to the MC and implemented by the MA, with the RDAs cooperation.    
7 Conclusions 
 
 The competencies analysis carried out above underlines the major role the 
national authorities play in the management and implementation of the regional 
development policy in Romania. This conclusion validates our hypothesis, presented in 
the introductory chapter, that Romania practices at this moment a type one of regional 
development as presented in Claval 1998.     
 As cumulus of competencies, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has a 
paramount position in the management and implementation of the Regional Operational 
Programme, through three departments: 1. the Authority for the Coordination of 
Structural Instruments, 2. the Certifying and Paying Authority and 3. the Central 
Harmonizing Unit for Public Internal Audit (CHUPIA).  
 
146 see Annex no 9 
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 As the ACIS elaborated the National Development Plan 2007-2013 and 
coordinated the entire process of OPs drafting it influenced significantly this process. 
The evaluation competency is concentrated at ACIS level as well, in the Evaluation 
Central Unit, which coordinates the evaluation activities carried out at NSRF level, 
supports the activity of the ROP Evaluation Unit and takes appropriate measures to 
strengthen the evaluation capacity of both demand and supply side in Romania. One 
ACIS representative is a voting member of the ROP Monitoring Committee, while, for 
example, other ACIS members participate to the MC proceedings, i.e. ECU, as non-
voting member. The setting up of the SMIS and of the eligible expenditures list was 
carried as well under the close coordination of ACIS.  
 Through the Certifying and Paying Authority, the MEF plays a pivotal role in 
the financial management of the ROP, as interface between the programme level and the 
European Commission. As the disbursement principle is applied in implementing the 
structural instruments, it is of major importance that the beneficiaries receive clear 
information as regards the types of eligible expenditures, and that the RDAs and the 
Managing Authorities oversee thoroughly their application in project implementation. 
Nevertheless, if at MDPWH and RDAs level expenditures are authorised, respectively 
verified, the CPA needs to certify them in order to be able to submit payment claims to 
the European Commission.  
 
 The Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing is the central actor 
enjoying decision-making powers as regards the construction of the programme and the 
strategic choices it encompasses. It also closely manages the programme 
implementation, by mastering the first and the last links in this process: decides on the 
KAIs’/operations launching schedule, drafts the necessary documentation, and has the 
final word regarding the projects to be financed under ROP. As regards monitoring, 
although SMIS data entry is done by the RDAs, the Ministry manages the system, and 
finally uses it for the purpose of implementation reporting to the European Commission. 
It also supports the activity of and participates with full voting rights in the Monitoring 
Committee. The MDPWH also is exclusively in charge with the evaluation of the ROP. 
It plays also the most significant role from the implementation side as regards audit, 
financial management and information and publicity.  
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 The Regional Development Agencies are an institutional tool for the 
implementation of the ROP, under the management of the MDPWH. They carry out 
specific tasks as prescribed by the Managing Authority, i.e. programming, evaluation, 
audit, expenditures certification, but they do not enjoy decision-making power in of 
these policy phases. Project appraisal and selection, the bulk of the implementation 
work, is carried out using external expertise, and the RDAs do not have voting rights in 
the Monitoring Committee. The RDAs do represent significant centres of technical 
expertise as regards implementation of a series of regional development measures, but 
in terms of regional development as such, further than being able to carry out the 
analysis of the socio-economic situation in the region, the SWOT analysis, and, to set 
up a list of development priorities based on these analyses, they make little difference. 
 
 Even less difference make the other institutions set up for regional development 
in Romania, respectively the National Board for Regional Development and the 
Regional Development Boards. Their role actually decreased in comparison with the 
Phare ESC Component. The former was only consulted during the ROP elaboration, 
while the latter’s position decreased as members of the Monitoring Committee. Even if 
they have voting rights as members of this committee, given its limited role, and 
especially the fact that it does not approve the projects anymore, the competencies of 
the RDB are significantly reduced. Further than approving the Regional Development 
Plan, they do not seem to carry out any of their tasks as regulated by the Law on 
Regional Development no. 315/2004.   
 
 One may say that the RCSECs compensate for the power lost of the RDBs, but 
this happens to a very limited extend, as they have a different composition and different 
attributions. The purpose of their setting up, i.e. assuring the coherence among different 
interventions, financed from different programmes, EU or/and national, carried out at 
regional level, would have served tremendously to regional development; nevertheless, 
as the scope of the RCSEC competences is limited to the ROP and not to all 
programmes and interventions, its decision will not have a significant impact on the 
“regionalisation” of development policy in Romania.   
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The concepts of regional development, regionalization, regionalism in all 
aspects, i.e. institutional, cultural-historical/identity, socio-economic etc., represented 
the starting point for this research project. Nevertheless, considering the intimate link 
between regional development in Romania and the Regional, nowadays Cohesion, 
Policy of the European Union, the regional development process in this country could 
be analyzed only in the context of this European Policy. As the timeframe covered by 
this material stretches from 1998, when the first measures for setting up a regional level 
were taken, until nowadays, when this regional framework is (at least for the next 5 
years) settled, conclusions on both this evolution and on the perspective for this process 
can be drawn.   
 
As presented in the introductory chapter, this research project sought to analyse  
? to what extent the Romanian regional development policy-making 
system is organised in and functions at several levels,  
? which are the most significant institutions involved and  
? at which level they enjoy more decision making power vis-à-vis the SIs 
programming, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, financial 
management and control, and audit.  
The focus of the research was on the role played by the regional institutions, i.e. 
the Regional Development Agencies and Regional Development Boards, in the 
framework of the regional development policy in Romania as defined here, respectively 
the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion Component and the Regional Operational 
Programme. The analysis was based on a methodology derived from Multi-Level 
Governance theory, as developed by Gary Marks and Lisbeth Hooghe. The choice of 
the MLG theory for this analysis is justified by the fact that it is not enough to analyse 
the existing regional institutions and their formal competences in a vacuum; in order to 
draw a valid conclusion on the weight of the regional actors in the framework of the 
regional development policy, these institutions need to be seen against the background 
of the entire picture   and in their relationship with all the other institutions/layers in this 
policy. 
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1. Type of MLG in Romania  
 
On the basis of the theoretical model for multi-level governance developed by 
Gary Marks and Lisbet Hooghe, the Romanian governance system, as a whole, 
represents a type I of MLG. A limited number of jurisdictions, nested as “Russian 
dolls”147, fulfil a series of functions, shared and/or divided specifically for each policy, 
i.e. national level/central government; county level/county councils, prefects; 
municipalities level-city/commune council, mayors. Although a series of bodies 
function at a regional level, these institutions are not directly (at regional level) 
politically legitimised and limit their activity to a large extend to the implementation of 
the regional development programmes set up at central level, while the regions are not 
administrative-territorial units. Therefore, this structure chosen for the implementation 
of the pre-accession and Structural Instruments in Romania cannot be considered as 
embodying a regional governance layer.  
  
2. Upward diffusion of authority  
 
The steering process in Romania has been already been influenced by the 
international “trend” towards diffusion of central authority to higher layers. This 
transfer process has taken place in parallel, and as a consequence of the efforts Romania 
has made, after 1990, to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures. In this context 
NATO and the European Union have had the strongest influence on the Romanian 
policy and decision-making actions, influence/penetration sealed once Romania became 
a member of these two international organisations.   
The particular power position the European Union/Commission has enjoyed in 
regional development has been assured by the accession talks and the negotiations 
taking place on Chapter 21 „Regional policy and the coordination of structural 
instruments”, and, after 1st of January 2007, by being the initiator and ultimate 
coordinator of EU Cohesion Policy implementation.  
The enlargement talks had a particular objective, namely to bring Romania to a 
level which would allow it to become a member of the EU, mainly through the 
 
147 As concluded in the chapter 3, although the Constitution declares the administrative-territorial levels 
of governance as autonomous, acting independently from each other, in practice the lower local level, 
especially the small towns and the communes, still find themselves in a subordinate position in relation to 
central government.   
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transposition of the acquis communautaire into national legislation and its 
implementation; during these talks the areas where measures needed to be taken  by the 
Romanian government with this purpose were identified; subsequently, the EU provided 
financial support to the Romanian authorities to implement these measures. Although 
the term “negotiations” is used “sui generis” to describe this process, Romania had 
limited “espace de manoeuvre” in this framework, as its membership was conditional 
on the fulfilment of the established enlargement criteria. In this process the European 
institutions, especially the European Commission and the Council, ultimately, the 
European Parliament as well, enjoyed an almost absolute decision-making power.    
Narrowing down to regional development, this axiom applies to both the Phare 
ESC Component, as part of the PHARE National pre-accession support programme, and 
the Structural Instruments/ Regional Operational Programme, as their financing 
depended fully on the approval of the European Commission of the plans and 
programmes developed for their implementation, plan and programmes comprising also 
a detailed description of the institutional arrangements put in place for this.  
As substantiated in the fourth chapter, in the context of the Phare ECS Cohesion, 
the European Union decided, firstly, the total budget to be allocated to Romania, and its 
detailed distribution, through the Sector and Project Fiches. The competency of finally 
approving these fiches also marks the significant role of the Commission in the pre-
accession aid programming phase, which was finalised in 2007 (the latest programming 
exercise being carried out for the Transition Facility).     
As regards the other phases of the policy cycle, i.e. implementation (including 
contracting), monitoring, evaluation and audit, the shift from DIS, Decentralised 
Implementation System, to EDIS, the Extended Decentralised Implementation System 
implied the waiving of ex-ante control by the European Commission/Delegation during 
implementation, and the full decentralisation of the monitoring competence and interim 
evaluation. 
Under DIS, the European Commission/Delegation endorsed all documents 
circulated in the implementation phase: project evaluation reports, project contracts, 
changes in the project fiches etc., while under EDIS the Implementing Agencies, i.e. the 
Romanian Ministries, bear the full responsibility of implementation. The same is true 
for the monitoring of reports, which are endorsed by the Commission/Delegation and 
discussed in the Sectoral Sub-Monitoring Committees and in the Joint Monitoring 
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Committee. Under EDIS, the Commission/Representation participates as observers in 
these committees.  
As regards evaluation, the shift to EDIS involved transferring the responsibility 
of the interim evaluation of the Phare programme to the National Aid Coordinator; 
nevertheless, the Commission still enjoys ex-post competencies, regarding both 
evaluation and audit, a competency which, for the implementation phase, is still shared 
with the Implementing Agencies and the Romanian Court of Account/Audit Authority. 
Regarding audit, the Commission has the last word on financial matters, as the requests 
for payment submitted by the NAO are finally paid by DG Regio.          
The initial idea as regards the shift to EDIS was for the Romanian authorities to 
be able to manage for a while Cohesion Policy-like programmes on their own, without 
the co-responsibility of the Commission/Delegation, in order to practice their skills in 
the managing and implementation of the real SIs. As the programming and 
implementation of Phare 2004 ESC overlap to a large extend with the Regional 
Operational Programme, and the EDIS was granted to the Ministry of Development at 
the very end of 2006, this intermediate phase did not take place.       
With the Regional Operational Programme, the European Union again enjoys 
significant decision-making power. As regards the budget as such, the central idea 
regarding the funds allocated was not their amount, in the sense that the Romanian side 
would have argued to receive more, but the absorption of what was already allocated to 
the country. The negotiations with the Commission in this sense were carried out not on 
the amounts, but on the priority axis and the key areas of intervention, and on the 
institutional arrangements and competency distributions which would assure the 
efficient and effective implementation of the funds. Nevertheless, in comparison with 
the Phare ESC, especially in its DIS period, the Commission, even if it decided on the 
NSFR and the OPs, does not have any decision-making rights as regards the specific 
projects to be implemented (with the exception of major projects). Beyond 
implementation, the Commission also has less power especially as regards monitoring 
and evaluation, but also audit. The strongest formal tool the Commission still has is the 
audit competency, and, related to this, the possibility of not reimbursing funds if the 
projects were not implemented according to the rules, especially those on eligible 
expenditures. Informally, since for Romania this is the first programming period in 
which Structural Instruments are being implemented, most probably the “dependancy” 
on the Commission guidance and assistance is still significant, and this leaves an open 
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door for more interference and for the influence of the European level in the national 
affairs.   
The shift from Phare ESC to Regional Operational Programme involves a 
decrease of the European Commission power; nevertheless, as we will see further, the 
main beneficiary of this transfer is the central government, and not the regional 
institutions or the local governance level.     
       
3. Downward diffusion of authority – regional and local dimension 
 
As narrowed down in the introductory chapter, the Phare Economic and Social 
Cohesion Component and the Regional Operational Programme embody regional 
development policy in Romania. As presented in chapter five, two other OPs, i.e. the 
Human Resources Development OP and the Environment OP, and the National Rural 
Development Plan have regional intermediate bodies, but these are deconcentrated 
institutions, acting under the subordination of the Ministry/MA.    
 
In the framework of the Phare ESC Component, the RDAs fulfil the 
Implementation Authority role for a part of the Phare ESC priorities. The competencies 
of the RDAs are mainly limited to project implementation (appraisal and selection, 
monitoring, control). They do contribute to the programming phase, but indirectly; the 
Regional Development Plans elaborated by the RDAs served as a source for the 
National Development Plans, and the Phare ESC priorities were decided by the 
MEI/MDPWH with the European Commission taking into account the RDPs priorities, 
but not reflecting them completely.  
The Regional Development Boards do enjoy decision-making rights both in the 
programming and implementation of the Phare ESC, since they approve the RDPs and 
the lists of projects appraised and selected by the RDAs. As their representatives are 
members in the NBRD, they also approved the National Development Plans. 
Nevertheless, we should underline the fact that these boards are composed of 
representatives of the local authorities, mostly promoting their local interest. As 
repeatedly mentioned, the National Board for Regional Development hasn’t been very 
successful in carrying out its strategic tasks related to the promotion of regional 
development. Its role was limited to the approval of the National Development Plan, of 
the appraisal and selection criteria for the Phare ESC and of the large infrastructure and 
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HRD projects; as a consequence, it was convened rarely, mainly when it needed to 
exercise these formal competencies.    
 
As concluded in the fourth chapter, if we compare the pre-accession period with 
the 2007-2013 programming period, the Phare ESC represents rather a predecessor of 
the National Strategic Reference Framework 2007-2013 than of the Regional 
Operational Programme 2007-2013. Despite the fact that the sums the 
MDPWH/RDAs/RDBs implement between 2007-2013 are considerably higher than the 
budget of the Phare ESC, the role of the institutions responsible for regional 
development in Romania, at both regional (RDBs) and national level (NBRD), 
decreased as regards the management and implementation of the NSRF/Structural 
Instruments, in terms of their weight in policy elaboration and implementation. Their 
responsibilities are limited to the Regional Operational Programme, which deploys 20% 
of the total allocated funds; within the ROP delivery system, the role of the RDAs 
remain, more or less, the same, but some of the competencies of the RDBs are taken 
over by the MDPWH as the Managing Authority (project approval, see further).                  
  
 The Regional Development Agencies remain an institutional tool for the 
implementation of the ROP, under the management of the MDPWH. They carry out 
specific tasks as prescribed by the Managing Authority, i.e. programming, evaluation, 
audit, expenditures certification, but they do not enjoy decision-making power in any of 
these policy phases. Project appraisal and selection and the bulk of the implementation 
work, is outsourced, and the RDAs do not have voting rights in the Monitoring 
Committee. The Agencies do represent significant centres of technical expertise as 
regards implementation of a series of regional development measures, but in terms of 
regional development as such, beyond being able to carry out the analysis of the socio-
economic situation in the region, the SWOT analysis, and establishing a list of 
development priorities based on these analyses, they make little difference. As 
underlined in the fourth and fifth chapters, the Regional Development Plans, including 
the ones drafted for the 2007-2013 programming period, stop at establishing the 
strategy, and do not contain detailed information on the RDPs financing sources, on the 
implementation, monitoring and the delivery system of the plan.  
 The other institutions set up for regional development in Romania make even 
less difference. These are the National Board for Regional Development and the 
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Regional Development Boards. The former was only (formally) consulted during the 
ROP elaboration and it did not approve the National Development Plan 2007-2013; the 
National Coordination Committee took over this competence after 2004. The position of 
the RDBs became less prominent as members of the Monitoring Committee. Even if 
they have voting rights as members of this committee, given its limited role, and 
especially the fact that it does not approve the projects anymore, the competencies of 
the RDB are significantly reduced. Further than approving the Regional Development 
Plans, they do not seem to carry out any of their tasks as regulated by the Law on 
Regional Development no. 315/2004.   
 
The Regional Committees for Strategic Evaluation and Correlation could have 
made a tremendous contribution to the synchronisation of all interventions from 
different OPs in the region, and, consequently, could have created a sound base for 
genuine regional development. This would have been necessary, as the Regional 
Development Plans are only partially financed through the ROP, the rest necessitating 
interventions from other OPs; nevertheless, as the RCSEC was attributed decision 
making power only as regards the projects financed from the ROP and not for all  public 
interventions in the region, its decision will not have a significant impact on the 
“regionalisation” of development policy in Romania.   
 
Law no. 315/2004 on regional development creates a framework and the 
institutions for regional development strategies, plans and programmes to be elaborated, 
managed and implemented. In practice, this regional development policy comes down 
to the Regional Operational Programme, and the institutional structures and 
competences arrangements related to this OP, which depart, to a certain extent, from the 
legal framework.  
 
The local authorities at both levels, counties and (rural and urban) 
municipalities, are involved in regional development policy directly, as members of the 
Regional Development Boards (nevertheless, this is valid only for some of the 
representatives in each county), and indirectly, as beneficiaries of the funding. As 
members of the RDB, they act mostly in their local interest, and less for the “good” of 
the development region as such. As beneficiaries of funds, they need to possess solid 
knowledge on planning and programming, project management and technical, content-
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related expertise in the fields where they try to invest. They also should have the 
financial capacity to finance or co-finance these programmes/projects, and most 
importantly, the will to do so. 
As presented in the third chapter, in the most recent years several measures have 
been taken in order to strengthen the capacity of local administration, from both 
planning/technical and financial points of view. These measures didn’t have the 
necessary impact. Therefore, in 2006 a new package of laws on local public 
administration was passed. These laws resolve certain shortcomings of the previous 
arrangements, especially as regards the budgetary distribution to the local levels, and 
offer local administration important tools to stimulate them to plan and induce socio-
economic development in the territory under their jurisdiction, but the impact of these 
new laws is not known, yet. 
Further than the central government position on the issue of regionalisation, the 
important role the counties, the superior tier of the local administration in Romania, 
play in both the governing process and the population mental framework, will act as a 
brake on a process of regionalisation which will imply shifting up powers from the 
county to the regional level.     
 
4. The central governance level and its role in regional development in 
Romania  
 
All three core chapters of this research project (III, IV, V) revealed the strong 
position of power the central government enjoys, from both a formal and an informal 
point of view, in the framework of regional development policy. The informal 
characteristics of the governance and administrative act in Romania presented in chapter 
three reinforce this balance of power. Although the local administrative levels are, 
formally, autonomous and not subordinated to the central levels, in practice this 
subordination is, to a large extent, still the case. The political actors ensure this 
dependency, of administration from politics and of local levels from the influence of 
central government. The impact of the recent measures which should strengthen the 
capacity and position of the local administration is still not known. Nevertheless, taking 
into account the “incremental” rhythm of the administrative reform process in the last 
years, and the fact that cultural factors change only in long term, we can expect that this 
process will be completed in the best case in the long run (20 years) and on the 
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assumption that the political actors, at all levels, will agree on and implement the 
necessary measures to achieve this goal.               
 
In the framework of the Phare ESC Component, the Ministry of Public 
Finance/Ministry of Economy and Finance concentrated, especially after 2004, a 
significant number of competences:  
? programming, monitoring, evaluation, through the National Aid 
Coordinator,  
? financial management and control, through the National Authorising 
Officer, and partially  
? audit, through the internal audit structure.  
After the shift from DIS to EDIS took place, the MEF was fully in charge of the 
monitoring and evaluation of Phare National Programme (including Phare ESC). 
In respect to the ROP, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has a paramount 
position, through three departments: the Authority for the Coordination of Structural 
Instruments, the Certifying and Paying Authority and the Central Harmonizing Unit 
for Public Internal Audit (CHUPIA).  
 As the ACIS elaborated the National Development Plan 2007-2013 and 
coordinated the entire process of OPs drafting, it significantly influenced this process. 
The evaluation competency is concentrated at ACIS level as well, in the Evaluation 
Central Unit, which coordinates the evaluation activities carried out at NSRF level, 
supports the activity of the ROP Evaluation Unit and takes the appropriate measures to 
strengthen the evaluation capacity of both programme evaluation demand and supply 
side in Romania. One ACIS representative is a voting member of the ROP Monitoring 
Committee, while, for example, other ACIS members participate in the MC 
proceedings, i.e. ECU, as non-voting member. The setting up of the SMIS and of the 
eligible expenditures list was also carried out under the close coordination of ACIS.  
 Through the Certifying and Paying Authority, the MEF plays a pivotal role in 
the financial management of the ROP, as interface between the programme level and the 
European Commission. As the disbursement principle is applied in implementing the 
structural instruments, it is of major importance that the beneficiaries receive clear 
information as regards the types of eligible expenditures, and that the RDAs and the 
Managing Authorities oversee thoroughly their application in project implementation. 
Nevertheless, if at MDPWH and RDAs level expenditures are authorised and verified, 
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the CPA needs to certify them in order to be able to submit payment claims to the 
European Commission.  
 The Central Harmonizing Unit for Public Internal Audit (CHUPIA) plays an 
important role at national level as regards the audit function, together with the Audit 
Authority.   
  
The Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Development, Public Works 
and Housing was, for one year (2004), the most important institution for the Phare 
ESC, as in this year both the National Aid Coordinator and the Implementing Agency 
for Phare ESC acted in its framework. After 2004 the MIE preserved only the later 
position; the elaboration of the National Development Plan competency left the MEI 
together with the NAC; in this context, the MEI/MDPWH  remained responsible for the 
drafting of the Phare Programming Document 2004-6, under the coordination of the 
Ministry of Public Finance/NAC. The MEI/MDPHW bears the final responsibility as 
regards the technical and financial implementation of the Phare ESC 2004-2006. 
In its role as Implementing Agency, the MEI/MDPWH enjoys decision-making 
rights in all phases of the policy cycle: it coordinates the drafting of the RDPs, and 
elaborates the Phare ESC Programming Documents, it sets up the project appraisal and 
selection mechanism, it launches the measures/calls for proposals, it approves the list of 
projects selected by the RDAs and it coordinates the monitoring and the financial 
management of the component. It acted, in these respects, very much as a Managing 
Authority of an Operational Programme under the EU Cohesion Policy.         
 In respect to the ROP, the MDPWH represents the central actor enjoying 
decision-making powers as regards the construction of the programme and the strategic 
choices it encompasses. It also closely manages the programme implementation, by 
mastering the first and the last links in this process: decides on the KAIs’/operations 
launching schedule, drafts the necessary documentation, i.e. appraisal and selection 
criteria, the applicants guide, and has the final word regarding the projects to be 
financed under the ROP. As regards monitoring, although SMIS data entry is done by 
the RDAs, the Ministry manages the system, and finally uses it for the purpose of 
implementation reporting to the European Commission. It also supports the activity of 
and participates with full voting rights in the Monitoring Committee. The MDPWH also 
is exclusively in charge with the evaluation of the ROP. It plays also the most 
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significant role from the implementation side as regards audit, financial management 
and information and publicity.  
 
Comparing the two periods and policies, we could say that the framework for 
the implementation of structural instruments as a whole witnesses a “decentralising” 
movement. Firstly, as previously explained, the role of the European Commission 
decreased; secondly, the Managing Authorities and their competencies were clearly 
established by law, while within the Phare ESC Component they were “ministries 
technically responsible” for different ESC measures, falling outside the “institutional 
roles” created for the management and implementation of this component, i.e. 
Implementing Authorities or Agencies. The Ministries took over some competencies 
from the coordination level: monitoring and partially, evaluation. Nevertheless, this 
“decentralisation” is rather a clarification and re-arranging  process, at central level, 
of the institutions in charge of European funds, and stopped at central government 
level; the regional level was actually slightly striped of some of its competencies under 
the Phare ESC, i.e. the project approval competency was fully taken over by the 
Ministry of Development.        
 
As Hooge&Marks state, “a weighted measure of multi-level governance must 
take account of formal and informal power relations among jurisdictions” 
(Hooghe&Marks, 2001a:2). The analysis of the formal relationship between 
jurisdictional levels proved the centrality of the institutional system in place for the 
implementation of regional development policy. The presentation of the public 
administration history, culture, and “modus operandi”, without bringing direct evidence 
of systemic malfunctioning, supports and even strengthens the conclusion of the formal 
analysis. The central authorities exercise, through political and administrative channels, 
a strong influence on local authorities, which are, in their turn, paternalistic and display 
a rent-seeking behaviour. The principles of “local autonomy” and “decentralisation” 
still need some time to become the real basis for the public administration organisation 
in Romania and for the relationship between its layers.        
 
5. Path dependency issue in regional development in Romania 
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Hooghe and Marks assert that, in a type I MLG system, the barriers to change in 
the distribution of jurisdictions or of competences inside a jurisdiction are very high 
(see the last paragraph of the point 3 of these conclusions, as well, page 179). Two 
things should happen in order to create a new jurisdiction. Firstly, reformers must 
coordinate to bring the change about. Secondly, they must overcome whatever 
decisional barriers stand in their way (Hooghe&Marks, 2001a:15). The more rooted a 
jurisdiction is in other institutions, the higher the barriers to change, and since the  
decision to “give away” competencies is taken by the actors in power, interests already 
organized and vested in established jurisdictions will benefit from this power shift. 
Therefore, a level of governance, once established, is likely to behave as a magnet for 
additional competencies, even if this is not optimal from a pure efficiency standpoint. 
Path dependency arises due to increasing returns to concentration of competencies in 
existing jurisdictions (Hooghe&Marks, 2001a, 16).  
This assertion is verified in the case of regional development policy in Romania. 
On one side, the regional development-related new competencies were assigned to 
already strong institutions involved in the development process, i.e. the Regional 
Development Boards are formed of representatives of local administrations, while the 
National Board for Regional Development brings together the representatives of the 
RDBs, and consequently, of the counties. It is interesting as well to see that the 
presidency of the RDB is assured by the county councils presidents only, and not at all 
by mayors; this arrangement reinforces and strengthens the power position of the 
counties as regards RD at both regional and national level.       
As regard the development regions as such, although they were set up 
artificially, as agreements between counties, they create a dangerous precedent. 
Currently, these regions constitute the basis for the regional implementation of the 
Human Resources Development and Environment OPs and, to a certain extent, of the 
National Plan for Rural Development. This “path dependacy” will perpetuate, and 
diminish the chances for a genuine regional territorial organisation to take place, on a 
scientific base.       
 
6. Regional development in Romania     
 
More than ten years ago, the “Green Book on Regionalisation” and the 
subsequent legislation created the first framework for regional development in 
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Romania. The development regions were defined and the institutions in charge of 
regional development policy at both national and regional level were created. Since 
then, these institutions have exercised their competencies on this legal basis, in the 
framework of development policies which subscribed to other rules as well, i.e. the 
Phare programme and Cohesion Policy programmes. Becoming a member of  the 
European Union is indisputably the most important factor that determined the creation 
of regional structures. 
These ten years haven’t witnessed significant changes as regards regional 
development in Romania. A second law on regional development refined and updated 
the existing arrangements in order for these to correspond to EU requirements, i.e. 
especially as regards the NUTS II regions. Towards January 2007 the structure of the 
SIs management and implementation system was clarified: since the EU structural funds 
are invested in a large series of national development priorities, they are managed by 
different ministries through nation-wide programmes; the Ministry of Development and 
the RDAs, RDBs and the NBRD remain responsible for one of the 7 Operational 
Programmes, which embodies the Romanian regional development policy.  
From the point of view of administrative-territorial organisation, the 8 
development regions are not administrative-territorial units and they do not have 
juridical personality; they represent agreements between counties, created for the 
elaboration, implementation and evaluation of the regional development policies, and 
for data collection at NUTS II level; while regional identity was not among the factors 
which led to their definition. At the same time, no genuine regional government is in 
place, legitimated politically by elections at regional level, with the power to collect and 
spend taxes in the regions, eventually through socio-economic development 
programmes. Regional development plans are drafted, but they have a limited impact, as 
the RDAs are in charge only of the implementation of those RDPs priorities financed 
through the ROP, and no mechanism exists for monitoring and evaluation of the results 
and impact of the each OP interventions at regional level. The socio-economic evolution 
of the regions will be analysed again for the future programming period, 2014-2020, but 
it will be difficult 1. to accurately asses which interventions had a direct impact, 
positive or negative, on the development of the regions, and 2. to adopt, adjustment 
measures until that period,  to counteract the negative effects of certain interventions in 
terms of regional disparities. For example, more than half of the SOP Transport 2007-
20013 budget will be directed at the motorways, the related national road infrastructure 
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and railways in the north-western part of Romania. These investments will have a clear 
positive impact on the development of Transylvania, which already registers a 
competitive edge in comparison with Moldova, and the Regional Operational 
Programme won’t be able to counteract this development, although it takes into account 
the existing regional disparities in allocating funds to regions.              
Despite the choices made as regards the particular characteristics of the regions, 
of the regional institutions and of the regional development policy, the current 
arrangements represent a starting point, a good base on which the decision-makers 
could genuinely rethink and implement socio-economic development in terms of the 
territorial level where investments can bring the best returns. Nevertheless, setting up a 
new, regional, governmental tier in Romania needs to overcome considerable obstacles, 
and the very first of them is the political will to induce such a change. The next 
programming period, 2014-2020, might constitute an impetus for more regionalisation. 
It will be, firstly, up to the Romanian government to “regionalise” some of the future 
Operational Programmes148, starting with the two OPs which are already implemented 
partially at regional level, i.e. Human Resources Development OP and Environment OP, 
or even to prepare 8 integrated regional development programmes. If the European 
Commission is convinced of the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach, and of 
the capacity of the institutions responsible for the programmes implementation, it will 
most probably agree with some more regionalised national OPs or 8 regional 
development programmes. But, as Romania is a full member of the EU, it will be up to 
her to decide on the future of regional development within its boundaries, and the odds 
are not in favour of such a development. It is commonly agreed that regionalisation 
enters the politicians’ reforming agenda at the moment when the other major political 
and economic problems have been resolved. Most probably in 2010-2011, when the 
preparations for the new programming period starts, absorption rates, and growth and 
jobs will still represent priorities for both the European Commission and the Romanian 
Government, therefore, an efficient and practical implementation system for the SIs will 
still be preferred to a major overhaul of the administrative-territorial organisation and to 
significant competency shifts, with possibly unpredictable consequences.      
 
 
 
 
148 This is not possible in the case of the SOP Transport, for example, which, it is already known, will 
continue to focus on major, nation-wide infrastructure projects. 
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Further possible research topics 
 
 
1. “Efficient” regionalisation options (if any) for Romania: as repeatedly underlined, 
regionalisation was carried out in this specific form in Romania in order to comply with 
the EU requirements regarding the SIs implementation. Nevertheless, the necessity of 
genuine regionalisation, i.e. the setting up of a regional government with tax-and spend 
power and related competencies to offer public services to the members of its 
jurisdiction and foster regional socio-economic development), needs to be investigated. 
In this sense, the core research question could be: at which level could a series of/all 
public services, including socio-economic development, be more efficiently offered in 
Romania, in the current setting? Would a regional governance level be (more) 
appropriate in this sense, in terms of cost-efficiency?            
 
2. The issue of setting up genuine regions connects to the previous proposed topic. As 
underpinning element for a future regionalisation process in Romania, the development 
regions need to be re-defined, by taking into account a complete set of economic, 
geographic, historic and socio-cultural criteria.  
 
3. During the empirical research carried out at regional level, slight differences among 
regions could be identified as regards the manner in which regional development is 
perceived and pursued by the local authorities and the regional institutions involved. For 
example, in the West Region, in Timisoara, the local authorities were more focused on 
local development, especially at municipal level, as they had more financial (internal 
and external) resources. In this context, the role of the RDA did not seem significant, as 
a source for development projects. A different situation was visible in the North-East 
Region. As the RDA was an important source of funds for the local projects, it enjoyed 
a stronger power position. In would be interesting to find out which are the explanatory 
variables for this different behaviour, and their impact on regional development  as such 
(if any).     
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4. Monitoring the activity of the Regional Committees for Correlation and Strategic 
Evaluation might prove to be very interesting for the future of regional development in 
Romania and conducting analysis to see if this activity has an impact on the 
implementation of the Regional Development Plan and ultimately, for regional 
development as such.   
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1. The institutional “loci” of the National Aid Coordinator and of the 
competencies  related to regional development  
 
 
Year 
 
National Aid Coordinator Year 
 
Regional Development 
competencies 
1998 Department of European 
Integration 
The Government of 
Romania 
1998-2002 National Agency for 
Regional Development  
1999-2000 Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Department of European 
Integration 
2002-2003 Ministry of Development 
and Prognosis 
2001-2004 Ministry of European 
Integration 
2003-2007 Ministry of European 
Integration 
2004-2007 Ministry of Finance 
DG Managing Authority for 
the Community Support 
Framework 
2007-onwards Ministry of Development, 
Public Works and 
Housing 
2007-
onwards 
Ministry of Economy and 
Finance 
  
DG Authority for the 
Coordination of Structural 
Instruments 
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Annex 2.  The composition of the Regional Development Board, North-West 
 Region 
 
 
1. Presidents of all 7 County Councils in the region  
 
Bihor County:   Mr. Alexandru Kiss 
Bistrita Nasaud County: Mr. Gheorghe Marinescu 
Cluj County:   Mr. Marius Petre Nicoara  
Salaj County:   Mr. Tiberiu Marc 
Maramures County:  Mr. Kovacs Marinel 
Satu-Mare County:  Mr. Stefan Szabo 
 
 
2. One representative of the capital (municipiu) city councils  for each county  
 
Bihor County:   Mr. Filip Petru, Mayor Oradea 
Bistrita Nasaud County: Mr. Vasile Moldovan,  Mayor Bistrita 
Cluj County:   Mr. Emil Boc, Mayor Cluj-Napoca 
Salaj County:   Mr. Radu Capalnasiu, Mayor Zalau 
Maramures County:  Mr. Cristian Anghel, Mayor Baia Mare 
Satu-Mare County:  Mr. Iuliu Ilyes, Mayor Satu Mare 
 
 
3. One representative of the city councils in each county 
 
Bihor County:   Mr. Kovacs Zoltan, Mayor Valea lui Mihai 
Bistrita Nasaud County: Mr. Nicolae Moldovan,  Mayor Beclean 
Cluj County:   Mr. Nicolae Chis, Mayor Huedin 
Salaj County:   Mr. Augustin Borz, Mayor Primar Jibou 
Maramures County:  Mr. Anton Ardelean, Mayor Tautii Magheraus 
Satu-Mare County:  Mr. Nicolae Bura, Mayor Negresti Oas 
 
 
4. One representative of the communes in each county 
 
Bihor County:   Mr. Dorel Cosma, Mayor Vadul Crisului 
Bistrita Nasaud County: Mr. Sangeorzan Stefan, Mayor Feldru 
Cluj County:   Mr. Dumitru Sfarlea, Mayor Gilau 
Salaj County:   Mr. Emeric Pop, Mayor Crasna 
Maramures County:  Mr. Pasere Ioan, Mayor Stramtura 
Satu-Mare County:  Mr. Dumitru Dorel Pop, Mayor Odoreu 
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Annex 3.  Institutional Architecture Phare 2001, ESC Component 
Programme 
Component 
Implementing 
Agency 
(contracting,  
payments and 
financial control 
(1) 
Authority approving the selected projects 
(Project selection mechanism) 
N.B. Representatives of line ministries are not voting 
members in the regional selection committees 
(2) 
Implementing 
Authority 
(Technical 
Implementation and 
monitoring) 
(3) 
Line Ministries technically competent 
(Steering Commitee) 
Grant Schemes for 
SMEs (A) 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
Regional Development Board 
(Local open calls 
Regional Selection Committees including RDAs, 
representatives of MoSMEC, independent evaluators, 
observers from MDP, MEI, EC Delegation) 
RDA Ministry of SMEs and Co-operatives 
(MDP, RDAs, MoSMEC, Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity, 
Ministry of Water and Environmental Protection) 
Modernisation of 
vocational schools 
(B) 
(works and supply) 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
Regional Development Board 
(Regional Consortia led by RDAs will select the schools 
and identify needs) 
MDP (works) 
Ministry of Education 
and Research (supply) 
Ministry of Education and Research 
(MDP, RDAs, MoER, MoLSS) 
Social Services 
(C) 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
Regional Development Board 
(Local open calls 
Regional Selection Committees including RDAs, 
representatives of MoSMEC, independent evaluators, 
observers from MDP, MEI, EC Delegation) 
RDAs Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity 
(MDP, RDAs, MoER, MoLSS)  
Regional 
Infrastructures  
(D) 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
National Board for Regional Development 
(Maturity and impact of projects appraised at regional 
level 
List of projects approved by RDBs 
Final approval of NBRD based on RDB approval 
RDAs 
National Authority for 
Roads for national 
roads 
Ministry of  Transport, National Authority for Roads, Ministry of 
Tourism, Ministry of Environment, (MDP, RDAs, Ministry of Public 
Works, Transport and Dwellings, Ministry of Water and 
Environment Protection, Ministry of Tourism) 
Small scale 
infrastructure 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
Regional Development Board 
(Local open calls 
Regional Selection Committees including RDAs, 
representatives of MoSMEC, independent evaluators, 
observers from MDP, MEI, EC Delegation) 
RDAs Steering Committee: MDP, RDAs, Ministry of Public Works, 
Ministry of Water and Environment Protection, Ministry of Tourism) 
(E) 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
 Technical 
Assistance 
(F) 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
RDAs 
 
Source: 2001 Financing Memorandum, page 47 
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Annex 4:  Institutional Arhitecture, Phare 2002, ESC Component 
Programme Component Implementing 
Agency, contracting 
authority and 
paying agency (1) 
Authority approving the selected projects (Project 
selection mechanism) (2) 
Implementing 
Authority (3) 
Line Ministries technically Competent 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
  Phare ESC Steering Committee 
(Ministry of Public Finance, Ministry of Education and Research,  
Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity, National Agency for 
Employment, Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Dwellings, 
National Administration of Roads, Ministry of Water and 
Environmental Protection, Ministry of Public Administration, 
National Centre for vocational and technical education, Ministry of 
European Integration, ED Delegation, other relevant administrative 
bodies identified at national level for each measure) 
Economic and Social 
cohesion programmes 
(Investment) 
Modernisation of 
vocational schools (A) 
(works and supply) 
 Regional Development Board 
(Regional Consortia chaired by RDAs will identify 
needs, assess the application and nominate members in 
the regional selection committee) 
MDP (works) 
Ministry of Education 
and Research (supply) 
Ministry of Education and Research 
Human Resources (B)  Regional Development Board 
(Regional Consortia chaired by RDAs will identify 
needs, assess the application and nominate members in 
the regional selection committee) 
RDAs Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity and the National Agency 
for Employment 
Regional Infrastructures 
(C1) 
 National Board for Regional Development 
(Maturity and impact of projects appraised at regional 
level 
List of projects approved by RDBs 
Final approval of NBRD based on RDB approval) 
RDAs 
National Authority for 
Roads for national 
roads 
Ministry of  Transport, National Authority for Roads, Ministry of 
Tourism, Ministry of Environment, (MDP, RDAs, Ministry of Public 
Works, Transport and Dwellings, Ministry of Water and 
Environment Protection, Ministry of Tourism)  
SAMTID (C2)  SAMTID Steering Committee  Ministry of Public 
Administration 
Ministry of Public Administration, Ministry of Public Finance, 
Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Water and Environment 
Protection 
Technical Assistance   Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
 
RDAs 
Institution Building 
 
Technical Assistance 
Twinning 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Prognosis 
 
Source: Phare 2002 National Programme, page 73 
Concerned Ministries 
and Regional 
Development Agencies 
Concerned Ministries 
(beneficiaries) 
 
Annex 5:  Institutional Architecture, Phare 2003, ESC Component 
 
Programme 
Component 
Implementing 
Agency, contracting 
authority and 
paying agency (1) 
Authority approving the selected projects (Project 
selection mechanism) (2) 
Implementing 
Authority (3) 
Line Ministries technically competent 
Economic and 
Social cohesion 
programmes 
(investment) 
Ministry of European 
Integration (MEI) 
  Phare ESC Steering Committee 
(Ministry of Public Finance, Ministry of Education, Research and 
Youth,  Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family, National 
Agency for Employment, Ministry of Transport, Constructions and 
Tourism, National Administration of Roads, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry, Waters and Environment, Ministry of Administration and 
Interior, National Centre for vocational and technical education, 
NAC - Ministry of European Integration, ED Delegation, other 
relevant administrative bodies identified at national level for each 
measure) 
Modernisation of 
vocational schools 
(A) 
(works and supply) 
MEI Regional Development Boards 
 
Ministry of Education , 
Research and Youth 
(supply) 
Ministry of Education, Research and Youth 
Human Resources 
(B) 
MEI Regional Development Board 
(Regional Consortia chaired by RDAs will identify 
needs, assess the application and nominate members in 
the regional selection committee) 
Ministry of Labour, 
Social Solidarity and 
Family through the 
PCU and the PIUs 
Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family and the National 
Agency for Employment 
Small-scale waste 
management 
investment scheme 
(C) 
MEI Regional Development Boards (RDAs, regional 
environmental protection inspectorates, local 
environmental protection inspectorates) 
 
RDAs 
 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Waters and Environment 
Regional 
Infrastructures 
(D1) 
MEI National Board for Regional Development/ Regional 
Development Boards 
 
(Maturity and impact of projects appraised at regional 
level 
List of projects approved by RDBs 
Final approval of NBRD based on RDB approval) 
RDAs 
 
Ministry of Transport, Constructions and Tourism  
(Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Waters and Environment) 
SAMTID (D2) MEI SAMTID Steering Committee/ National Board for 
Regional Development  
Ministry of 
Administration and 
Interior 
Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Public Finance, 
Ministry of Transport, Constructions and Tourism, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, Waters and Environment 
Business 
Development 
MEI  MEI National Agency for Small and Medium size Enterprises and Co-
operation 
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Support (E) 
Technical 
Assistance 
MEI  Ministry of European 
Integration and  
RDAs 
 
Ministry of European 
Integration 
 Concerned Ministries 
and Regional 
Development Agencies 
 Institution 
Building 
  
Ministry of Public 
Finance 
 Technical 
Assistance Concerned Ministries 
(beneficiaries)  
Twinning 
Source: 2003 Financial Memorandum, Phare National Programme, pages 52-53 
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Annex 6.  Institutional Arrangements, Phare 2004, ESC Component 
 
Programme Component Implementing Agency, 
contracting authority and 
paying agency 
(1) 
Authority approving the selected 
projects (Project selection 
mechanism) 
(2) 
Implementing Authority 
(3) 
Line Ministries 
technically 
competent 
(4) 
Priority A: 
Improving regional 
infrastructure to support 
economic development 
Measure a 
Regional and local transport 
and business infrastructure 
 
MEI for all investment projects 
MEI for classical TA, including 
PPF 
MEI for site supervision and 
subproject 4, component 
G of Priority E 
CFCU for twinning projects 
PAO: MIE 
RDBs and NBRD approve the list 
of projects 
 
RDAs 
MEI for site supervision and for RDAs 
monitoring contracts, sub-project 4, component 
G, of Priority E 
 
 
Priority B: Human 
Resource Development 
Measure a 
Tackling structural 
unemployment 
 
Measure b 
Improving long term labour 
market adaptability 
 
Measure c 
Actively combating social 
exclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure d 
Improving access to 
education and region 
MoLSSF for TA and investment 
projects 
CFCU for twinning 
PAO: MoLSSF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEI for all investment projects 
MEI for classical TA, including 
PPF 
MEI for site supervision and 
subproject 4, component 
G of Priority E 
CFCU for twinning projects 
MoLSSF/MIE/MER National Agency for Employment, PIUs at 
regional level for investment 
MoLSSF for TA and corresponding supply 
contract 
NATB for TA NQR project and for the 
corresponding supply 
National Agency for Employment, PIUs at 
regional level for investment 
MoLSSF for TA and corresponding supply 
contract 
National Agency for Employment, PIUs at 
regional level for social inclusion investment 
MoLSSF for TA and corresponding supply 
contract for social inclusion 
Specialized directorate within MoLSSF for 
social services – for TA; investment component 
will work through NAE PIUs at regional level 
RDAs for works contracts 
MEI for site supervision 
Ministry of Education, Research and Youth 
(MER), National Centre for Vocational 
education and training for TA and IT equipment 
MoLSSF/MIE/MER 
 195
specific technical and 
vocational education 
and training system 
 
 
PAO: MIE 
 
supply National Centre for pre-university 
education staff Training for sub-project 2 
Priority C: 
Development of the 
productive sector 
through support to SMEs 
196
Measure a 
SMEs support 
 
MEI for all investment projects 
MEI for classical TA, including 
PPF 
MEI for site supervision and 
subproject 4, component 
G of Priority E 
CFCU for twinning projects 
 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) for 
grant and credit schemes 
NASMEC for TA and IT supply components 
 
 
Priority D: 
Environmental protection at 
regional level 
 
Measure a 
Improving environmental 
protection at local 
and regional level 
Measure b 
SAMTID 
MEI for all investment projects 
MEI for classical TA, including 
PPF 
MEI for site supervision and 
subproject 4, component 
G of Priority E 
CFCU for twinning projects 
 
 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and 
REPAs 
MEWM for TA components 
Ministry of European Integration 
 
 
Priority E: (IB) 
Building the institutional 
structures in order to 
achieve, upon accession 
sound and efficient 
management of EU SF, and 
efficient management of 
programmes under EDIS 
Measure a 
Development of 
administrative capacities 
for Structural Funds 
management 
 CFCU, excepting for sub-project 
4, component G, 
which is financed from national 
co-financing budget of 
Priorities A and D. The Priority 
A implementation 
arrangements applies for this 
component. 
PAO: MFP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Overall coordination by MPF 
Ministry of Public Finances, Ministry of 
European Integration, RDAs, Ministry of 
Economy and Trade, Ministry of Transport, 
Constructions and Tourism, Ministry of Labour, 
Social Solidarity and Family, Ministry of 
Environment and Water Management 
 
Source : Phare Programming Document for Economic and Social Cohesion 2004-2006, page 197-8 
 
Annex 7.   Priority Axes and Key Areas of Intervention of the SOP 
Environment 
 
Priority Axis 1 Extension and modernization of water and wastewater systems 
 
KAI 1.1. Extension/modernization of water and wastewater systems  
 
Priority Axis 2 Development of integrated waste management systems and 
rehabilitation of historically contaminated sites 
 
KAI 2.1. Development of integrated waste management systems and extension of 
waste management infrastructure  
KAI 2.2. Rehabilitation of historically contaminated sites 
 
Priority Axis 3 Reduction of pollution and mitigation of climate change by 
restructuring and renovating urban heating systems towards energy efficiency 
targets in the identified local environmental hotspots 
 
KAI 3.1. Rehabilitation of urban heating systems in selected priority areas 
 
Priority Axis 4 Implementation of adequate management systems for nature 
protection 
 
KAI 4.1. Development of infrastructure and management plans to protect 
biodiversity and Natura 2000  
 
Priority Axis 5 Implementation of adequate infrastructure of natural risk 
prevention in most vulnerable areas 
 
KAI 5.1. Protection against floods 
KAI 5.2. Reduction of coastal erosion 
 
Priority Axis 6 “Technical Assistance”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 8: Priority Axes and Key Areas of Intervention of the SOP Human 
Resources  Development 
 
Priority Axis 1 Education and training in support for growth and development of 
knowledge based society 
KAI 1.1. Access to quality education and initial VET;  
KAI 1.2. Quality in higher education; 
KAI 1.3. Human resources development in education and training; 
KAI 1.4. Quality in CVT; 
KAI 1.5. Doctoral and post-doctoral programmes in support of research. 
 
 
Priority Axis 2 Linking life long learning and labour market 
KAI 2.1. Transition from school to active life; 
KAI 2.2. Preventing and correcting early school leaving; 
KAI 2.3. Access and participation in CVT.  
 
Priority Axis 3 Increasing adaptability of labour force and companies 
KAI 3.1. Promoting entrepreneurial culture; 
KAI 3.2. Training and support for enterprises and employees to promote adaptability; 
KAI 3.3. Development of partnerships and encouraging initiatives for social partners 
and civil society.  
 
Priority Axis 4 Modernising the Public Employment Service 
KAI 4.1. Strengthening the Public Employment Service capacity to provide 
employment services; 
KAI 4.2. Training of PES staff. 
 
Priority Axis 5 Promoting active employment measures 
KAI 5.1. Developing and implementing active employment measures; 
KAI 5.2. Promoting long term sustainability of rural areas in terms of human resources 
development and employment. 
 
Priority Axis  6 Promoting social inclusion 
KAI 6.1. Developing social economy; 
KAI 6.2. Improving the access and participation for vulnerable groups on the labour 
market; 
KAI 6.3. Promoting equal opportunities on labour market; 
KAI 6.4. Trans-national initiatives on inclusive labour market. 
 
Priority Axis 7 Technical assistance 
 
 
 
 
Annex 9.  Financial flow of the Regional Operational Programme (ROP, 180)  
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European Commission 
 
? Transfers the pre-financing 
? Approves and transfers the interim payments to 
the CPA 
? Transfers the final payment to the CPA after the 
    approval of the specific supporting documents 
Certifying and Paying Authority 
? Verifies that there are apropriate control procedures 
at MA/IB level 
? If necessary, performs on the spot checks at lower 
levels  
? Submits the interim payment applications + their 
certification to the EC, at least 3 times a year 
? Submits to the EC the final payment application
Managing Authority/Intermediate body 
 
? Confirms that the claims include only expenditure: 
- that has been actually incurred 
- incurred in operations that were selected 
for funding in accordance with selected 
criteria & procedures 
- from operations for which all state aid has 
been formally approved by EC 
? Performs on the spot checks at the lower levels, based 
on risk analysis 
? Assures itself that there are adequate controls 
performed at lower level 
? Submits the payment claim + confirms it to CPA 
Beneficiary 
? Verifies the accuracy, actuality and eligibility of 
expenditures (ex-ante) 
? Submits the application for reimbursement to the 
MA/IB + supporting documents 
Paying Unit 
(MDPWH) 
Makes the payments to 
the beneficiaries
Audit Authority 
 
- System audit 
- Sample checks 
- Statement of 
validity (winding up) 
Internal c
Level 1 verifi
ontrol 
cation of expenditure 
Level 2  verification of expenditure 
Level 3   certification of expenditure 
Flow of documents
Flow of funds 
 
Annex 10.  The management and Implementation system in place for the Regional Operational Programme (ROP, 170) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project applicants/ 
(Beneficiaries) 
Submit application for funding/projects 
Carry out the implementation of the project 
Intermediate Bodies 
- Ensure the development of project pipelines 
- Provide guidance to potential applicants in project preparation 
- Launch the call for proposals 
- Receive and register applications for funding support under the ROP 
- Check the administrative compliance and the eligibility of the applications submitted 
- Organize the technical and financial evaluation sessions, with the support of 
independent evaluators 
- Organize the strategic evaluation and provide the secretariat support for the RCSAC 
- Conclude financing contracts with beneficiaries, follwing ROP MA’s decision to finance 
the proposed projects  
- Carry out on-the-spot checks of projects 
- Report to the MA on a regular basis with regard to the results of the evaluation process 
- Monitor the implementation of approved projects. 
 
Regional  Committees for Strategic 
Assessment and Correlation 
 (RCSAC) 
 (8) 
- Evaluate the  proposed applications from the strategic 
point of view  
-  Examine the correlation of the project applications 
financed through ROP with those that are financed through  
other OP’s, National Rural Development Programme as 
well as the objectives of the european territorial 
cooperation.
ROP Managing Authority
- Schedules the launching schedule of calls for proposals 
- Elaborate the project selection criteria and submit them for the ROP Monitoring 
Committee approval 
- Prepare and sign an agreement with Intermediate Bodies for the effective 
implementation of the ROP at regional level 
- Elaborate and implement the Communication Action Plan  
- Takes final decision with regard to the financing of the project applications 
- Carries out the evaluations of the ROP 
- Perform the control of EU/national funds allocated through ROP 
- Authorize the eligible expenditure based on the checks performed on the progress 
reports and other relevant documents received from the IBs 
 
ROP Monitoring Committee 
 
 
- Approves the criteria for selecting operations 
financed under the ROP  
- Approves any revision of those criteria in 
accordance with programming needs 
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ANNEXES 11-20. INTERVIEWS 
 
The first round of (semi-structured) interviews was carried out in January 2004, and its 
general purpose was more that of first encounter with the reality on the ground in 
Romania; at the same time, the discussions served as a filter and first validation (or 
actually, invalidation) for/of the work hypothesis initially proposed. These initial 
hypothesis were very much connected with regionalisation and regional development as 
such, as the initial assumption was these two processes and the European Funds 
implementation practically overlap. This first round on interviews made very clear the 
fact that implementing the EU Cohesion policy/ structural funds is in a very incipient 
phase in Romania (only in terms of preparing the necessary legislative base for the SIs 
delivery system), and that the pre-accession funds were pre-eminent, while their 
learning effect towards SIs management and implementation still minimum.  
 
The questions addressed to all interviewed persons were concentrated on clarifying the 
delivery system (institutions and their competencies) for the future Cohesion Policy, 
with a focus on the regional institutions, including the National Board of Regional 
Development, and informal practices; as the state of affairs was as explained in the 
previous paragraph, the answers relate very much to the pre-accession implementation 
system and forecast how things will look like beyond accession. As you will see, very 
many, especially implementation aspects, “forecasted” in a certain way back in 2004, 
have been, in the end, very differently organised when the time came. Further, a series 
of questions were asked directly regarding regionalisation, the way the process had been 
organised and its perspectives, and the weight of the political actors in this respect.        
 
In 2005 the discussions tried to link further regional development and regionalisation as 
such with the pre-accession funds (Phare ESC) and structural instruments (the Regional 
Operational Programme); nevertheless, this attempt was not very successful, and the 
gap between the two aspects, regionalisation/regional development and socio-economic 
development at any costs/level was obvious.    
 
The latest interview, in 2008, was meant to clarify last points on the implementation of 
the Phare ESC Component, as it is tremendously different from SIs implementation, 
but, at the same time, very important, as fundament for the delivery system created for 
the SIs in Romania. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annex 11. Interview with Mrs. Pompilia Idu, Director of the Programme 
Monitoring and Evaluation Direction, MA of the Regional Operational 
Programme, Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing, March 2008    
  
1. As regards programming for regional development, the regional development plans 
served as bottom-up information source for the National Development Plans. Prior to 
the 2004-2006 the regional development plans were very little related to the Phare 
Economic and Social Cohesion Component, whose priorities were decided, in the 
general framework of the Phare programming mechanisms,  by the Romanian 
government (MEI as IAg and MPF as NAC) and the European Commission. In the 
2004-2006 programming period for the first time a connection was made between the 
National Development Plan and the Phare ESC Programming Document (PPD) 2004-
2006. The Phare ESC programming and management has been done in a very 
centralised manner, the (ex) MEI having final decision-making power in all respects. 
Especially at the beginning of the process, the NAC was less involved in the drafting of 
the PPD 2004-6 (later, it enjoys its regular powers as regards the Annual Financial 
Memoranda), the DG Enlargement and the Delegation being the main counterparts in 
the process, including as regards the institutional arrangements to be made for the PPD 
management and especially, implementation. 
 
2. Phare programme display procedures significantly different in comparison with the 
Structural Instruments. The transfer of expertise from Phare towards SIs was more 
successful at regional level, i.e. RDAs, than at central, ministerial level, where limited 
use of the Phare experience was made in preparing the ROP.  
 
3. As regards the National Strategy for Regional Development, it hasn’t existed as a 
separate document as such, it is included in the National Development Plan. The 
National Development Plan is approved by the National Board for Regional 
Development. This Board met more regularly at the beginning of the Phare ESC 
implementation, i.e. 1999-2001, but in the following years it met only when it was 
necessary (to fulfill their assigned tasks). Its activity became even more formal when the 
parallel legislation and institutions for the preparation of the SIs entered into force, and 
when the National Coordination Committee took over some of its tasks (including the 
approval of the National Development Plan 2007-2013 and of the Regional Operational 
Programme 2007-2013!). 
 
4. As regards the National Steering Committee, the same evolution as in the case of 
NBRD could be observed; this committee was set up at the request of the European 
Commission, it met a few times, but its members lost very easily the interest in its 
gathering as this body did not enjoy any decision-making power. Although it was not 
convoked for Phare 2004-2006, it served as basis for the first (Shadow) Monitoring 
Committee of the ROP (reunited for the first time in 16th of August 2007). The there 
Sub-Steering Committees had a different evolution. The Steering Committee  for 
Human Resources Development functioned well until 2006, autumn; in 2007 it was 
transformed in the Monitoring Committee for the SOP HRD. The SC for Infrastructure 
functioned very well, it approved all projects to be financed in this field in the 
framework of the Phare ESC. The opposite was the case with the third SC, for SMSEs; 
the National Agency for SMSEs had already its own stakeholders network, and this 
took over the tasks of the SC. If, as committees, these SCs will die together with Phare, 
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 their institutional members will continue to be involved in the implementation and 
monitoring of the ROP and other OPs, through their Monitoring Committees.  
 
5. As regards contracting Phare 2004-2006 programmes, the salient aspects are that, 
further than approving the Regional Development Plans and against the provisions of 
the RD Law, the Regional Development Boards are involved in the implementation 
process related to the measures under the RDAs jurisdiction (for which the RDAs act as 
Implementing Authority); as regards the HRD sub-component, only the Ministry of 
Labor, as IAg and the regional IBs are involved in this implementation. All public 
procurement are done by the IAgs, as required, and in accordance with PRAG (before 
1st of January 2007) and with the Romanian PP law, beyond this date.           
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 Annex 12. Interview with Ms. Luminita Mihailescu, General Director, RDA South-
East Region, Braila, May 2005 
 
1. At this moment Romania finds itself fully in the process of preparing to access the 
European funding to be allocated to this county upon accession, in the framework of the 
EU Cohesion Policy. The institutional system is set up and the National Strategic 
Reference Framework and the operational programmes are in drafting. Regarding the 
Regional Operational Programme, the Ministry of European Integration act as MA, 
managing the input from regions, and its correlation with the other sectoral OPs and 
spatial development. The National Strategy for Regional Development does not exist as 
such; at this moment discussions are carried out at central level for matching the 
Romanian regions’ needs with the European priorities; due to its specific development 
phase, Romania has different needs, e.g. hard infrastructure. 
2. The first bottleneck in this process is the lack of proper, overarching, development 
strategies at all levels, local, regional and national; in contradiction with the practices in 
the Western European countries. Regarding regional development as such, the Regional 
Development Board plays a formal role, as it is elected indirectly and its members 
represent the local and not regional interests and apply no regional approach. At 
regional level, (NUTS II), the government does not have a political counterpart as it is 
the case with the county and municipality levels; at the same time, these lower 
governmental levels are not very powerful in terms of decision making.  
3. The second bottleneck is represented by implementation as such; the ministries take 
decisions at central level without taking very much into account the positions in the 
territory, and this modus operandi will impact on funds absorption, as the IBs will be 
delegated a series of competencies in the implementation system and there are 
significant differences between pre-accession and structural funds, e.g. reimbursement 
principle. At the same time, as the main target group of the structural funds are the 
public authorities, especially the local ones, these have a serious capacity problem in 
attracting (administrative and financial) and implementing  these funds; this aspect 
hampers the ROP management and implementing authorities in preparing an adequate 
project pipeline. A series of new laws are necessary for the local administration to be 
able to implement the European funds, especially regarding the co-financing ability.   
4. The third problematic issue is the control of funds, understood here as all measures to 
be carried out (in parallel, and at all levels, including beneficiaries), which assure the 
correct, efficient and effective funds absorption (financial control, monitoring and 
evaluation, audit), and which, upon their successful completion, facilitate the 
programmes closure by the European Commission. 
5. From the capacity point of view it is justifiable that the Regional Operational 
Programme will be a central exercise in the 2007-13 programming period; in this way 
the distribution of funds can be made from the ministry towards the regional level 
directly proportional with the regions’ capacity to absorb these funds; if this regional 
absorption capacity is not taken into account, the objectives of these funds won’t be 
attained.  
6. In this context the sectoral programmes should have a regional approach. At this 
moment this is not the case and it is very difficult to thing about regional development 
strategy without knowing what the e.g. Human Resources or Environment OP intend to 
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 finance in each region. The RDAs have the task of drafting the RDPs, but these are 
more general and unclear as they should be; it is very difficult to draft such a plan 
without communication with the involved ministries, e.g. Ministry of Transport, in the 
case of the infrastructure projects planned to be implemented in the region.   
7. In the context of structural instruments the role of the county councils needs to be 
reinvented. The EU cohesion policy relays very much on the municipalities and in this 
case the dialogue partners are the mayors, politically legitimated through direct 
elections. In this sense, if the municipalities should be in charge with the urban 
development, the counties should be responsible with the rural development, its 
coherence with the urban one, and assuring that the same public services are offered to 
all citizens under its jurisdiction. Until now, the role of the county councils was to 
redistribute funds, and this was not done all the time adequately, on the basis of a 
development strategy and set up priorities (sometimes this redistribution was done on 
political criteria).  The counties, as funds beneficiaries and members of the RDB, should 
make real development strategies, coordinated with the strategies of the neighbouring 
counties and the regional strategies, and not only oriented towards the ministries 
requirements and policies.  
8. When the development regions were created, it was feared that the counties would 
lose their role; this is not necessarily a risk for the coutnies, as long as the competencies 
are re-distributed appropriately, each level fulfilling certain well defined roles. The 
RDAs are the only institutions newly created and having regional development 
responsibilities at NUTS II level, unlike other insitutions, deconcentrated at this level, 
which communicate and take into account the local level only if they want to.      
9. If implementation services as such rendered to the Ministry of European Integration 
are paid by this institution, the rest of the RDA activities, around regional development 
as such: dialog with stakeholders, thinking, development of network, strategic 
programming etc. are not financed, as the counties do not pay their contributions to the 
RDA budget (sometimes such activities are carried out in the framework of projects 
RDA submitted to the MEI and received finance from the Phare ESC programme). At 
the same time, the pure remuneration problem remains, the government needs to .think 
very well about this issue, as persons in charge with the implementation of million euro 
need to be remunerated accordingly.  
10. A change of the situation, in all terms, financial, institutional, administrative-
territorial, will be triggered only by a political understanding of and strong will and 
commitment for further promoting regional development.   
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 Annex 13. Interview with Mr. Gabriel Friptu, General Director Managing 
Authority for the Regional Operational Programme, Ministry of European 
Integration, May 2005 
1. The pre-accession implementation system, as its purpose is “learning”, is rather rigid, 
in comparison with the structural funds. Several other differences can be identified 
between the two policies and they implementation modus (points 1-10 Phare, points ).   
2. Partnership (in all its dimensions, with SNAs and other socio-economic actors) was 
not obligatory in the pre-accession period, the negotiations/decisions were taken 
between the central level and the European commission. For structural instruments, 
assuring partnership is obligatory.  
3. Phare ESC is s national policy implemented at regional level, and from the strict 
point of view of the relationship between EU, which finances, and the national recipient, 
the ministry, as representative of the domestic counterpart, it is not obligatory for the 
later to be “supported” by the regional level: here the frustration of the RDAs appear: 
they need a sort of projects to be financed (e.g. Braila, infrastructure), and the EU, 
through the ministry, finances another sort of projects. The RDAs list in their RDPs all 
they want to get financed and are disappointed when they see the sums received.  
(limited under pre-aceession). 
4. Phare is a system extremely centralised, the decisions are taken only at central level. 
The three persons involved in the Phare funds implementation are: the NAC 
(programming), NAO (financial management), PAO (responsibility of a component, 
e.g. Phare ESC, from both points of view, technical and financial); all three of them 
function at ministry level, with a deputy: state secretary or general director (civil 
servant). The Chapter 21, as all other negotiation chapters, was discussed between the 
government and the commission, without the implication of the regions, which is 
absolutely normal.  
5. PHARE has three components: 1) institution building and investments: 2) 
investments as such and the 3) technical assistance for supporting these investments. 
CFCU contracted initially all 1st and second category of projects, MIE took over three 
as well in 2001. The Phare National Programme is implemented along eight 
components, one of them being the ESC Component, the predecessor of the ERDF and 
ESF-like investments. This was the reason for which two implementing agencies were 
set up for the national programme, and later three (Ministry of Labour).  
6. The difference between the two Implementing Agencies, within the MEI and the 
CFCU, is that MEI prepares the regional strategy, as well, further than carrying out  the 
Phare ESC funds contracting. MEI prepares the Phare ESC Component programme, 
submits it to the NAC, agrees with this institution the contents of this document, which 
is further negotiated between the NAC and the European Commission. In the 
programme implementation, some things are decided at regional level, and some other 
at ministry level. Nevertheless, as the PAO is the final responsible, he/she can impose a 
certain approach, and as the ministry approves all decisions taken at regional (RDAs) 
level, the agencies have a very limited , independent, word to say in the implementation 
process.  
7. As regards the project approval, the RDAs organises the project appraisal and 
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 selection, and the project evaluation reports are finally approved by the Implementing 
Agency in the MEI and the EC Delegation in Bucharest (before EDIS); this 
competencies arrangement between the RDBs (politically legitimated) and the IAg, as 
technical DG within a ministry, can lead to frictions and render the RDBs approval 
phase valueless. Nevertheless, as the system is centralised, this was considered the 
optimum solution for accommodating all interests.  
8. In terms of financial control, the RDAs carry it out, but the MEI takes 
decisions/approves, in this respect.  
9. Regarding contracting: the IAg/MEI assures the final signature of the contract, but 
the RDA prepare the contract; three signature system is practiced; as the RDAs will 
monitor the project implementation, it is obviously indispensable that they know the 
project very well. In the framework of the project monitoring, the RDAs control all 
projects, and the MEI does this on a sample basis, most of the times this sample is 
decided commonly with the RDAs (difficult projects). Expenditures are certified by 
both RDAs and finally by MEI, and the payments are made directly by MEI to the 
beneficiaries.  
10. The core areas financed under Phare ESC are: SMSEs, human resources and 
regional and local infrastructure (the latest 60-70%).     
11. The institutional arrangements for the structural funds management and 
implementation are decided in the Chapter 21 document; having experience in 
managing pre-accession funds hasn’t been an obligatory pre-condition for the 
institutions involved in post-accession funding. Although the rules are totally different 
between pre-accession and structural instruments, it is a pity not to use the experience 
accumulated in the management and implementation of the pre-accession aid; the two 
processed will unfold in any case in parallel until Phare funds are exhausted; the two 
structures in charge will as well remain separated. The two systems will work in 
parallel: Phare ESC component, in EDIS, and MA/ROP in accordance with the 
European regulations, 1260/99. For the first one, the counterpart remains DG 
Enlargement, for the second, DG Regio (it would be interesting to see how these two 
communicate in Cohesion Policy matters) 
12. The question is how to address the changes involved by the transition from pre-
accession funds management and implementation system, rigid and dense at central 
level, towards structural instruments system involving a decentralisation of 
competencies; especially in terms of staff management. Ideally, as soon as a phase is 
finalised under Phare, e.g. programming, the staff involved in this phase are transferred 
to SIs programming; contracting will not be carried out by the management and 
implementation institutions, but by the beneficiaries, therefore, the people involved in 
contracting need to be absorbed in the ROP system, on different other positions. The 
last will be absorbed the staff involved in monitoring and payments.    
13. The structures i.e. pre- vs. post-accession, are very different, they do not have too 
much in common, except some methodologies, procedures and the communication and 
information provisions. For the ROP, contracting will mean a different thing; this step 
will be decentralised to IBs (sic!), and certifying the expenditures will be made in 
cascade; the MEI will just certify and not make payments; the audit will be differently 
carried out, the monitoring will not be carried out at project level anymore, as for Phare.  
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 14. The percentage of funds to be allocated to the ROP from the total amount is not 
known yet, in any case this will be less than the percentage (40%) Phare ESC had from 
the Phare National.  
15. The RDAs will function as  IBs, on the basis of a contract, with delegated (by the 
MEI) functions. 
16. The prefect will not play any role, at least at the moment no decision in this sense 
was taken. Initially it was proposed that the prefect was a member of the RDBs. The 
argument against it was that as the prefect is the representative of the government in the 
counties, it would be better that only the locally elected political representatives are 
RDBs members. He/she is, in any case, permanent observer. If the prefect becomes civil 
servant, it might get a role in the SIs implementation.  
17. The county and local councils are beneficiaries, if they have the necessary capacity; 
they can also manage grant schemes, e.g. for SMES.  
18. The National RD, or the RD Funds are not accounts as such, but an abstract concept. 
The NDP was never approved formally by the European Commission.  
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 Annex 14. Interview with Mrs. Andra Chirila, councellor, MA for the Regional 
Operational Programme, Ministry of European Integration, May 2005 
1. The institutional system for the Structural Instruments was decided in the framework 
of the negotiations for the Chapter 21, for which MEI (NAC) was responsible. The 
MACSF has a coordinating role in the entire SFs management and implementation 
process,  nevertheless, it is not a MA as such of the NSRF; the NSRF, in comparison 
with the CSF, is a more strategic document, and a high degree of coordination is 
necessary. The MACSF coordinates the preparation of SIs implementation, including 
the preparation of the institutional system; in this position, the MACSF guides the work 
of the NCC, which meets with this very purpose, of preparing the SIs management and 
implementation, including from institutional point of view. In the framework of the 
NCC agreements are made, on certain measures to be taken in order for the Romanian 
involved institutions to be prepared/able to manage/implement the funds upon their 
allocation. 
2. The Ministry of Public Finances concentrates, further than the MACSF, the MA 
Infra, and the Paying Authority for the Phare National Programme; the later will turn 
into Paying Authority for the Structural Instruments system.   
3. The Inter-institutional Committee for Planning  is a deliberating body, it discusses the 
various versions of the NDP; the partners invited to the CIPs meetings are only 
generally mentioned in the legal base in force for this body, as the representatives of the 
respective institutions will be invited to the CIP meetings to the extend to which the 
subject of discussions relate to their field of activity. From the point of view of the 
regional contribution to the NDP, the RDAs organise the Regional Committees for 
Planning.  
4. After 2007, considering the fact that an inter-ministerial coordination body needs to 
exist, and that the MACSF will continue to coordinate the process, the NCC will play an 
important role, which needs to be “reassessed”; maybe its role of preparing the system 
will change in monitoring the management and implementation, further than the MCs 
for each OPs. 
5. Organising the CMs are not a first priority, at this moment. They will be organised 
after the MAs and the IBs will function in accordance with the European requirements 
and be staffed properly.  
6. The concrete negotiations with the European Commission will be carried out on the 
Operational Programmes as such, as the NSRF is a more strategic document. These 
negotiations can be very harsh (as personally experienced as participant in a discussion 
between the EU Commission and the Slovak Government); nevertheless, the European 
Commission is permanently giving feed-back to the Managing Authorities regarding the 
operations to be covered by their OPs. In the context of these negotiations the MEF 
plays a central role. The representatives of the MAs will participate in discussions. The 
European Commission will finally approve the OPs, therefore, these need to reflect its 
vision, intentions etc. as well.  
7. The ROP has the same priorities for all regions, but the budgets allocated to each 
priority/measure may differ, taking into account the specific needs of the region.           
Nevertheless, this policy of the EU did create a new framework, at regional/NUTS II 
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 level, which are no territorial-administrative units, indeed but the RDAs have 
experience as regards planning, programming, implementation of development funds. 
Sometimes they are more experienced, in some respects than the ministries. The 
downsize of the created system is the “fluidity” of the RDBs: the members of the RDBs 
change after local elections, the RDAs need to “permanent educate” them regarding the 
development activities they are having. 
8. At this moment the work on the CSF/NRSF hasn’t started yet. The message of the 
European Commission was for the Ministry of Public Finance to continue with the 
drafting of the NDP, as this will serve very much as basis for the NSRF. The NDP 
contains all structural  investments to be carry out in Romania between 2007-13. 
Central to these investments are, obviously, the funds to be received from the European 
Union.  
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 Annex 15. Interview with Mr. Razvan Cotovelea, Mrs. Iulia Gugiu, Mrs Pompilia 
IDU, Mrs. Antoaneta Popescu, NAC, Ministry of European Integration, January 
2004  
1. The main role of the National Board of Regional Development is to approve the large 
infrastructure projects financed under Phare ESC Component; it meets twice a year, in 
2003 it met only once; this did not constitute problem, all necessary decision were 
taken, but in other institutional frameworks. The RDBs meet more often, as they 
approve the smaller projects. The MEI verifies the documents sent by the RDAs 
regarding the selected projects and the EC Delegation in Bucharest approves them.      
2. The NFRD is financed from the central budget and finances national programmes. 
The European funds are collected in the National Fund, in order to be distributed to the 
RDAs, respectively, in the RDF. In accordance with the regional development law, the 
NF should collect other funds, as well, for redistribution purposes, e.g. EIB, EBRD, 
WB, etc. In reality, the EU funds plus the co-financing from the Romanian part is 
transferred to the Implementing Agencies according to the relevant procedures.  The 
NFRD is managed by the G.D. National Fund, within the MPF.  
3. For investment projects, the project appraisal is carried out at regional level, 
organised by the RDAs and effectively done by external project evaluators. On the basis 
of this project evaluation (scores) the RDAs set up a list of projects, to be approved by 
the RDBs (the large projects by the NBRD as well) and the Ministry of European 
Integration/EC Delegation. The evaluation reports (of each project proposed) are 
attached to this list. The projects finally approved by all institutions involved, including 
the EC Delegation in Bucharest, are contracted; this is the final responsibility of the 
IAg, nevertheless, the contracts are prepared by the RDAs. The contracts are signed by 
the beneficiaries, RDAs and the IAg (PAO). After contracting, the beneficiaries start 
implementing their approved projects. The RDAs monitor their implementation, visit 
them and report towards the IAg. The payment requests made by the beneficiaries are 
verified by the RDAs, firstly, and sent to the IAg, they are verified again (more general, 
as the RDAs, which are closer to the projects). The EC Delegation is involved in 
monitoring, but at programme level (SMSCs, meet twice a year), not at project level.    
4. In the case of large infrastructure projects, the procedure is a little different. The 
projects are collected by the RDAs, together with the necessary documentation. For 
projects between 2 and 5 million Euro Phare money, a pre-selection takes place at 
regional level. A list is made in accordance with the programme priorities, and 
transmitted to the IAg. The IAgs rank the projects in accordance with a comprehensive 
appraisal and evaluation grid. The final ranking is submitted to the National Board for 
Regional Development. The IAg, together with TA experts, prepare the documentation 
for launching the (public) international procurement process, in accordance with PRAG 
rules; following this process, a firm is selected to carry out the project, with whom a 
contract is signed. 
5. The institutional building projects, directed at the institutions meant to play a role in 
the implementation of the Structural Funds, are contracted by the IAg.  
6. Regarding the Green Book on Regionalisation in Romania, we can say that the 
formula utilised for the stetting up of NUTS II and RDAs took into account the 
Romanian administrative and institutional traditions. In creating the statistical 
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 development regions, the principle of “homogeneity” was followed, at least from certain 
points of view, e.g. number of inhabitants, more or less the same access to resources, 
etc. This system, the way it is designed now, is the most fitted to Romania, at this 
moment.  The organisation and functioning of regions was, in the first place, necessary, 
in order to implement the European funds. Without the EU, this concept would have 
been implemented more slowly. The regions are involved in drafting the NDP, they are 
involved in the process of funds division, a permanent dialogue with the regions takes 
place. 
7. The setting up of the regional institutions, even if in this very “light” form, did affect 
the “centrality” of the unitary state, but not significantly. . Before 1998, a relationship of 
the central government with other structure than the county council was unthinkable. 
Especially when finances were involved. Now the situation is radically different: 
implementation of the funds coming from the EU has to be made in accordance with the 
European requirements, and NUTS II regions and implementation bodies created at this 
level are some of these European requirements. In the case of the other policies and 
their implementation, the relationship central government-county councils remained the 
same. Only when it comes to European funds the RDAs play a role. For example, in the 
case of the “lagging behind areas” policies, these areas were drafted at county level, and 
this policy was implemented through the prefects.             
8. One can say that a sort of “indirect proportionality” exists between the strength of the 
local level, municipality and county, and their access to other financing sources, internal 
and external, e.g. Timis, funds from the German Government, on one side, and the 
position of the RDA in the region. For example, in the North-East region, where little 
other funds than European aere available and where the local actors are less capable of 
identifying new sources of financing, the RDA is seen as a very important institution, 
while in West (where Timis belongs), the RDA was seen just as one source of 
financing, among others.  
9. As regards the RDAs, the relationship between MEI and them is of contractual 
nature: the RDAs provides the MEI with a series of services, and the MEI pays them for 
these (implementation) services. Nevertheless, it is still up to the county councils to 
cover the running costs of the RDAs; which happens in some regions better than in 
other. The same “variation” is valid also in term of involvement of the county councils 
in the county development process stimulated through European funding: in some 
counties, the political leaders are very driven in stimulating socio-economic 
development, and they are very active in accessing Phare funding through the RDAs 
and the RDBs.  
10. The NBRD is not an executive board, in the sense that it implements a certain 
policy; it decides upon a series of projects submitted to them by the MEI and RDAs.  
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 Annex 16. Interview with Mrs. Luminita Mihailescu, General Director, RDA 
South-East Region, Braila, January 2004 
1. The structural funds management and implementation system is currently in 
construction, and this process is guided by the accession negotiations carried out in the 
framework of the Chapter 21.  
2. The RDAs are NGOs of public utility, in accordance with the proposals made in the 
Green Book on Regionalisation; the major reason for this choice was the fact that, as no 
regional government was in place, the RDAs needed to represent the civil society, as 
well, generally, all interest of the stakeholders. In opposition with his formula, a 
governmental organisation might have been politically dependent.    
3. Now, in Romania, one can still talk about national policies applied at regional level, 
and not about regional programmes decided, and implemented at regional level, with 
regional financial means. The RDAs are instruments for the implementation of a 
national policy/national funds in this respect, and they next to the RDBs have little to 
say as regards this policy and the budget they receive. The decisions in this respects 
belong to the Romanian government and the European Commission. The 
implementation of the policy as such, is, indeed, done by the RDAs, but as regards 
designing the programmes and the set of conditions, criteria, requirements for the 
programme, these are decided at central level, with no involvement from the RDA part.  
4. Regarding the process of regionalisation as such, it will not continue in Romania due 
to the connotation this process receives on the political scene (regionalisation= 
segregation of parts of the Romanian territory). As long as at regional level there is no 
regional government and no regional tax-and-spend power, we do not have region and 
regional development. The simple implementation of some programmes is too little, in 
comparison with what the concept of regional development involves. If genuine 
regional government is established, the position of counties in uncertain. In any case, at 
this moment, the county is very well established in the Romanian administrative system; 
the Ministry of European Integration, all other ministries address the counties to 
implement their policies. Nevertheless, although these regional structures are weak, they 
affect the centrality of the state. Local identity is stronger than the regional one, there is 
not “demand” for regionalisation, region, because these concepts are not understood. If 
regionalisation were done top-down, e.g. the Parliament would vote a law, according to 
which a regional government, parliament would be created, than the “demand” would 
be stimulated, people would become interested in such movement… but this will 
happen in long, long run, not now. And until now the government hasn’t showed any 
interest to create these regions. Creating NUTS II regions happened clearly at the 
request of the European Commission, which said that the structural funds cannot be 
implemented either at county level or at national level (sic!); but from here until genuine 
regions, the step is huge.    
5. The creation of the eight development regions and its institutions, e.i. the RDAs and 
the RDCs started after the law was adopted in 1998, and it was a bottom up process, 
carried out by the county councils, and supported by a TA project financed with Phare 
funds. 
6. The main preoccupation of the RDA since its setting up was to survive from a 
financial point of view. The local public authorities in the region supposed to finance 
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 the activity of the RDAs, thing which did not happen, as some county councils did not 
pay their contribution to the agency budget. The decisions of the RDBs are not biding 
for the local authorities! If the RDB decides on the level of the contribution of the 
county councils to the RDAs functioning, this decision needs to be taken also by the 
county councils itself!  The situation has changed in 2003, when the MEI started paying 
for some of the activities of the RDAs. The RDA cannot provide project generation 
facilities/ assistance to potential beneficiaries against a certain tariff, it does not receive 
sponsorships either; a comprehensive agreement needs to be reached, at a certain point 
about who will finance RDAs activity: the government, the region or/and the EU. 
7. The relationship between the RDA and the RDB is good, as their competencies are 
clearly delimitated. Unfortunately, the Council does not have a decision-making power 
comparable with the one of a regional government. The Board does meet, but the 
“mentality” is the problem. The members of the board should think “region-wide”, 
instead, they represent the interest of the area (county) where he/she was elected, where 
from he/she draws his/her legitimacy. The members take part in the board because they 
have something to gain for their own jurisdiction. Rejecting a project can, nevertheless, 
create conflictual relationships between the RDAs and local authorities, among the 
members of the RDBs. The RDA does not know what other programmes/projects the 
other Ministries implement in the regions, the ministries do not think regionally and the 
MEI do not assure this short-cut between the regional level/policy and the sectoral 
interventions. On the other side, the NBRD has limited to no impact to regional 
development.  
8. The NDP 2004-6 was drafted in one year, including analysis and consultations. Two 
major problems were encountered in this process: firstly, the lack of sectoral policies 
designed in terms of regional level as well, e.g. Sapard, Ispa. The result was a plan 
concentrated only on the resources available for regional development, Phare ESC, a 
mix of everything, not coordinated with the other interventions in the region. The 
second problem would be the insecurity of the financial resources the region has at 
disposal. The plan is made not on the basis of the real financial needs of the region 
regarding regional development, but on a given sum, announced by the Ministry/EU 
side. The implementation of the RDP means actually the implementation of the funds 
made available by the EC trough the MEI, for specific measures, which represent only a 
part of the RDP.  
9. The National Plan of Regional Development supposed to gather all RDPs at national 
level; finally, this document turned into PND, and it is better like this, as the regional 
development component is only one component of the entire process of development; 
subsequently, it represents now only one of the NDP priorities.  
10. The RDB monitors the financial realisation of a programme; at project level, the 
RDA carries out this activity. In this respect the Board is in a peculiar position, as its 
members are funds beneficiaries and the RDA need to report back to them on their 
projects.  
11. The RDAs monitor the project implementation, and the ministry control the RDAs 
(through sample of projects). The payments are made by the Ministry, while in the case 
of other governmental programmes, the RDAs make the payments. Other programmes 
implemented in the region by the RDA are, for example, a WB project in agriculture; 
Tulcea county council implement a very complex, BERD project, but these operations 
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 are not “integrated” with the regional development plan. This does not happen because 
the region is not recognised as entity/partner, while the RDA is not recognised as an 
actor which promotes development but as an actor which provides a series of services 
for a Ministry or another.        
12. Regarding spatial planning, in the counties of the regions exist plans for spatial 
planning, but in the existing form, it does not have anything to do with the regional 
development plan. In the best case it may fulfil a “source” function for the analytical 
part of the RDP.    
13. Regarding the “indirect proportionality” issue, between the access to finance and the 
importance of the RDA/EU funds, in the very well developed cities, a different attitude 
exists. SMSEs have better access to finance, the local revenues are higher; e.g. RDA 
Bucharest is less interesting for investors, as it manages anyway less funds, as the 
region it represents is very developed. It is also a problem of mentality: if, for example, 
the mayor of a city (Timisoara) is more interested in projects without an impact on 
regional development, but which has an impact on the electors in short run (hospital 
renovation etc.), he will go for “easy money”, especially when one takes into account 
also competition, documentation etc. which is involved by applying for European funds 
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 Annex 17. Interview with Mr. Simion Cretu, General Director, RDA Region 
Centre, Alba Iulia, January 2004 
1. Regarding the statute, of NGO, of the RDA, in order for a governmental layer to be 
created at regional level, the region needed to exist as administrative-territorial unit. As 
long as no administrative-territorial region and no regional government were set up, this 
solution was adopted, in accordance with the proposals of the Green Book on 
Regionalisation. As regards the continuation of the regionalisation process as such, the 
prime-minister said that the existing structures are enough for the EU funds 
implementation; a radical administrative-territorial reform, in the sense of creating a 
regional governmental tier, in the middle of negotiations with the European 
Commission would create a high degree of confusion, and chaos.  
2. The members of the RDB do not have a political commitment vis-à-vis the region as 
such, but for the county or municipality they represent. Me, as director, I am here to 
manage a programme. The prefect participates in the meetings of the RDB, but it has no 
voting right. The RDB monitors/observes the financial realisation of the related regional 
Phare ESC, as a sort of Monitoring Committee. 
3. In Sept 2002 the decision to elaborate the Regional Development Plan was taken. A 
series of structures for elaborating the RDP were set up at county level, i.e. a sub-
regional planning committee, with representatives of all stakeholders, and a planning 
committee at regional level; different priority fields were discussed in planning sectoral 
committees; on top of all these bodies, a regional conference was organised with a 
“deliberative” role. This entire process took a few months. Consequently, at regional 
level, a very wide and divers network is created, despite the lack of traditions in this 
sense; all stakeholders are permanently involved in the programming phase, socio-
economic actors, NGOs, academia, etc.;   their permanent involvement results in a final 
regional development plan which corresponds, as much as possible, to everybody’s 
positions and interests. 
4. Problematic is that, at the moment the plan is drafted, it is not known what funds will 
be made available for its implementation. These sums are decided, at a certain point, at 
national level, (through the Financial memorandum etc.) but the distribution of these 
funds towards the regional level comes later. A clear formula for distributing these 
funds to the regions was adopted rather late, and this formula will be used for Phare 
2004. Because we do not have a clear, financial allocation, at the moment we draft the 
plan, we do insert in it all kind of measures and priorities in the plans, therefore, in 
practice, it is difficult to use these plans as operational documents.   
 5. The National Fund for Regional Development is managed by MEI (sic!) and it is 
correlated with the national budget, as it involves the European allocated funds plus the 
national co-financing. To the RDF the county an municipalities contribute in two ways: 
co-financing their projects, and contributions for the functioning of the agency. After 
the MEI started to supplement the budget of the agency, this was able to function 
properly. The budget for regional development consist only in the European funds 
received from the government (Phare ESC), or other governmental programmes the 
RDA is asked by different ministries to implement, e.g. for SMSEs.  
6. As regards the regional development concept in Romania, we have to keep in mind 
the fact that in 1995-6 this concept was absent, and currently, it is implemented/used/ 
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 applied in Romania. The EU did not impose anything, in terms as how the regional 
structures should be organised, they just needed a NUTS II statistical level for the 
funds’ implementation. The way to organise this statistical layer was left to Romania. 
Unfortunately, the concept of regional development is still not very well (widely) 
understood, and often manipulated politically; the discourse around it is not consistent, 
comprehensive, and based on scientific research.  
7. The decision-making power at regional level belongs to the RDB, which approves 
everything as regards the RDA, organisational chart, budget, projects etc. The council 
(as political body) oversees the activity of the RDA; for the programmes the agency 
implements, the MEI carries out a “technical” coordination. The National Board for 
Regional Development is more of a formal institutions, it meets once per year. In terms 
of projects, the Delegation decides ultimately which projects will be financed; it is 
difficult to work with the RDB, as this body is not a permanent one, it meets when it is  
needed.  
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 Annex 18. Interview with Mr. Serban Gratian, President of the County Council 
Cluj and President of the Regional Development Board, North-West Region, 
January 2004 
1. The participation of the representatives of the local authorities (county councils, 
municipalities, communes) in the RDB facilitates the promotion of their local interests 
at this level. For example, the Cluj county council received (through projects) in 4 years 
160 million Euro from European programmes (including ISPA, SAPARD), ten times 
more than the yearly county budget or the equivalent of more or less 14 counties yearly 
budgets.  
2. The RDB in North-West Region meets once per month, the decisions are taken by 
vote, by the 24 members, through simple majority. At the beginning of the RDB 
functioning its members were observing more their own interests, nevertheless,  in the 
last 2 years, after the members got to know each other better, they have worked together 
much better and the decisions are taken in consensus (upon informal, “underground 
negotiations” and agreements).  
3. There are limited connections between the RDB and the NBRD. The national council 
decides the strategy and the evaluation and selection criteria, and the decisions are taken 
at county level, without the interference of the NB. 
4. Several other investments are carried out in the region, by the county councils, with 
county&national funds e.g. the Cluj international airport, which became in 3 years, the 
third largest in the county, waste management system in Cluj county (continued with an 
ISPA project); utilities, transport infrastructure. The Cluj county has its own 
development strategy and afferent investments. The situation is not the same in the 
other counties in the region, as Cluj is the most active in this sense, most probable also 
because it has more financial resources available, as it is economically more prosperous 
as the other counties.  
5. Regarding the contribution of the county Cluj to the budget of the RDA, we think 
that, for its functioning needs, this is too big! And this is the only aspect we did not 
succeed in resolving with the agency, some sums still need to be paid to it (sic!). 
6. There are psychological barriers regarding regionalisation, and setting up a genuine 
administrative-territorial region, especially in some areas, sensitive areas (2 counties 
with strong Hungarian minorities). 
7. The centrality of the Romanian state was not affected by the creation of these 
regional structures. It was just fulfilling one condition for entering the EU and benefit 
from development funds.  
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 Annex 19. Interview with Mrs. Georgeta Smadu, Director, RDA North-East 
Region, Piatra Neamt, January 2004 
1. Considering the fact that the concept of regional development is very new in 
Romania, and that the country territorial-administrative organisation is based on central 
government and counties, the choice for volunteer county agreements in NUTS II 
regions and RDAs and RDB was understandable. The EU and the Delegation supported 
this formula, as well. The agencies are executive bodies of the RDBs which approve 
everything related to the agencies, from its budget, to its development plan and the 
selected projects. 
2. If reaching an agreement on these two arrangements was not difficult, more difficult 
was to assure the functioning of the agency, as the local authorities do not always 
understand to pay their contributions to the RDA budget. Lately, the situation was 
changed in the sense that only the county councils have an obligation to contribute to 
the RDA budget, while some other activities of the agency are financed through Phare 
project. The needs of the RDA, especially in terms of training and know-how transfer, 
are covered to a certain extent from some projects, financed in the framework of Phare 
programme, for which the agency applies as any other beneficiary.  
3. The members of the RDB do represent the interests of the local authorities involved, 
and try to obtain financing for as many projects as possible in their jurisdictions. There 
were situations in which, due to this situation, decisions on certain projects were 
difficult to reach; nevertheless, after negotiations, a series of choices were made. 
Gradually, the members of the RDB understand that some priorities need to be set up, 
and that not everything, and immediately, can be financed. The county councils 
presidents represent decision-making “poles” within the RDB. If a commune intends to 
ask financing for a major infrastructure project, it needs to discuss and get the approval 
of the county council, as this is the one distributing the public funds towards the 
communes and the co-financing of the project would depend on the budgetary allocation 
made by the county council towards the commune (sic!).  
4. The institutional changes at central level, from the National Agency for Regional 
Development to the Ministry of Development and Prognosis, further to the Ministry of 
European Integration determined a certain instability which affected the activity of the 
agency along a few months (each time). One positive aspect would be the fact that 
position of  the MEI is a stronger ministry, in comparison with the MDP.  
5. There is s strong correlation between the regional development plan and the spatial 
planning plans: the spatial plans at local level are obligatory for financing infrastructure 
projects. If the local authority asking for financing for an infrastructure project do not 
submit the local urbanism plan, it does not receive financing. Currently, in the N-E 
Region one of the two pilot regional territorial plans are elaborated (it was launched  in 
2002 with a meeting in Bacau). The same goes for the regional statistical regions. Even 
if we have discussed for 2 years, they are at the very beginning as well.  
6. Regarding the RDP, permanent communication with the RDB and the Ministry on its 
different versions is carried out. When the RDP is finalised, it is attached to the NDP, 
which is send, for information, to the European Commission.  It is not the EC role to 
approve it, as this document contains also national and other international donors 
programmes/investments, the EC gives only its opinion on this plan.  
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 7. The RD could not influence ISPA, SAPARD and other sectoral, centrally-decided 
strategies and programmes etc. The regional level do not play a role in the elaboration 
phase,  only, eventually, in implementation; the RDA inserted in the plan the needs and 
investments related to these programmes, in order to correlate them with the operations 
to be financed with Phare ESC funds.  
8. The control (n.a. understood very widely, as financial control, monitoring, 
evaluation) is done at several levels, by the agency, by the ministry, by other bodies and 
the European Commission delegation. Sometimes we are visited by evaluators, from the 
side of the E Commission, as well. At project level project indicators are set up, and 
these are monitored by the agency, through the request for payments made by the 
beneficiaries (these are verified by the agency and sent to the Ministry which makes the 
payment). One important aspect: the implementation, monitoring, control activities 
require significant resources: human, financial, office infrastructure. On one side, the 
agency wants to approve and implement as many projects as possible, on the other side 
it needs to take into account the resources necessary to implement them and round them 
up according to the procedures (sic!). As in other regions, the same problems exist in N-
E as well; the county councils do not understand why they have to finance the activity 
of the RDA. Some other have financial problems, some other refuse to pay because 
none of their projects have been approved (some localities were not eligible, e.g. 
communes where the necessary investments were made under SAPARD) 
9. Project generation facilities are organised for potential beneficiaries under a TA 
country-project, of 2 mil Euro (distributed to the regions directly proportional with the 
budget which needed to be absorbed), contracted between the MEI, RDAs (as any other 
funds beneficiary) and a consultancy consortium.   
10. If the region is not organised as a territorial-administrative unit, more efforts are 
needed in order to reach the same results, as regards regional development.  
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 Annex 20. Interview with Mr. Liviu Musat, Deputy General Director, RDA South 
Muntenia, Calarasi, January 2004 
1. As regarding the relationship between the RDB and the RDA, the latest is the 
executive body of the Board; if we are to drawing a parallel with the national level 
where the parliament functions as legislative body, and the government as executive 
body, one can say that the RDB is an embryonic regional parliament (representative), 
and the agency a regional government (sic!). The regional institutions will evolve 
together with the regionalisation process in Romania, process which will continue, 
considering the fact that this is the current trend in Europe. Nevertheless, the moment of 
institutionalising the regions needs to be determined with a lot of tact and patience, 
because in Romania there is no clear concept of regionalisation and regional 
development. The members of the RDB represent the local interests, and they fight for 
their own jurisdiction, not for the region. If the members of the RDB, as regional 
parliament, were chosen at regional level, they would have the obligation to think and 
act regionally.  
2. All regional development plans (2000-2002, 2002-2005, 2004-2006) have been 
elaborated by the RDA in an as wide as possible partnership. Two problems were 
encountered in this process: continuity and representativity. On one side, different 
representatives of one institution were taking part in the discussions on the plan (in 
time), and this hampered building up knowledge on regional development aspects, and 
some other institutions were not represented in these discussion by persons able to make 
the necessary decisions, and having the necessary background and level of knowledge, 
but by junior, inexperienced people. In September 2002 the preparation of the RDP 
2004-6 started, this was approved in December 2003! 
3. As the other agencies, the South Muntenia Agency has problems in  receiving the 
contributions from the local authorities for it functioning (there are 504 territorial-
administrative units in the region). Currently, due to this lack of financial resources, the 
agency is understaffed,  34 staff work instead of 60 persons needed.   
 The approach decided was for the agency to prove to the local authorities its added 
value, and, in this way to convince them that this contribution needs to be made is based 
on good communication strategy, visits, to all local authorities.  
4. The financial allocation to each region (from the annual total Phare ESC budget) is 
made  by the MEI, approved by the NBRD, and directed at the particular measures in 
the RDP which correspond to the priorities in the Phare ESC Programming Document. 
The RDP does not provide for the financial sources for all proposed priorities; this is 
exactly the difference between a plan and a programme. 
5. The RDP was elaborated in wide partnership, at county and regional level, with 
representatives of all stakeholders.  As the plan was just finalised in December 2003, we 
are trying to find a way to keep these partnership active until the preparation for the 
structural funds starts. It is difficult to maintain this partnership, due to two factors: lack 
of tradition and resources. The RDA does not have resources to undertake different 
actions in order to stimulate, and keep alive, these partnerships. 
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http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiat
ions/eu10_bulgaria_romania/chapters/chap_21_en.htm
 
Chapter 28 “Financial Control” 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiat
ions/eu10_bulgaria_romania/chapters/chap_28_en.htm   
 
 
COHESION POLICY 2000-2006 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general 
provisions on the Structural Funds 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1447/2001 of 28 June 2001 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1105/2003 of 26 May 2003 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds 
 
REGULATION (EC) No 1783/1999 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 12 July 1999 on the European Regional Development Fund  
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 REGULATION (EC) No 1784/1999 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 12 July 1999 on the European Social Fund 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities 
 
 
COHESION POLICY 2007-2013 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and 
the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 
 
REGULATION (EC) No 1080/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 5 July 2006 on the European Regional Development Fund and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1783/1999 
 
REGULATION (EC) No 1081/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 5 July 2006 on the European Social Fund and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1784/1999 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 
 
COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1828/2006 of 8 December 2006 setting out 
rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund and of Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional Development Fund 
 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW No 151/1998, issued by the Romanian 
Parliament in July 1998 
  
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW No 315/2004, issued by the Romanian 
Parliament in November 2004 
 
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION No 1115/2004 on the elaboration in partnership pf the 
National Development Plan  
 
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION No 1200/2004 on the setting up, organisation and 
functioning of the National Committee for the Coordination of the process preparing the 
management of Structural Instruments 
 
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION No. 497/2004 on the setting up of the institutional 
framework for the coordination, implementation and management of structural 
instruments 
 
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION No 772/2005 approving the Organising and 
Functioning Rules of the National Board of Regional Development  
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 GOVERNMENTAL DECISION No. 765/2007 for the approval of the Monitoring 
Committee of the Regional Operational Programme 2007-2013 and of the Framework-
Regulation regarding its organising and functioning 
 
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION No. 764/2007 approving the setting up of the Regional 
Committees for Strategic Evaluation and Correlation and its organising and functioning 
framework-regulation    
 
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION No. 457/2008 on the setting up of the institutional 
framework for the coordination and management of structural instruments, replacing the 
GD No 497/2004.   
 
Law No. 200/2005, regarding the approval of the governmental Emergency Ordinance 
no. 22/2005, issued for the completion of the Law no. 94/1992 regarding the 
organisation and functioning of the Romanian Count of Accounts 
 
Cohesion Policy 2007-2013, comments and official texts, EC Guide, January 2007 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdf/2007/public
ations/guide2007_en.pdf
 
Growing Regions, growing Europe, 4th Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 
European Commission, 2004 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion4/index_en
.htm
 
COMMUNITY STRATEGIC GUIDELINES on COHESION 2007-2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/2007/osc/index_en.htm  
 
ROMANIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2007-2013  
http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/index.php?sectionId=173
 
ROMANIAN NATIONAL PLAN FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT 2007-2013 
http://www.madr.ro/pages/page.php?self=03&sub=0302
 
ROMANIAN NATIONAL STRATEGIC REFERENCE FRAMEWORK 2007-2013 
http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/index.php?sectionId=172  
 
Regional Operational Programme 2007-2013 
http://www.inforegio.ro/index.php?page=PUBLICATIONS_POR_2007_2013  
 
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, North-East Region, Piatra-Neamt 
http://www.adrnordest.ro/index.php?page=LIBRARY_STRATEGIC&language=2  
  
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, South-East Region, Braila 
http://www.adrse.ro/DocumentePDR/PDR_2007-2013.pdf  
 
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, South/Muntenia Region, Calarasi 
http://www.adrmuntenia.ro/pagini/planul_de_dezvoltare_regionala_286.html
 
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, South-West/Oltenia Region, Craiova 
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 http://www.adroltenia.ro/newro/pagina.php?cod=5
 
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, West Region, Timisoara 
http://www.adrvest.ro/index.php?page=domain&did=180
 
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, North-West Region, Cluj-Napoca 
http://www.nord-vest.ro/Document_Files/PDR%20%202007-2013_hpqtpb.zip
 
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, Centre Region, Alba Iulia 
http://www.adrcentru.ro/Document_Files/ADPlanulRegional/00000021/9591f_PDR-
2007-2013.pdf
 
Regional Development Plan 2007-2013, Bucharest-Ilfov Region 
http://www.adrbi.ro/content.php?varPg=3
 
SOP Increase of Economic Competitiveness 2007-2013 Romania 
http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/index.php?sectionId=190
 
SOP Transport 2007-2013 Romania 
http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/index.php?sectionId=190
 
SOP Environment 2007-2013 Romania 
http://www.mmediu.ro/proiecte_europene/01_integrare_europeana/02_POS_mediu/SO
P-ENV_revised-official-version_30May07.doc
 
SOP Human Resources Development 2007-2013 Romania 
http://www.fseromania.ro/down-docs/sop_hrd11.pdf
 
OP Administrative Capacity Development 2007-2013 Romania 
http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/index.php?sectionId=190
 
OP Technical Assistance 2007-2013 Romania 
http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/index.php?sectionId=190
 
WD no. 5 of the European Commission, Indicative Guidelines On Evaluation Methods: 
Evaluation During The Programming Period, 2007 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/working/sf2000_en.htm  
 
The Evaluation of socio-ecnomic development. The Guide (EVALSED)  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/index_en.htm  
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 Curriculum vitae Laura Trofin  
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
 
Name of Firm : NEA Transport  
  research and training  
 
Name of Staff : Trofin, Laura  
 
Profession : EU Affairs Advisor 
 
Date of Birth : 04-10-1977  
 
Date with firm/Entity : September 2007  
 
Nationality : Romanian  
 
Membership in professional societies: 
 
ECPR Standing Group of Regionalism  
  
European Evaluation Society  
 
 
Detailed Tasks Assigned:  
 
 
Key Qualifications: 
 
For three years Laura Trofin has been an expert on Programme and Project Evaluation, i.e. carrying out 
and the coordination of evaluation processes as such, as well as developing methodologies and 
procedures. Her expertise is circumscribed especially to pre-accession programmes (Phare) and the EU 
Structural Instruments. She has been active for more than 5 years in this area, in the framework of her 
PhD research and through the professional activities she has been carried out. 
   
o Programme and Project Evaluation 
o Phare programmes: programming, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, including Project 
Cycle  Management and PRAG procedures 
o EU Cohesion Policy: implementation, monitoring/indicators, evaluation, state aid, 
o Transport ( including infrastructure) 
o Strategic Environmental Assessment 
o Cost-Benefit Analysis  
o European Integration, enlargement 
o Decision-making in the European Union 
o Public administration (focus on transitional systems) 
o Regional development, regionalism, decentralisation 
 
 
 
Education: 
 
October 2008 Institute for Political Science, WWU University, Münster, Germany   
 diploma / degree: PhD  
description: European Studies and Sociology: Multi-level Governance and 
the Management of EU funds for Regional Development in Romania 
 
February 2008  Post-Academic Course: Introduction in Transport and Traffic 
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July 2001 Faculty of European Studies, BB University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania  
 diploma / degree: B.A  
description: Political Science/European Studies  
May 2001 Faculty of Law  
 diploma / degree: Certificate  
description: Exchange Law Student  
 
 
Trainings: 
Topic of Training Training deliverer Duration & 
Training date 
Location 
Management of Evaluation Jim Fitzpatrick, Niall 
McCann, David Hegarty 
April 17-18, May 16-17 
and 24-25 2006 
Bucharest, Romania 
Managing Phare Interim 
Evaluation Scheme  
ECOTEC Romania April-August 2006 
 
Bucharest, Romania 
Phare programming and 
Evaluation 
RO 2003/005-
551.03.03.04 
2-4 May 2006 Poiana Brasov, 
Romania 
Structural Funds 
Management in Hungary 
National Development 
Office, Budapest 
7-12 May 2006 Budapest, Hungary 
Structural Funds Overview: 
management, 
implementation, monitoring, 
evaluation, financial control  
John Bedingfield, Richard 
Harding  
6-8 June 2006 Bucharest, Romania 
Project Cycle Management Andrzej Bialowas  12-15 June 2006 Bucharest, Romania 
Evaluation of Structural 
Funds 
Italian Evaluation Unit 2-7 August 2006 Roma, Italy 
Implementing Structural 
Funds in Saxony, Germany 
 12-16 September 2006 Leipzig, Dresden, 
Germany 
Policy and Planning 
Evaluation (including CBA 
and MCA) 
National University of 
Ireland: Jim Fitzpatrick, 
Niall McCann, David 
Hegarty, Prof. Michael 
Cuddy 
18-24 September 2006 Galway, Ireland 
Mid-term and on-going 
evaluation of Structural 
Funds  
 7-9 November 2006 Budapest, Hungary 
Monitoring of Structural 
Funds Projects 
ECO 3 (European 
Consultants Organisation) 
12-15 February 2007 Sinaia, 
Romania 
Training on Transition Facility Phare RO 2003/005-
551.03.03.04   
15 – 17 February 2007 Sinaia, Romania 
Structural Instruments – 
Practical Course 
John Bedingfield, Richard 
Harding 
19-21 February 2007 Bucharest,Romania 
Training Seminar for 
Members of the Evaluation 
Plan Committees 
(including CBA and MCA) 
David Hegarty and Jim 
Fitzpatrik 
26 February 2007 Bucharest, Romania 
Lenglet et Paul Cardi – 
Twinning Experts 
27 February-1 March 
2007 
Bucharest, Romania Practical training on 
project management, 
payment and control  
Cost-Benefit Analysis  NEA/PANTEIA NL 08 – 11 May 2007 Sinaia, Romania 
 
 
Employment record: 
 
September 2007  -  Present : NEA Transport research and training, the Netherlands 
   EU Affairs and Evaluation Advisor 
March 2006  -  August 2007 : Ministry of Economy and Finance, Authority for the 
Coordination of         Structural Instruments/Evaluation Central Unit, Romania  
   Evaluation Expert 
January 2004  -  August 2004 : Regional Government, Flevoland, the Netherlands 
   In-service training, Management and 
implementation of Structural     Funds 
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 October 2001  -  March 2003 : Institute for Political Science, WW University Munster, 
Germany 
   Research assistant/ Coordinator of the International 
Relations Office 
 
Since September 2007 onwards (as NEA Employee) 
Project Coordinator of the Ex-post evaluation of INTERREG 2000-2006 Community Initiative, 
assigned by the European Commission DG Regio 
Evaluation Expert INTERACT Community Programme ex-post evaluation, assigned by the European 
Commission DG Regio 
Evaluation Expert In-depth analysis INTERREG 2000-2006 Community Initiative ex-post evaluation, 
assigned by the European Commission DG Regio 
Evaluation Expert, Impact Assessment of the INTERREG 2000-2006 Community Initiative, assigned 
by the INTERACT Programme Managing Authority  
Team Coordinator, Sofia Airport: Performance of Survey on Standard Weights of Passengers and 
Baggage, project assigned by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
Romania Country Expert: Assessment of the Transport Sector in Romania and Poland, 
Internationalisation and Labour Market 
Governance and Urban Issues Expert in the framework of the Urban Audit Analysis II, assessment 
commissioned by the European Commission DG Regio 
European Cross-Border Cooperation and Regional Development Expert,  Expert Network on Complex 
Border Regions, assigned by the Ministry of the German Community in Belgium  
Project preparation and appraisal expert, Project “Organising the collection of waste from IWT 
vessels in Romania” to be financed with EU structural funds from the SOP Transport Romania  
Country expert-Romania in the framework of the “Partners for Roads”, Programme of the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, directed at the National Companies for the management of Roads in 
new members states of the European Union  
Ex-ante evaluation of the Framework Document for the Implementation of the Sectoral Operational 
Programme Transport, Romania 
 
March 2006-August 2007, as Evaluation Expert within the Evaluation Central Unit, 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, Romania  
Project Manager of the Phare Interim Evaluation Scheme, 2 years evaluation project, budget: 2 
million Euro   
• drafting and assessing terms of reference,  
• project appraisal,  
• quality control of evaluation reports,  
• communication and dissemination of draft and final evaluation reports, 
• management of the follow-up process 
 
Evaluation expert involved in the co-ordination of the ex-ante evaluation of the seven Operational 
Programmes 2007-2013, which implement the European Structural Instruments in Romania 
(including the SOP Transport and SOP Environment), 1 year and a half project, budget 1,1 million 
Euro 
• support to the coordination of the ex-ante evaluation process (procedure and 
content), 
• coordination of Strategic Environmental Assessment process (SEA) for 
Convergence Objective,  
• quality control of evaluation reports, 
• design and management of institutional building actions for public administration, 
in the field of evaluation 
 
January 2004  -  August 2004: Regional Government, Flevoland, the Netherlands  
• assessing, selecting and guiding projects submitted for European Structural Funds 
co-financing (for all 5 major European Funds: ERDF, EAGGF, ESF, FIFG, Cohesion 
Fund) 
• monitoring  of the projects implemented by the EU funds beneficiaries 
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Language Reading Writing Speaking 
Romanian Mother Tongue Mother Tongue Mother Tongue 
English Excellent Excellent Excellent 
German Excellent Good Good 
French Excellent Good Good 
Dutch Excellent Good Good 
 
 
Certification: 
I, the undersigned, certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, these data correctly 
describe me, my qualifications and my experience. 
 
_______________________________________________ Date: __________________ 
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